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ABSTRACT: In this work, we investigate the security of interactive computa-
tions. The main emphasis is on the mathematical methodology that is needed
to formalise and analyse various security properties. Differently from many clas-
sical treatments of secure multi-party computations, we always quantify security
in exact terms. Although working with concrete time bounds and success prob-
abilities is technically more demanding, it also has several advantages. As all
security guarantees are quantitative, we can always compare different protocol
designs. Moreover, these security guarantees also have a clear economical in-
terpretation and it is possible to compare cryptographic and non-cryptographic
solutions. The latter is extremely important in practice, since cryptographic tech-
niques are just one possibility to achieve practical security. Also, working with
exact bounds makes reasoning errors more apparent, as security proofs are less
abstract and it is easier to locate false claims.
The choice of topics covered in this thesis was guided by two principles.
Firstly, we wanted to give a coherent overview of the secure multi-party com-
putation that is based on exact quantification of security guarantees. Secondly,
we focused on topics that emerged from the author’s own research. In that sense,
the thesis generalises many methodological discoveries made by the author.
As surprising as it may seem, security definitions and proofs mostly utilise prin-
ciples of hypothesis testing and analysis of stochastic algorithms. Thus, we start
our treatment with hypothesis testing and its generalisations. In particular, we
show how to quantify various security properties, using security games as tools.
Next, we review basic proof techniques and explain how to structure complex
proofs so they become easily verifiable. In a nutshell, we describe how to repre-
sent a proof as a game tree, where each edge corresponds to an elementary proof
step. As a result, one can first verify the overall structure of a proof by looking at
the syntactic changes in the game tree and only then verify all individual proof
steps corresponding to the edges.
The remaining part of the thesis is dedicated to various aspects of protocol
design. Firstly, we discuss how to formalise various security goals, such as input-
privacy, output-consistency and complete security, and how to choose a security
goal that is appropriate for a specific setting. Secondly, we also explore alterna-
tives to exact security. More precisely, we analyse connections between exact
and asymptotic security models and rigorously formalise a notion of subjective
security. Thirdly, we study in which conditions protocols preserve their security
guarantees and how to safely combine several protocols. Although composability
results are common knowledge, we look at them from a slightly different angle.
Namely, it is irrational to design universally composable protocols at any cost;
instead, we should design computationally efficient protocols with minimal us-
age restrictions. Thus, we propose a three-stage design procedure that leads to
modular security proofs and minimises usage restrictions.
KEYWORDS: asymptotic security, data authentication, exact security, homomor-
phic encryption, secure multi-party computation, sequential composability, sub-
jective security, time-stamping, universal composability.
TIIVISTELMA¨: Tässä työssä tutkitaan vuorovaikutteisen laskennan turvallisuutta.
Erityisesti painotetaan matemaattisia menetelmiä, joita tarvitaan erilaisten tur-
vallisuusominaisuuksien määrittelyyn ja analysointiin. Perinteisistä käsittelyta-
voista poiketen usean osapuolen laskennan turvallisuutta mitataan tässä työssä
tarkoilla suureilla. Vaikka tarkkojen rajojen käyttö arvioitaessa laskennallista
vaativuutta ja onnistumisen todennäköisyyttä on teknisesti vaativampaa, sillä on
myös useita etuja. Se tekee mahdolliseksi eri protokollien välisen vertailun.
Lisäksi, tällaisilla turvallisuuden mitoilla on selkeä kustannustaloudellinen tul-
kinta, mikä tekee mahdolliseksi vertailla salaustekniikkaa käyttävien ja muiden
tietoturvallisuusratkaisujen kustannuksia. Tällä on merkitystä käytännön kannal-
ta, koska salaustekniikkaan perustuvat menetelmät ovat usein vain yksi vaihto-
ehto käytännön turvallisuusjärjestelmiä toteutettaessa. Lisäksi tarkkojen rajo-
jen käyttö tekee turvallisuustodistuksista selkeämpiä ja siten helpottaa todistusten
päättelyvirheiden havaitsemista.
Tämän työn aiheiden valinta perustuu kahteen periaatteeseen. Ensimmäisen
mukaan tavoitteena on luoda johdonmukainen katsaus usean osapuolen lasken-
nan turvallisuuteen, joka perustuu turvallisuustakuiden tarkkaanmäärittämiseen.
Toisen periaatteen mukaan keskitytään tarkastelemaan aiheita, jotka ovat olleet
tekijän tutkimusten kohteena. Tässä väitöskirjassa esitetään yleistetyssä muodossa
monia tekijän tekemiä menetelmiä koskevia löydöksiä.
Niin yllättävältä kuin se tuntuukin, turvallisuuden määritelmissä ja todistuk-
sissa käytetään tilastollisen päättelyn ja stokastisten algoritmienmenetelmiä. Siksi
tämän työn aluksi tarkastellaan hypoteesien testausta ja sen yleistyksiä. Erityi-
sesti osoitetaan kuinka erilaisille turvallisuusominaisuuksille voidaan antaa nu-
meerinen arvo turvallisuuspelejä käyttäen. Seuraavaksi tarkastellaan todistuksen
perustekniikoita ja esitetään kuinka todistus tulee rakentaa, jotta se on helposti
todennettavissa. Kiteytettynä tämä tarkoittaa, että kuvataan turvallisuuspeli puu-
na, jonka jokainen kaari vastaa yksinkertaista askelta todistuksessa. Näin esitetty
todistus voidaan todentaa tarkastelemalla ensin sen syntaktista kokonaisraken-
netta ja sen jälkeen todentamalla jokaista puun kaarta vastaava todistusaskel.
Väitöskirjan loppuosassa tarkastellaan salausteknisten protokollien suunnit-
telun eri piirteitä. Ensiksi käsitellään erilaisten turvallisuustavoitteiden, kuten
syötteen yksityisyys, tuotoksen oikeellisuus ja täydellinen turvallisuus, täsmällistä
määrittelyä ja sitä, kuinka turvallisuustavoite tulee asettaa vastaamaan konkreet-
tista tilannetta. Toiseksi tutkitaan tarkan turvallisuuden vaihtoehtoja. Tarkem-
min sanottuna analysoidaan tarkan ja asymptoottisen turvallisuusmallin välisiä
yhteyksiä ja annetaan täsmällinen määritelmä subjektiiviselle turvallisuudelle.
Kolmanneksi tarkastellaan ehtoja, joilla protokolla säilyttää turvallisuusominai-
suutensa, ja kuinka useita protokollia voidaan yhdistää turvallisesti. Salausteknis-
ten protokollien teoriassa yhdistettävyyttä koskevat tulokset tunnetaan yleisesti,
mutta tässä työssä niitä tarkastellaan uudesta näkökulmasta. Nimittäin, ei ole
mielekästä rakentaa universaalisti yhdisteltävissä olevia protokollia mihin hin-
taan hyvänsä, vaan tuloksena olevien protokollien tulee olla tehokkaita ja käytön
rajoitusten niin pieniä kuin mahdollista. Tässä työssä esitetään kolmivaiheinen
menettely, jolla saavutetaan modulaariset turvallisuustodistukset ja minimaaliset
käytön rajoitukset.
AVAINSANAT: asymptoottinen ja tarkka turvallisuus, datan autentikointi, ho-
momorfinen salaus, turvallinen usean osapuolen välinen laskenta, peräkkäinen
yhdistettävyys, subjektiivinen turvallisuus, aikaleimaus, universaali yhdistettävyys.
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CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE AUTHOR
This thesis consists of a mini-monograph followed by four articles. The articles
were carefully selected out of seven articles published by the author to illustrate
the theoretical methodology developed in the first part of the thesis. In short,
this thesis gives a systematic overview of secure multi-party computations in the
framework of exact security. To the author’s knowledge, no similar work has been
published in cryptographic literature, although the need for such treatment is
apparent. We emphasise that the first part of the thesis is not just a summary but
contains several technical novelties and methodological advances:
• We develop a consistent methodology for quantifying the security of in-
teractive computations. The corresponding security definitions are much
more descriptive than classical asymptotic security definitions.
• We show that not all security proofs can be formalised as game chains
and explain how game trees and new deduction rules solve this problem.
Additionally, we describe how to verify the overall structure of a proof by
looking at the syntactic changes in the game tree.
• We are the first to consistently use time-success and risk profiles to charac-
terise quantitative properties of cryptographic reductions.
• We explicitly discuss intermediate levels of security between security in the
semi-honest model and complete security in the malicious model. Such
models provide cost-efficient solutions for many practical tasks.
• We establish a rigorous formalisation of subjective security. As a result,
one can formulate and prove security claims for individual public keys
and hash functions and thus escape limitations of classical formalisations.
• Finally, we show how to combine protocols with different composability
guarantees. The corresponding three-stage design methodology can signif-
icantly simplify the design of complex protocols.
The included articles [P1, P2, P3, P4] provide solutions to specific but practi-
cally important computational tasks and thus nicely illustrate different theoreti-
cal aspects covered in the first part of the thesis.
[P1]: Bart Goethals, Sven Laur, Helger Lipmaa, and Taneli Mielikäinen. On
Private Scalar Product Computation for Privacy-Preserving Data Mining.
In Choonsik Park and Seongtaek Chee, editors, Information Security and
Cryptology - ICISC 2004, 7th International Conference, Seoul, Korea,
December 2-3, 2004, Revised Selected Papers, volume 3506 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 104–120. Springer, 2004.
[P2]: Sven Laur and Helger Lipmaa. A New Protocol for Conditional Disclo-
sure of Secrets and Its Applications. In Jonathan Katz and Moti Yung, edi-
tors, Applied Cryptography and Network Security, 5th International Con-
ference, ACNS 2007, Zhuhai, 5-8 June, 2007, volume 4521 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 207–225. Springer, 2007.
x CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE AUTHOR
[P3]: Ahto Buldas and Sven Laur. Knowledge-Binding Commitments with Ap-
plications in Time-Stamping. In Tatsuaki Okamoto and Xiaoyun Wang,
editors, The International Conference on Theory and Practice of Public-
Key Cryptography, PKC 2007, Beijing, 16-20 April, 2007, volume 4450 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 150–165. Springer, 2007.
[P4]: Sven Laur and Kaisa Nyberg. Efficient Mutual Data Authentication Us-
ing Manually Authenticated Strings. In David Pointceval, Yi Mu, and
Kefei Chen, editors, The 5th International Conference on Cryptology and
Network Security, CANS 2006, Suzhou, Dec. 8-10, 2006, volume 4301
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 90–107. Springer, 2006.
The author has made significant contributions to all of the abovementioned arti-
cles. In short, the author derived most proofs and attacks in the article [P1]. The
basic methodology used in the article [P2] was also discovered by the author, al-
though the current exposition is a result of extensive joint work with H. Lipmaa.
Similarly, the author established the notion of knowledge-binding commitments
and corresponding reductions in the article [P3]. Finally, the original problem
statement and the initial solution in the article [P4] is due to K. Nyberg and
N. Asokan. However, the author derived all security proofs and made several
technical refinements that were essential for achieving provable security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Good design is always a trade-off between conflicting requirements regardless of
whether we talk about physical objects, such as buildings and devices, or mental
constructions, such as mathematical objects and computer programs. Some of
those design constraints are easy to describe and formalise, whereas others are
either subjective or inexplicable. Therefore, the design process itself is often a
mixture of creative and engineering steps and thus not completely expressible
using formal methodology. Nevertheless, we can use mathematical models as
powerful tools to formalise design requirements, to limit the search space and to
validate the resulting prototypes against objective constraints.
In this thesis, we describe how to formalise and analyse the security of dis-
tributed computations. Since a computational process is always inseparable
from physical phenomena that make it observable, simplifiedmathematical mod-
els, such as finite automata and Turing machines have their limitations. Namely,
some artefacts that are observable in theoretical models might not be present or
meaningful in practice. Therefore, we must make a constant conscious effort to
assure that theoretical models adequately represent the reality.
In particular, note that security as a concept cannot be viewed as a thing in
itself, rather it has a meaning only in a larger economical, political or military
context, where entities and organisations compete against each other. Conse-
quently, these entities have to withstand internal and external attacks in order to
achieve their goals. As reliable information transfer and processing are usually
among the key factors to success, we have to protect computations against wire-
tapping and device corruption. Essentially, there are three main types of pro-
tection methods: physical, organisational and cryptographic countermeasures.
Physical countermeasures limit the abilities of a potential attacker to compro-
mise critical computational processes. For example, servers that run mission
critical software are often located in physically guarded rooms. Organisational
countermeasures change the common process logic in order to demotivate po-
tential attackers, limit potential damage, or provide fail-safe recovery procedures.
For example, making regular back-ups from mission critical data can both limit
the potential damage and simplify the recovery procedure.
Cryptographic countermeasures are somewhat different, since they modify
the computational process itself and not the surrounding context. Although this
approach can be immensely flexible, there are certain inherent limitations. Most
importantly, cryptographic methods are applicable only in distributed settings.
Indeed, if an adversary gets full control over the computational process, then
he or she can ignore all cryptographic countermeasures built into the process.
Moreover, successful recovery from such attacks is impossible, as the adversary
can corrupt the entire internal state. In particular, note that back-up strategies
make sense only in a distributed setting, otherwise the adversary can corrupt the
back-ups, too. To minimise such risks, mission-critical processes are often di-
vided into well-isolated sub-processes or accompanied with unerasable logging
procedures. But the latter does not automatically imply that we need many com-
putational devices. In fact, we can still use a single device for all computations,
provided that a potential adversary cannot corrupt the entire device and all sub-
tasks look like different computational entities.
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We emphasise that one cannot achieve security without combining various
countermeasures against the attacks. In fact, one must find a proper balance
between various protection methods, otherwise a single weakness can make the
entire defence meaningless. In short, cryptographic countermeasures achieve
their purpose when attacks against non-cryptographic measures are more attrac-
tive to the adversary. In many cases, the cost of cryptographic countermeasures
is marginal compared to the other measures and thus people tend to use them as
cheap substitutes for real solutions. Although cryptographic constructions must
have an appropriate safety margin, it is impractical and wasteful to make them
overly strong compared to the other protection measures that users are willing to
accept. For the same reason, the total cost of countermeasures must match the
potential losses and sometimes the best strategy is to ignore threats.
To summarise, finding an appropriate balance between different protection
methods is mostly an economical decision that should be based on approximate
cost estimates. Unfortunately, precise estimation of potential losses and gains
currently resembles more to magic than science. In fact, we still cannot answer
even the simplest questions like what would it cost to break a modern 128-bit
block cipher, or when the use of 1024-bit RSA becomes a considerable liability
issue in e-commerce. Although such a sad state of affairs is really discouraging,
we should still try to capture practical requirements in theoretical models, or at
least try to develop solutions that are meaningful in practice.
1.1 CRYPTOGRAPHY AS AN ENGINEERING DISCIPLINE
Cryptography as a general term unites a wide spectrum of different subfields
ranging from empirical design of various base constructions to branches of pure
mathematics that focus on complexity theoretical aspects and fundamental lim-
itations in cryptography. Hence, there are many valid viewpoints and possible
research goals. In this thesis, we view cryptography mostly as an engineering dis-
cipline that should provide formal methodology for making economically sound
and scientifically justified decisions. More precisely, we study how to design pro-
tocols with desired properties using cryptographic primitives and how the achiev-
able security level depends on the properties of basic primitives. We are mostly
interested in the exact quantification of security and thus state all security guar-
antees in terms of concrete running times and success probabilities. Although
such a quantification does not directly reflect the corresponding monetary losses
and gains, we can easily overcome this by estimating the cost of computations
and the perceived utility of a successful attack. The corresponding cost estima-
tion phase is beyond our scope, since it is a purely economical problem. Nev-
ertheless, the existence of such transformations is important, as it gives a clear
interpretation to all security estimates and allows us to compare cryptographic
and non-cryptographic countermeasures.
In many cases, it is beneficial to combine cryptographic and non-crypto-
graphic countermeasures. Consequently, our formalismmust be flexible enough
to model a wide range of security goals and adversarial powers. Moreover, none
of these theoretical models is a priori better than the others, since the corre-
sponding costs and gains depend on practical details. A solution that is tuned for
a particular setting may be completely unsuitable for other settings. As a result,
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there are literally hundreds, not to say thousands, of meaningful security models.
Since we cannot treat each model separately, we must limit ourselves to the most
important aspects that are shared by most of the models.
In particular, it makes sense to use the same formal model of interactive com-
putations. Although all standard formalisations are based on Turing machines,
there are some technical details that make Random Access machines more ap-
pealing. We remark here that the difference is only in exact resource consump-
tion and both models are qualitatively equivalent, see Chapter 2. Also, note that
security properties are commonly described in terms of computational indistin-
guishability or advantage. Both notions have their origins in statistics. Chapter 3
covers essential properties of hypothesis testing that are necessary to quantify and
analyse various security properties. Moreover, the knowledge of these basic con-
cepts is sufficient to carry out most common security proofs as long as we abstract
away all complexity theoretical details.
We can always specify complex constructions in terms of abstract primitives
that are known to satisfy certain functionality and security guarantees. In other
words, we actually specify a template that can be instantiated by replacing ab-
stract primitives with practical constructions. Therefore, the corresponding se-
curity proofs are free from implementation details and rely mostly on the ele-
mentary probability theory. Of course, the complexity theoretical problems do
not disappear entirely. They re-emerge as soon as we try to establish whether a
concrete realisation of an abstract primitive indeed satisfies the necessary secu-
rity requirements or not. However, the latter is the main concern of primitive
design and thus beyond our scope.
Such an approach leads to a hierarchy of cryptographic abstractions. At the
lowest level of this hierarchy, we find many low level primitives that formalise
our current beliefs and knowledge about computational complexity. For ex-
ample, we can talk about abstract Diffie-Hellman groups and abstract sets of
RSA composites that formalise certain complexity theoretical beliefs about the
hardness of discrete logarithm and integer factorisation. Again, we must use
the common methodology of primitive design to establish whether such abstract
constructions can be implemented in practice. Primitives that realise some well-
specified functionality, such as encryption or authentication, are often specified
in terms of lower level primitives. For example, ElGamal and Rabin encryp-
tion schemes are built on top of Diffie-Hellman groups and RSA composites.
The next abstraction level consists of lower level protocols that are designed and
optimised for well-specified tasks, such as authentic message delivery or entity
identification. These basic protocols can be combined in order to achieve more
complicated tasks like online banking and digital rights management. The hi-
erarchy of abstractions continues—we can combine these protocols to achieve
even more complex tasks. Since there are so many different levels, it is essential
to have a flexible formalism that makes it easy to change the levels of abstraction,
otherwise we are either trapped in the ocean of unnecessary technical details or
the viewpoint is too coarse for performance optimisations.
Still, many proofs are inherently complex, even if we choose a correct ab-
straction level, and occasionally we must increase the granularity to discover
performance bottlenecks. In these cases, we must handle proofs that are tens, if
not hundreds, of pages long. For obvious reasons, such proofs quickly become
unmanageable, unless they are extremely well structured. Ideally, these proofs
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should be automatically verifiable. Such a goal seems extremely hard to achieve,
as cryptographic proofs are often based on complex reductions and thus require
creative manipulation of probabilities. In Chapter 4, we explore this issue fur-
ther and show that all proofs share the same meta-structure. Any proof can be
formalised as a game tree, where each edge corresponds to an elementary proof
step. Although each elementary proof step itself may rely on complex reasoning,
it is easy to describe the related syntactical change in the game. More impor-
tantly, proof steps that lead to the same kind of syntactic changes also reuse
the same proof template. Therefore, we can formalise such steps as reduction
schemata. Notably, the total number of reduction schemata is rather limited,
since each primitive introduces few elementary reduction schemata and other
more complex reductions can be expressed as mixtures of those.
As reduction schemata abstract away complex technical details, the resulting
proof skeleton is compact and easily verifiable. In fact, a person who applies
reduction schemata does not have to know the exact technical details as long as
he or she applies reduction schemata correctly. In short, derivation of security
proofs is mostly an engineering task, whereas formalisation and systematisation
of reduction schemata requires a deeper understanding of cryptography. We
believe that such a representation of basic concepts brings us closer to computer-
aided design of complex cryptographic primitives and protocols. The need for
such design assistants becomes self-evident when we compare cryptography to
other engineering disciplines, where hundreds or even thousands of general and
special purpose design programs are routinely used by engineers. Although there
are many experimental protocol analysers, most of them put too much effort on
automatic derivation of proofs. The author believes that the latter is a secondary
goal and the most critical part is a human readable representation of proofs and
the ability to apply various reduction schemata without errors. Of course, the
development of such a computer environment is a major undertaking and it
may take several man-years to achieve significant progress.
1.2 INTRODUCTION TO CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOL DESIGN
A conceptual difference between cryptographic primitives and protocols lies in
the security guarantees. Primitives are designed to preserve security in few well-
defined scenarios, whereas protocols must resist different attacks aimed at differ-
ent targets. Often, there are literally thousands and thousands of potentially rel-
evant security goals and we cannot analyse them separately. Instead, we should
compare different protocols πα and πβ for the same functionality. Beaver was
the first to state the corresponding resilience principle [Bea91a]:
If any adversary attacking piα cannot gain more information or wield more in-
fluence than when it attacks piβ , then piα is at least as secure and reliable—i.e.
as resilient—as piβ .
Evidently, a protocol πα attains a maximal security level if πα is as resilient as any
other protocol πβ that correctly implements the same functionality. As a direct
comparison with any other imaginable protocol πβ is infeasible in practice, we
must use a methodological shortcut. Namely, we can easily define an ideal
implementation π◦ that is as resilient as any other protocol πβ . Since resilience
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is transitive by definition, it is sufficient to compare only protocols πα and π◦
to establish optimality. The corresponding real versus ideal world paradigm is a
central methodological approach in cryptographic protocol design.
However, the exact nature of these security guarantees depends onmany tech-
nical details. Most importantly, we must define comparability between attacks
against real and ideal world implementations. In particular, note that participa-
tion in a protocol is economically justified if potential gains outweigh associated
risks. Thus, we must assure that all relevant economical aspects are also cap-
tured by the ideal implementation, otherwise real and ideal implementations
are not truly comparable. In Chapter 5, we study this problem thoroughly in
the simplest stand-alone setting, where a protocol is executed in isolation and
the adversary cannot use external information. Although the resulting security
definitions are equivalent to the standard formalisations [Can00a, Gol04], our
treatment also reveals underlying causes why the definitions must be formalised
in such a way.
Again, note that an appropriate solution for a specific task is often a balanced
mixture of cryptographic and non-cryptographic measures. Therefore, different
applications utilise different cryptographic properties. In Chapter 5, we describe
the most common security objectives. We start from the semi-honest model,
where all participants follow the protocol, and finish with the malicious model,
where the set of malicious participants can arbitrarily deviate form the protocol.
Since we consider input-privacy and output-consistency in addition to complete
security, we obtain four security models that capture the most essential secu-
rity requirements. Although practical settings are often more complex, they are
usually just intelligent variations of these basic models.
The biggest advantage of the stand-alone setting is conceptual simplicity,
which makes it easy to formalise and analyse various security objectives. How-
ever, the corresponding security models explicitly assume that adversaries are iso-
lated from external influences. The assumption rarely holds in practice, where
protocols are commonly used as subroutines to achieve more complex goals.
Hence, it is essential to know which computational contexts preserve the secu-
rity of the protocol. First, if we know the corresponding usage restrictions, we
can combine various protocols without unexpected consequences. Secondly,
usage restrictions are actually security guarantees that describe when it is secure
to execute a protocol. Since the whole computational context is often unknown
to the participants, it is important to state usage restrictions in local terms. We
emphasise that there is a natural trade-off between usage restrictions and the ef-
ficiency of a protocol. In other words, we cannot rank protocols only according
to the usage restrictions, since protocols with the most liberal usage restrictions
might have sub-optimal performance and unjustified deployment costs.
Although it is relatively straightforward to understand what a computational
context is, the corresponding formalisation is cluttered with many tedious techni-
cal details. Hence, we try to present the complex computational model as mod-
ularly as possible in Chapter 7. We also study the true limitations of stand-alone
security and establish the corresponding usage restrictions. Briefly, stand-alone
security is sufficient for all computational contexts, as long as we are willing
to assume that all external participants1 are corrupted during the protocol. Al-
1More formally, external participants are parties that do not participate in the protocol.
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though the result is a minor enhancement of classical sequential composability
theorems [Ore87, Can00a], it bears a huge conceptual significance. Namely, it
implies that stand-alone security is sufficient for all end-to-end applications that
treat all external participants as enemies.
However, the corresponding usage restrictions are also quite limiting, since
participants in a stand-alone secure protocol cannot perform any side-computa-
tions during the execution of the protocol. As a result, we obtain a centralised ex-
ecution model that treats the whole network as a single virtual processor. Since
network-wide synchronisation is often impossible or causes significant perfor-
mance penalties, we need protocols with more liberal usage restrictions. Sur-
prisingly, we can significantly relax usage restrictions for stand-alone secure pro-
tocols as soon as the correspondence between real and ideal world adversaries
satisfies certain structural restrictions already suggested in early works [Bea91b,
MR91b]. In fact, such protocols are called universally composable, as they pre-
serve security in any reasonable context. Moreover, all-or-nothing results by Lin-
dell [Lin04] indicate that a general class of protocols with simple and natural
usage restrictions consists of protocols that are either secure only in the stand-
alone model, or universally composable.
The structural restrictions mentioned above are difficult to fulfil. In fact, it
is impossible to achieve universal composability when honest participants are in
minority, i.e., malicious participants have more control over the protocol than
the coalition of honest parties. Fortunately, there is a loophole that allows us to
bypass the all-or-nothing nature of usage restrictions. Namely, we can often lo-
cate critical regions in a stand-alone protocol that must be executed in isolation,
whereas the other regions are indeed universally composable. Consequently,
our task is to minimise the duration and count of these critical regions without
losing the overall efficiency. Chapter 7 covers also the corresponding three-stage
design methodology and studies protocols with a trusted setup.
As a final detail, note that cryptographic protocol design borrows many con-
cepts from hypothesis testing and thus it also inherits many limitations of clas-
sical statistics. In particular, classical statistics describes only average-case be-
haviour and cannot be used for analysing individual experiments. Analogously,
classical cryptography describes only collective security properties and fails when
we want to analyse the security of specific instances. In other terms, design
and usage of cryptographic protection measures are two separate things. As an
illustrative example, consider a nation-wide public-key infrastructure. A well-
designed signature scheme assures that the number of weak signing keys and
potential monetary risks are negligible for the organisation that issues keys for all
individuals. However, the latter does not imply that a particular signing key is
secure to use. In fact, we cannot even formalise the corresponding design goal
by using classical statistics. The latter is a serious drawback as a key holder is only
interested in the security level provided by his or her signing key. In Chapter 6,
we show how to formalise such security goals by using the notion of subjective
probability. While we acknowledge that such concepts and security goals are
somewhat non-standard in cryptographic literature, the resulting formalism is
mathematically sound and well-aligned with practice.
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1.3 BENEFITS OF FINITE SET POLICY
There are many ways to obtain mathematically sound security definitions; exact
quantification of security properties is only one of them. In particular, various
asymptotic security models are widely used in theoretical cryptography, since
these models are well aligned with complexity theory and also hide many tire-
some technical details. Nevertheless, there are several compelling reasons why
we should stick to exact quantification of security. First, connections between
theoretical results and practical consequences are significantly weaker and we
must address the limitations already raised by Yao [Yao82]:
In this theory, the complexity of a computational problem is measured by the
asymptotic behaviour of algorithm as the input length becomes large. To apply
the theoretical result to input of a particular length, we tacitly assume that this
length is large enough that the asymptotic results can be used.
Secondly, asymptotic behaviour can be surprisingly brittle and counterintuitive.
Misunderstanding of limiting processes has created countless errors and para-
doxes throughout the history of mathematics. There is no reason to believe that
cryptography or computer science are special in that respect and thus we should
always follow the finite set policy [Jay03]:
Apply the ordinary process of arithmetic and analysis only to expressions with
a finite number of terms. Then, after the calculation is done, observe how the
resulting finite expressions behave as the number of terms increases indefinitely.
Less formally, we first formulate models with precise bounds and only then
observe limiting behaviour. Indeed, violation of this simple principle has lead to
subtle errors or inconsistencies in cryptography. For example, aesthetic reasons
urged theoreticians to consider also algorithms that run in expected polynomial
time, see [Gol07] for further discussion. As a result, we have now at least four
different notions of polynomial security, which are incompatible. Tomake things
worse, several important results, such as composability theorems, do not hold for
all of these models, see the first half of Chapter 6. At the same time, there exists
basically one finite security model and we can safely apply a theorem as soon as
all quantitative requirements of the theorem are satisfied.
Another notorious example is the definition of universal composability. De-
pending on subtle details in definitions, some important equivalence results ei-
ther hold or not, see the discussion in [Can00b]. In fact, there are at least four
different asymptotic definitions of universal composability [DKMR05], whereas
there is a single finite security model for universal composability. All these results
clearly demonstrate that skipping the finite modelling step is dangerous.
Finally, we remark that many asymptotic models use a complex limiting pro-
cess over several variables to characterise many aspects in a single stroke. For
example, a zero-knowledge proof can be characterised by the complexity of
the statement to be proved and three other quantitative properties: correctness,
soundness and zero-knowledge property. However, the corresponding asymp-
totic model is unidimensional and thus many details that are important in prac-
tice are erased by an inherent dimension reduction.
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1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE AUTHOR
This thesis has a slightly non-standard structure. Most theses are either mono-
graphs or contain a brief summary and a listing of published articles, whereas
this thesis consists of a monograph followed by a few selected articles. Such a
choice was made mostly because the author felt compelled to first systematically
present essential theoretical concepts and then use the articles as illustrations for
the covered topics. The author believes that such a systematic approach is jus-
tified, since an engineering view on cryptography is currently underrepresented
in mainstream literature. Although exact quantification of security properties is
quite common in cryptographic primitive design, the corresponding formalisa-
tions are often very application specific. Moreover, all standard treatments of
secure multi-party computations [MR91b, Can00a, Can00b, Gol04] are based
on asymptotic settings and do not place results into a larger economical context.
Hence, the need for systematical treatment of exact security is real and hope-
fully this thesis is a step to the right direction. Also, most of the topics covered
in this thesis are closely connected with the problems that the author has faced
in his research. However, we put the main emphasis on the methodological is-
sues, since protocol design itself becomes a mundane engineering task as soon
as methodological issues are resolved and design criteria are fixed.
As this thesis covers many essential results, it is somewhat difficult to sep-
arate the author’s original contribution from prior art. Therefore, we list the
most important novelties and their connections to the author’s published arti-
cles. Conceptually, the most important novelty is an engineering viewpoint to
cryptographic protocol design and the coherent use of exact security guarantees
throughout this thesis. Differently from standard treatments, we use hypoth-
esis testing as a main tool and design a primitive or a protocol only from ab-
stract primitives that completely formalise all relevant security properties. Such
an approach allows us to present proofs in a more systematic manner and use
(semi-)formal methods to derive and verify security proofs. The corresponding
formalism established in Chapter 4 is a novel addition to game-playing proofs
popularised by Shoup and Rogaway, see for example [Sho04, BR06]. First, we
demonstrate that some security proofs cannot be converted to game chains and
show how to formalise these proofs by using game trees. Although such proofs are
quite rare in primitive design, they are often required in the security analysis of
protocols. In fact, the author experienced these limitations by analysing authen-
tication protocols in [LN06] and the proof methodology presented in Section 4.4
is just a direct generalisation of the techniques used in [LN06]. Secondly, we go
one step further than the standard game-playing proofs [Sho04, BR06] and show
how to abstract away all technical details and express the skeleton of the proof
via syntactic changes formalised as reduction schemata. The approach differs
from classical security calculi, as the proof skeleton is informative enough to re-
construct all technical details, including the bounds on advantages and running
times. The author has found the corresponding formal approach invaluable for
deriving and verifying technically complex reductions such as [LP08].
Thinking in terms of reduction schemata forces us to generalise individual
proof steps into parametric proof templates. The corresponding meta-level anal-
ysis often reveals analogies between proof steps that are formulated for com-
pletely different primitives, but use technically identical arguments. For exam-
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ple, the author’s study of specific collision extraction techniques [KLL06, BL07]
has shown that the corresponding security analysis deals with a certain combina-
torial problem. Hence, the results obtained in [KLL06, BL07] are not specific
to a certain primitive; but can be used in the contexts of hash functions, com-
mitment schemes, proofs of knowledge and digital signatures. We acknowledge
here that these results contain mostly technical improvements, but the generality
and optimality of the obtained bounds has a definite engineering value.
Time-success and risk profiles introduced in Chapters 4 and 5 is another
methodological advance that improves our understanding about cryptographic
reductions. In many security proofs, we must choose between alternative reduc-
tion methods, which lead to incomparable security guarantees. Consequently,
we need amethodology for comparing radically different reduction strategies. Al-
though the problem caught the author’s attention already in the article [BL07],
the issue was fully resolved during the preparation of the manuscript [KLL06]
that lead to the current formalisation presented in Section 4.2.
Also, note that standard formalisations of secure multi-party computations
just postulate the security criterion without explaining whether it also makes
sense from an economical viewpoint. Now, considering the problem in terms
of time-success and risk profiles provides an elementary explanation why these
security definitions are meaningful in the economical context as well.
As the third methodological advance, we explicitly discuss intermediate se-
curity levels between security in the semi-honest model and complete security
in the malicious model. Such models provide cost-efficient solutions for many
practical settings. In particular, we have studied many privacy-preserving data
mining tasks [GLLM04, LLM05, LLM06] that become practically intractable
in the malicious setting, if we want to achieve complete security. Still, we can
guarantee the privacy of inputs by using the techniques developed in the ar-
ticle [LL07]. Moreover, we have shown that one can detect cheating with a
significantly lower overhead than is needed for complete security [LL06].
Another, more debatable but still conceptually novel enhancement by the
author is a rigorous formalisation of subjective security. In Chapter 6, we de-
fine the corresponding notion and explain why classical security definitions are
inadequate for certain settings. Moreover, we also explain why random oracle
or generic group models provide only subjective security guarantees and why all
standard arguments, such as [CGH04b], against these models are unconvincing.
A final and probably the most important methodological advance is a co-
herent and practice-oriented treatment of modular protocol design. Differently
from the standard approach, we treat universal composability as a tool and not as
the final aim. In particular, we present an efficient three-stage design method-
ology that significantly simplifies the construction of complex protocols without
losing efficiency. The corresponding design process often leads to protocols that
share the same trusted setup phase. As all classical composability theorems are
inadequate in such settings, we must use more fine-grained methods. The cor-
responding methodology presented in Section 7.7 is a direct generalisation of
proof methods used in the article [LL07], where we proved composability the-
orems for very specific two-round protocols with a shared key generation phase.
Similar theoretical concerns emerge also in the articles [LN06, LP08] where
protocols are proved to be secure in the common reference string model.
On the choice of selected articles. As explained above, the first part of this
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thesis covers and generalises the most important methodological advances made
by the author. Thus, we include only four articles [GLLM04, LN06, BL07,
LL07] out of eight publications into this thesis. This does not mean that the
remaining four publications [LLM05, BL06, LLM06, LP08] are technically less
sound or otherwise inferior. Neither was the choice based on the author’s impact
on the articles. The author has made a significant contribution to all eight arti-
cles. The choice was made mainly on the basis that the selected articles illustrate
certain theoretical aspects and methods more vividly.
Published articles cover three different sub-fields of protocol design: privacy-
preserving data mining, time-stamping and message authentication. To be pre-
cise, we consider only such tasks of privacy-preserving data mining that are spe-
cial instances of secure multi-party computation. In a nutshell, we assume that
the data is split between several participants and they want to learn global pat-
terns in the data without revealing more information than absolutely necessary.
Many data mining algorithms are based mostly on linear vector and matrix op-
erations. Therefore, private evaluation of scalar products is one the most im-
portant tasks in privacy-preserving data mining and many authors have used ad
hoc methods to solve the problem. The first included article [GLLM04] shows
that these ad hoc protocols are not only cryptographically insecure but can com-
pletely reveal the private input if used in practical applications.
We remark here that ad hocmethods are still widely used in privacy-preserving
data mining, since cryptographic solutions are practically infeasible and people
are actually willing to reveal more information during the execution than ab-
solutely necessary. Consequently, the cryptographic models must be flexible
enough to model various trade-offs between privacy and efficiency, in order to
be useful. See Section 5.4 for the corresponding remarks. At the same time, the
article [GLLM04] also emphasises that small leakages can accumulate and cause
total disclosure and thus one must be extremely careful with such specifications.
As a positive application of cryptographic techniques, we show that scalar prod-
ucts can be privately computed by using homomorphic encryption. Moreover,
the follow-up articles [LLM05, LLM06, LL07] use homomorphic encryption to
implement more complex privacy-preserving tasks.
The second included article [LL07] presents a general methodology for eval-
uating complex predicates by using homomorphic encryption. More precisely,
we study a hybrid security model, where the owner of the private key is mali-
ciously corrupted but all opponents are guaranteed to be semi-honest. We show
that complex protocols can be methodically designed by using three elementary
operations based on homomorphic encryption. In terms of Chapter 7, we estab-
lish that these protocols are universally composable even if they share the same
trusted setup phase. We also show how to enhance the security of semi-honest
protocols so that they become secure in the hybrid model described above. Al-
though the article presents methodology for certain two-round protocols, the
methodology can be generalised for more complex protocol classes.
The third included article [BL07] explores various properties of time-stamping
schemes. Briefly, a time-stamping scheme is a multi-party protocol that imple-
ments an unalterable digital register of events. As such, time-stamping must be
based on binding commitments, such as hash trees. However, state of the art
results [BS04] indicate that not all binding commitments are suitable for time-
stamping. More formally, there exists a binding commitment scheme that is not
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provably secure for time-stamping if one considers only black-box reductions. In
this article, we prove that bounded list and set commitment schemes are suffi-
cient for time-stamping. Moreover, our security definitions are more precise and
well aligned with the ideal versus real world paradigm. Secondly, the article also
provides a nice example of how white-box reduction techniques can be built on
top of constructive combinatorial arguments.
The last included article [LN06] contains practical protocols for manual data
authentication and manual key agreement. The article was greatly motivated by
the recent advances in wireless communication. Nowadays, many handheld de-
vices, such as cell phones, music players, keyboards send and receive data over
wireless links and are thus vulnerable to active attacks. Moreover, practical lim-
itations prevent the use of pre-shared keys or public-key infrastructure. Hence,
we can assure authenticity only with the help of human operators who trans-
fer short messages from one device to another. The article presents protocols for
message authentication and key agreement that achieve a maximal security level
in such settings. Moreover, these protocols are now used in the Bluetooth and
Wireless-USB standards, see the discussion in [LN06].
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2 COMMON NOTATION AND BASIC CONCEPTS
History has repeatedly shown that notation is extremely important in mathemat-
ics. Hence, we try to make the notation as simple and mnemonic as possible.
Sometimes we intentionally omit details that can be grasped from the context.
On the other hand, many authors try to capture all details and leave no room for
misinterpretation. Although such presentation is pleasingly rigorous, it is often
tedious, not to say boring and incomprehensible. We, readers, tend to have a
limited amount of memory and thus exposing all details often makes the nota-
tions so complex that it overshadows the concepts behind them.
Modern cryptography is built on various subfields of mathematics and com-
puter science, such as computational algebra, complexity theory, probability the-
ory and statistics. As this thesis considers only the design of cryptographic pro-
tocols, we can narrow the set of necessary mathematical concepts and build the
theory on basic properties of algorithms, reductions, probability and hypothesis
testing. Surprisingly, we can actually abstract away all complexity theoretical de-
tails and provide a clean conceptual design of protocols for many tasks without
any knowledge of complexity theory. We emphasise here that we still need com-
plexity theoretical conjectures to reason about security. However, these com-
plexity theoretical conjectures come into play later, when we must construct
cryptographic primitives used in the design.
Next, we briefly list basic notations and then discuss the central concepts,
such as models of computation and probability, more thoroughly.
2.1 BASIC MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS
Functions and domains. Cryptography deals mostly with discrete transforma-
tions; real-valued functions are used only in the security analysis. As usual the
set of all finite bit strings is denoted by {0, 1}∗. The set of finite bit string se-
quences is denoted by {0, 1}∗∗ and is identified with {0, 1}∗. Therefore, any
uniquely determined discrete transformation can be viewed as a deterministic
function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ regardless of how many arguments the trans-
formation has. Some discrete transformations are randomised. A randomised
function is defined as f : {0, 1}∗ × Ω → {0, 1}∗, where Ω is a corresponding
sample space and the output f(x) : = f(x;ω) depends on the random choice
ω ∈ Ω. A randomised function without explicit arguments X : Ω → {0, 1}∗ is
known as a discrete random variable. We always assume that the random choices
for different functions are independent unless explicitly specified otherwise.
Distributions and probability. Randomised functions are inherently non-
deterministic, as the random choice ω is not known ahead. Probability the-
ory provides qualitative methods for assessing the corresponding uncertainty.
Usually, the probability is formalised according to the axiomatisation given by
Kolmogorov [Bil95]. The latter requires a formal definition of measurable sub-
sets F(Ω) and the corresponding probability measure Pr [·] : F(Ω) → [0, 1].
Fortunately, we can omit these measure theoretical details and give a more el-
ementary definition for discrete random variables and functions. Any discrete
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distribution can be viewed as a random variable X : Ω → {0, 1}∗ together
with a sequence of non-negative numbers (px)x∈{0,1}∗ such that px = 0 for all
x /∈ X(Ω) and ∑
x∈X(Ω)
px = 1 . (2.1)
Usually, one can only observe the output X(ω) and not the underlying random
choice ω ∈ Ω. Therefore, we can limit our attention to externally observable
events X(ω) ∈ A where A ⊆ {0, 1}∗ and define the probability measure as
Pr [ω ← Ω : X(ω) ∈ A] : =
∑
x∈A
px . (2.2)
The equations (2.1) and (2.2) assure that the corresponding probability measure
is indeed well-defined and satisfies Kolmogorov’s axioms.
To simplify notation, we use the following conventions. A shorthand x← X
denotes that x is chosen according to the distribution X . Since a randomised
function f : {0, 1}∗ × Ω → {0, 1}∗ defines a distribution Fz(ω) = f(z;ω)
for every input z, we can use analogous shorthand y ← f(z) to denote that y
is chosen according to the distribution Fz. Finally, let A be a finite subset of
{0, 1}∗ consisting of n elements. Then a shorthand x ← A denotes a uniform
distribution over A, i.e., Pr [x← A : x = a] = 1
n
for all a ∈ A.
Asymptotics and time complexity. Cryptographic proofs often contain many
lower or upper bounds. In many cases, we are only interested in the asymptotic
behaviour of these bounds. Then so called Landau notation can significantly
simplify the derivation and the form of corresponding bounds.
Let f and g be non-negative functions that are defined over the positive real
numbers. Then f(x) = O(g(x)) denotes that there exists constants c, x0 > 0
such that f(x) ≤ c · g(x) for all x > x0. Similarly, f(x) = Ω(g(x)) denotes
that there exists constants c, x0 > 0 such that c · g(x) ≤ f(x) for all x > x0.
Now f(x) = Θ(g(x)) stands for f(x) = O(g(x)) and f(x) = Ω(g(x)). Finally,
symbols o(·) and ω(·) denote differences in the growth rates: f(x) = o(g(x)) if
f(x)/g(x)→ 0 and f(x) = ω(g(x)) if f(x)/g(x)→∞, as x→∞.
Asymptotic behaviour can be studied in two different contexts. First, we can
investigate how the exact security bounds of the basic primitives influence the
overall security of a particular construction. For example, we can characterise
how a discovery of a new more efficient factoring algorithm influences the over-
all security if a construction is based on 1024-bit primes. Secondly, we can
consider construction families that are indexed by a security parameter k and
observe asymptotic behaviour of security guarantees as a function of k. Such an
approach helps us to choose optimal constructions for specific security levels. In
particular, we can consider various complexity classes for different time bounds.
A time bound f(k) is polynomial if f(k) = O(kc) for c > 0 and polylogarithmic
if f(k) = O(log(k)c) for c > 0. The corresponding shorthands are f ∈ poly(k)
and f ∈ polylog(k). Similarly, a function ε(k) is asymptotically negligible de-
noted by ε ∈ negl(k) if it decreases faster than a reciprocal of any polynomial,
i.e., ε(k) ∈ o(k−c) for all c > 0. We deliberately emphasise the asymptotic na-
ture of this notion and reserve the term negligible for values that are insignificant
in practice, say less than 2−80. Similarly, overwhelming probability is a constant
sufficiently close to 1 and not an asymptotic notion.
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2.2 DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF PROBABILITY
Most of the cryptographic security definitions are explicitly based on the con-
cepts of hypothesis testing. Therefore, cryptography also inherits many problems
and shortcomings from statistics. In particular, we must interpret probabilities.
Interpretation of probabilities is by no means an easy and unambiguous task as
there are at least five different interpretations. Basic differences of interpretations
concern objectivity or subjectivity of probabilities.
Imagine that you throw an unbiased coin. Then objective probability de-
scribes the potential of seeing heads and subjective probability your rational
opinion about the odds of seeing heads. In particular, the objective probabil-
ity disappears when the coin has landed even if you do not see it. The subjective
probability can exist also after the landing provided that you do not see the out-
come. In other words, objective probability describes a potential that realises in
the future, whereas subjective probability can handle completed events with un-
known outcomes. In that sense, objective probability describes always collective
properties—characteristics of possible future events—and subjective probability
individual properties—characteristics of a fixed event. This conflict between in-
dividual and collective properties is an unresolved theme in statistics.
Frequentists believe that probability is an inherently collective property of
distributions that manifests itself as a limiting relative frequency of independent
repeated trials. This line of thought was initiated by Cournot, Venn and Ellis
in the middle of the 19th century. These ideas were extended further by von
Mises in 1919 who explicitly stated that probability is a property of infinite se-
quences (collectives) that satisfy certain conditions. In particular, all “admissibly
selected” sub-sequences must have the same limiting frequency as the sequence
itself, i.e., no gambler can devise a winning strategy with fixed bets. Such a
strong form of frequentism was refuted in 1937 by the contemporary mathemati-
cians, as the theory had several “inconsistencies” and Kolmogorov had provided
a better alternative in 1933, see [Fie92, vL96, Bin00, Sti86, LV97] for further
comments and historical remarks. Such development boosted the popularity of
mathematical statistics as a more liberal branch of frequentism and it became
a prevalent school of thought. Starting from seminal works of Pearsons, Ney-
man and Fisher the main emphasis shifted to the design inference procedures
(algorithms) that behave well on average over the distributions.
To illustrate the tension between objective and subjective probability in the
context of cryptography, consider the security of a cryptosystem. Recall that
a cryptosystem is a collection of sub-instances indexed by a randomly chosen
secret key. In particular, we can fix an optimal attack algorithm and ask how well
the cryptosystem as a collection of sub-instances survives the attack on average.
Such a frequentistic viewpoint is appropriate in the design and evaluation of
cryptosystems. Assume that an attack succeeds with negligible probability on
average. Then by the law of large numbers, we expect that only a tiny, not to say
non-existent, fraction of users to suffer from the attack. However, if we take the
position of a user then the tables are turned. A user could not care less about the
overall security as long as his or her particular sub-instance is immune against
the attacks. Such a problem is ill-posed in the frequentistic setting: the secret
key has already been chosen, we just do not know if the particular key is easier
or harder to break than the average key.
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To answer the questions about individual instances, it is inevitable to accept
the notion of subjective probability. This line of thought was started by Bayes
and was later rediscovered by Laplace. According to them, the probability is a
quantitative measure of uncertainty that can be rationally updated by observing
empirical data. During the early twenties and thirties of the 20th century the
notion subjective probability was intensively studied by economists and math-
ematicians. Keynes and Ramsey were the first to propose formal theories that
treated probability as a measure of uncertainty. The process was later completed
by de Finetti who showed in 1937 that any rationally behaving entity must as-
sign prices to bets that confirm Kolmogorov’s axioms and satisfy Bayes’ theorem.
These results were later reproved by Savage in 1954 and Cox in 1961 under dif-
ferent but natural assumptions about rational behaviour. We refer to [Fie05] for
an excellent treatment of historical developments and to [Jay03, Jef04, BT92] for
a thorough treatment of subjective probability.
Essentially, there are two schools of Bayesianism. In statistics the main goal
is objectivity and thus the objective Bayesianism tries to minimise the impact of
the subjectivity and make the end results universally acceptable. The subjective
Bayesianism makes no efforts to achieve objectivity and is more common in
economics and game theory, where the buyers or players may indeed have biased
but still rational preferences. Since all individual decisions about a particular
choice of cryptographic primitives can and should be treated in the framework
of economical game theory, we follow the school of subjective Bayesianism.
Finally, we emphasise that both interpretations of probabilities and their cor-
responding extensions in cryptography are equally important. The objective
treatment is a natural choice when we assess the general design of cryptographic
solutions, whereas one cannot avoid subjectivity if we want to make theoretically
well-founded user level decisions, see the thorough discussion in Chapter 6.
2.3 BASIC PROPERTIES OF RANDOM VARIABLES
Independence and product space. Two random variables X : Ω1 → {0, 1}∗
and Y : Ω2 → {0, 1}∗ are independent if the corresponding random choices are
independent. Formally, we must form a joint sample space Ω = Ω1 × Ω2 with
random variables X(ω1, ω2) : =X(ω1) and Y (ω1, ω2) : =Y (ω2) such that
Pr [X ∈ A ∧ Y ∈ B] : =Pr [ω1 ← Ω1 : X ∈ A] · Pr [ω2 ← Ω2 : Y ∈ B] .
(2.3)
Alternatively, we can postulate that two random variables X and Y defined over
the same sample space Ω are independent if for all events A and B
Pr [ω ← Ω : X ∈ A ∧ Y ∈ B] = Pr [ω ← Ω : X ∈ A] · Pr [ω ← Ω : Y ∈ B] .
(2.4)
Conditional probability. Let random variables X = X(ω) and Y = Y (ω) be
defined over the same sample space Ω. Then the conditional probability of the
event that X ∈ A given that Y ∈ B is defined as
Pr [X ∈ A|Y ∈ B] : = Pr [ω ← Ω : X(ω) ∈ A ∧ Y (ω) ∈ B]
Pr [ω ← Ω : Y (ω) ∈ B] (2.5)
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provided that the denominator is not zero. In the Bayesian framework, a short-
hand Pr [X ∈ A|Y ∈ B] quantifies a subjective belief that X ∈ A when Y ∈ B
is known to hold and a priori it is not clear that the equation (2.5) must hold.
Nevertheless, it is possible to prove that the famous Bayes’ theorem
Pr [X ∈ A ∧ Y ∈ B] = Pr [X ∈ A|Y ∈ B] · Pr [Y ∈ B] (2.6)
and all other Kolmogorov axioms still hold for any rational belief system, see the
handbooks [Jay03, Jef04] for further details. In other words, all manipulation
rules are formally the same for objective and subjective probabilities.
Statistical distance. Let X and Y be random variables. Then statistical dis-
tance (also known as statistical difference) between X and Y is defined as
sd(X,Y ) : = sup
A⊆{0,1}∗
|Pr [X ∈ A]− Pr [Y ∈ A]| , (2.7)
where the probabilities are computed over the corresponding distributions. It is
straightforward to prove that statistical difference has an alternative form1
sd(X,Y ) =
1
2
·
∑
x∈{0,1}∗
|Pr [X = x]− Pr [Y = x]| (2.8)
and thus can be viewed as ℓ1-norm. Hence, it also satisfies the triangle inequality
sd(X,Z) ≤ sd(X,Y ) + sd(Y, Z) . (2.9)
Intricate connections between statistical distance and hypothesis testing and
their extensions to computationally bounded cases are discussed in Chapter 3.
Random tape model. Many cryptographic models use coin-flipping as the
only source of randomness, i.e., the probability space is Ω∗ = {0, 1}∗ where
each consecutive binary digit ωi ∈ {0, 1} is generated by flipping a fair coin.
Note that it is fairly straightforward to show that any discrete distribution can be
constructed in such a way. That is, for any sequence of non-negative numbers
(px)x∈{0,1}∗ that satisfy the equation (2.1) there exists X : Ω∗ → {0, 1}∗ such
that Pr [X = x] = px. Moreover, the random variable X can be approximated
with arbitrary precision using enough coin-flips. More formally, we can define a
sequence of random variablesXn : Ω∗ → {0, 1}∗ such thatXn(ω) depends only
on the first n coin-flips (ω1, . . . , ωn) and sd(Xn, X)→ 0, as n→∞.
Surprisingly, a similar result holds in general. The Skorohod Representation
Theorem assures that any probability distribution on an arbitrary set X can be
represented as a random variable X : Ω∗ → X . See the handbook [Bil95] for
further details. Such a result is philosophically very pleasing, as it implies that
the random tape model can still adequately represent reality.
1The sum on the right is absolutely convergent, since all terms are non-negative and the sum
can be upper bounded by 2.
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2.4 DIFFERENT FORMAL MODELS OF COMPUTATION
Computability is another central concept in cryptography, which is essentially a
science of secure communication and computation. The notion of computabil-
ity emerged in the first half of 20th century during the systematisation and re-
evaluation of the foundations of mathematics. Initially, the emphasis was on
the limitations of formal proof systems but later the attention turned to fully au-
tomatic derivation of numeric results. The remarkable breakthrough came in
1936 when Alonzo Church and Alan Turing independently showed that it is im-
possible to algorithmically decide whether a certain claim holds in arithmetic or
not [Chu36, Tur37]. Both authors postulated that a rather simple model can be
used to describe any fully mechanistic computational processes.
These postulates were quickly accepted and the corresponding thesis explic-
itly stated by Stephen Kleene [Kle43]. The Church-Turing thesis states that all
“imaginable” algorithmic computations can be specified by Turing machines.
Of course, the Church-Turing thesis can never be proved, since the notion of
“imaginable” algorithmic computations is inherently vague.
We emphasise that the Turing machine is only a mathematical abstraction
that allows us to formally model some aspects of modern computational devices.
In the light of all known and foreseeable technologies, it is impossible to actually
construct a Turing machine. The problem lies in the fact that Turing machine
is an infinite object, whereas the observable universe is finite.2 Briefly, a Turing
machine is only a simple model of a modern computing device and not the other
way around. Moreover, in many situations Random Access Machines reflect
reality more precisely than Turing machines.
Turing Machines. A Turing machine can be viewed as a finite automaton
with access to an infinite stack of memory cells. The stack is usually modelled
by a one-sided infinite tape and a moving head that can read or write symbols
underneath it. The movement of the head is controlled by an automaton with
a finite number of states and a finite set of transition rules. A transition may
depend on the symbol read by the head and it can specify a replacement symbol.
However, the controller must be deterministic, i.e., there can be only a single
transition rule for each state and a symbol underneath the head. A more formal
treatment of Turing machines is given in textbooks [Pap93, HMU00].
Nevertheless, some peculiarities of Turing machines are worth stressing. By
common convention, the running time of a Turing machine is just the number
of transitions made by the controller before halting. In other words, the speed
of an elementary read-write operation is independent of the size of finite con-
troller. Therefore, for any predicate f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} there exist a Turing
machine that outputs the correct answer for any input x ∈ {0, 1}n in n steps.
Basically, we can hardwire the binary search for the 2n element truth table. The
corresponding 2n+1 state finite controller finds the right entry in the truth table
2Astrophysicist have estimated that the mass of the Universe ranges from 1053–1060 kg. Even
if the Universe is infinite, then our current knowledge indicates that mankind can observe only
a finite portion of the Universe during a finite time interval. Therefore, all modern computing
devices are actually finite automatons whether we like it or not.
Another justification comes from the fundamental von Neumann-Landauer limit [Lan61]:
any logically irreversible bit operation leads to unavoidable energy dissipation. Hence, only a
finite number of logically irreversible operations can be carried out.
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Figure 2.1: A schematic model of a computational node in a network
with n steps and outputs the corresponding result. More generally, any function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m can be computed in n+m steps.
To resolve the issue, we fix a universal Turing machine and require that any
algorithm must be specified as a read-only bit-string (program code) on the spe-
cial input tape. Such a model coincides with the non-uniform complexity model
where the Turing machine is fixed but one can feed a special advice string that
depends only on the input size n. Alternatively, we can directly penalise the Tur-
ing machine based on the size of the hardwired program. Interestingly enough,
the latter leads to circuit complexity, as the computational logic can be com-
pletely encapsulated in the controller design. Although circuit complexity pro-
vides a better insight into how well an algorithm can be parallelised, the corre-
sponding formalism is also much more difficult to understand.
Random Access Machines. Although Turing machines have no limits on the
amount of accessible memory, it takes time to move the head to a random loca-
tion. Often such linear memory access cost is not justified, since modern com-
puting devices provide a large chunk of volatile memory that can be randomly
accessed in a constant time. Similarly, read and write operations of modern
hard disks can be considered location independent. Consequently, if a program
has a small enough memory footprint, then a Random Access Machine (RAM
machine) models computations more precisely. Recall that a RAM machine
consists of a finite controller (processor) that can manipulate an infinite array
of registers by sequentially processing a finite hardwired program. Informally,
a RAM machine is just a program in some assembler dialect, i.e., it can do ba-
sic arithmetic operations with registers and conditional jumps. More formal
definitions of RAM machines together with comparison to other computational
models can be found in textbooks [Smi94, WW01, HMU00]. Similarly to Tur-
ing machines, we fix a single universal RAMmachine to avoid an artificial speed
up that is caused by hardwired binary search techniques.
Standardised interface. Although the computing process itself is handled dif-
ferently by universal Turing and RAMmachines, it is still possible to standardise
how these computing nodes interact with the surrounding environment. Briefly,
only three types of external events can influence computations: random choices,
messages from other computing devices and timer interrupts. In the following,
we gradually specify all these aspects of interaction, see Fig. 2.1.
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Randomised computations. A computing node has two one-sided read-only
input tapes: one for program code and one for randomness ω ∈ Ω∗. It also
has a one-sided read-write tape for input and output. Given a code of A, an
input x and a random tape ω, the interpreter U starts to execute code. The
computation ends successfully if the input is replaced by the output A(x;ω)
and U halts in the canonical end configuration. Otherwise, the output of A is
denoted by ⊥. An algorithm A is deterministic if no cells from the random tape
ω are read. A randomised algorithm A can access a prefix of ω proportional
to running time. Hence, we can talk about output distribution of A and the
distribution of running time t(ω) together with all statistical estimators.
Interactive aspects of computing. Besides classical input tapes a comput-
ing node has a pair of read-write tapes: one for communication and the other
for timer services. The communication tape is connected to a network switch.
A network switch is a dedicated machine that delivers messages between differ-
ent nodes. More formally, a network switch has access to all communication
tapes and whenever a new message is output by a node, it determines the recip-
ient, copies the messages to the communication tape of the recipient and sends
a notification message to the sender after that. Obviously, a certain communi-
cation protocol between nodes and network switch must be fixed, or otherwise
some messages may get lost or infinitely delayed. Let us neglect the exact details
and just postulate properties of a correct implementation: (a) no messages are
dropped, inserted or modified; (b) each node has a physical network address; (c)
a node always waits for a notification message that indicates a successful transfer;
(d) messages are transferred in the same order as they are created.
Note that the actual time needed to copy messages is linear in the size of
the message, whereas the network delay depends on the exact configuration and
behaviour of the network. Finally, reliable point-to-point networking is only a
stepping stone: more complex network topologies such as non-reliable and asyn-
chronous communication can be built on top of the basic network layer.
Complexity theoretical setting. Turing and RAM machines model the tim-
ing aspects of computations differently, as they use different models of memory.
More precisely, a random memory access takes Θ(n) elementary operations for
Turing machines and Θ(1) operations for RAM machines, where n is the size
of the memory bank. Neither of these estimates is truly accurate, as we can
arrange memory cells into a three dimensional lattice. Thus, the maximal phys-
ical distance between two memory cells is Θ( 3
√
n) and the corresponding access
time is o(n). Consequently, Turing machines overestimate and RAM machines
underestimate the actual time needed to compute the outcome.
These time differences are irrelevant in the classical complexity theoretical
setting that neglects polynomial factors. Although such an approach hides many
tedious details, the resulting estimates are often too crude in practice. For ex-
ample, algorithms with a quadratic asymptotic complexity are considered in-
tractable in the context of large numerical computations, whereas algorithms
with worst-case exponential complexity are successfully used in compilers. In
reality, the tractability of an algorithm depends on the number of required ele-
mentary steps. Moreover, the effective time bound depends on the context. It
can range from 10–1018 elementary operations depending whether it is a mission
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critical real-time software or an earthquake prediction algorithm.
Secondly, setting up a correct asymptotic feasibility definition is not a straight-
forward task at all, since there are so many choices. Often these choices are ir-
relevant and lead to equivalent descriptions, whereas sometimes they make a big
difference, see the discussion in manuscripts [Can00b, Gol07]. To avoid such
surprises, we persistently operate with exact time bounds and consider asymp-
totic behaviour whenever complexity theoretic results are needed.
Exact time complexity. Unfortunately, the definition of a Turing machine is
not robust if we consider exact time complexity. Namely, the running times
of different algorithms depend on whether a Turing machine has zero, one or
more than one internal working tape, see the discussion and further references
in [LV97, p. 432–444]. Although the difference in running times can be at most
quadratic, it is still very noticeable in practice. The same effect emerges also
when the computations are divided between several Turing machines. Then the
whole network has more working tapes at its disposal than a single Turing ma-
chine. Consequently, simulating an interactive computation on a single Turing
machine takes significantly more time steps than the total running time of all
the nodes in the network. Hence, the running time of an attack depends on
whether an attacker controls a single or a cluster of Turing machines. Of course,
the overhead is only polynomial in the total running time it but makes security
analysis more complex. Hence, we state security results only for RAMmachines,
as they are more robust in terms of exact time complexity.
Let A be an algorithm, that is, a finite program code for the universal RAM
machine. Then the running time of A is counted as follows. First, the program
code of A is red command by command to the main memory. Next, the pro-
gram is interpreted according to a fixed instruction set such as [CR72, p. 75].
Each basic operation should require time at least proportional to the bit-length
of the corresponding operands. Otherwise, we get paradoxical results such as
a factoring algorithm that works in linear time in the input size [Sha79]. Now
the exact time complexity of an algorithm can be defined either in a strict or
liberal sense. An algorithm A is a t-time algorithm in the strict sense if A always
halts after t elementary steps regardless of inputs and random coins. In reality,
computations are often halted based on an external clock, i.e., the output of A
is set to ⊥ when the time limit t is exceeded. The latter gives a rise to the liberal
definition of t-time computations that is used throughout the thesis.
Obviously, the definitions can be generalised to Turing machines but then
one must explicitly fix the number of Turing machines controlled by an attacker
and the number of working tapes inside a Turing machine.
Time-bounded subroutines. Most of the cryptographic proofs are based on
black-box reductions, where an algorithm B calls an algorithm A as a subroutine
to complete its task. Now the liberal definition of t-time computations causes a
slight trouble. Imagine that a t-time routine A succeeds with probability 1
2
and
otherwise stays in the infinite loop. Then B that calls A must stop the subroutine
A after t steps, or otherwise B also stays in the infinite loop. Obviously, such an
external clock can be included into B with the cost of polynomial slowdown.
However, such slowdown is highly undesirable in our setting. Thus, we include
timers explicitly into the computational model. Note that algorithms can use
many timers, since subroutines can also call subroutines with timers.
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For clarity, we use an infinite timer model, where an algorithm can set po-
tentially unbounded number of timers. If a timer is fired then the algorithm is
stopped and an interrupt handler is called. More formally, an algorithm B can
always write an address L of an interrupt handler and a time bound t on the
dedicated timer tape. Given L and t, the timer decreases t until it reaches zero.
Then the execution is continued from the Lth command of B.
Even more formally, an external clock is a dedicated machine with a single
timer t, an address register L and a potentially infinite stack containing time
difference and address pairs (∆ti,Li). The external clock is coupled with the
interpreter and each elementary step decreases the value of t until it reaches
zero. If the timer value reaches zero, then the interpreter seeks the Lth command
from the code and continues execution from it. Next, the timer and the address
registers are updated by the topmost pair (∆ti,Li) in the stack. If the stack is
empty then the external clock waits for a an incoming query (ti,Li) to update
the timer and address registers. If a query (ti,Li) arrives and the timer is already
activated, then the clock computes ∆t = t − ti. If ∆t ≤ 0 then the query
is discarded, otherwise the values (∆t,L) are pushed on top of the stack and
registers (t,L) are replaced by (ti,Li). As a final detail, note that computation
of∆tmust take into account the time needed to do all computations connected
to stack updates to get timer interrupts at precise time moments.
The discussion above also shows that the infinite timer model is just a con-
venience and adversaries cannot use the timers for speeding up their compu-
tations. Indeed, the use of timers cannot cause a significant speedup, as the
external clock can be realised by a single Turing or RAM machine.
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3 HYPOTHESIS TESTING
One of the main objectives in cryptography is confidentiality. Throughout his-
tory various encryption schemes have been used to scramble communication
so that eavesdroppers cannot reconstruct the original messages. However, some-
times even partial message recovery can be as disastrous as full disclosure. Gener-
ally, secrecy is preserved only if an adversary cannot reject or accept non-trivial
hypotheses about secret inputs given access to public outputs. Thus, we must
formalise secrecy goals in the framework of hypothesis testing.
More formally, let s be a secret input and f(s) the corresponding public out-
put x where f is a publicly known randomised function. Then we can state at
least one trivial hypothesis s ∈ {0, 1}∗ and many non-trivial hypotheses such
as s ∈ {1, 4, 7}. We say that H is a simple hypothesis if it uniquely deter-
mines the output distribution, i.e., probabilities Pr [x|H] are well-defined for
any x ∈ {0, 1}∗. For obvious reasons, any hypothesis can always be represented
as a union of simple hypotheses. Therefore, we start with a question of how to
choose between two simple hypothesesH0 orH1 and then gradually extend the
approach to consider more and more complex settings.
3.1 SIMPLE HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Statistical tests. Assume that an adversary must choose one of two simple
hypotheses H0 or H1. A statistical test A : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} is a randomised
predicate that specifies whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis H0. The
rejection probability of H0 is often denoted by φ(x) = Pr [A(x) = 1]. A sta-
tistical test A can make two types of errors: false negatives and false positives.1
The ratio of false negatives is commonly denoted by α(A) and the ratio of false
positives is denoted by β(A). In other words
α(A) = Pr [A(x) = 1|H0] , (3.1)
β(A) = Pr [A(x) = 0|H1] . (3.2)
A common task in statistics is to find a strategy A that minimises the ratio of false
positives β(A) given a bound on false negatives α(A) ≤ α0. A statistical test A∗
is optimal w.r.t. the bound α0 on false negatives if
β(A∗) = inf {β(A) : α(A) ≤ α0} . (3.3)
The most obvious way to choose between hypothesesH0 andH1 is based on the
likelihood of outputs. This test is known as the likelihood ratio test :
φlrt(x) =


1 if Pr [x|H0] < η · Pr [x|H1] ,
ρ if Pr [x|H0] = η · Pr [x|H1] ,
0 if Pr [x|H0] > η · Pr [x|H1] .
(3.4)
Observe that α(φlrt) decreases monotonically when η ∈ [0,∞) is decreased and
ρ ∈ [0, 1] only determines how the ties are handled, see Fig. 3.1. Hence, for any
1Due to historical reasons, statisticians use terms Type I and Type II Errors instead.
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Figure 3.1: Likelihood ratio test. Decreasing η moves the decision border to
the right and thus decreases α(φlrt) and increases β(φlrt). The aggregate error
γ(φlrt) is minimised when it coincides with the double crossed area.
α0 there exists a likelihood ratio test that achieves α(φlrt) = α0. Moreover, the
famous Neyman-Pearson Theorem states that the likelihood ratio test is optimal
and every optimal test is functionally indistinguishable from the corresponding
likelihood ratio test. See statistical handbooks such as [CB02] for more details.
Depending on the task at hand, the adversary can either reduce the ratio of
false positives α(A) by increasing the ratio of false negatives β(A) or vice versa.
Although different tests can provide different trade-offs, we can still establish
lower bounds for the aggregate error γ(A) = α(A) + β(A). Indeed, define a
statistical distance betweenH0 andH1 w.r.t. the output x as
sdx(H0,H1) = sup
A
|Pr [A(x) = 1|H0]− Pr [A(x) = 1|H1]| . (3.5)
Then γ(A) of a statistical test A is lower bounded as follows:
γ(A) = 1 + Pr [A(x) = 1|H0]− Pr [A(x) = 1|H1] ≥ 1− sdx(H0,H1) .
(3.6)
The inequality (3.6) also provides nice geometrical proof that the formula (2.8)
indeed computes the statistical distance. By the construction
γ(φlrt) ≥
∑
x∈{0,1}∗
min {Pr [x|H0] ,Pr [x|H1]} (3.7)
where the equality holds for parameters η = 1 and ρ = 1
2
. Again, by geometrical
considerations the right hand side of (3.7) can be expressed as the formula (2.8).
Since the likelihood test is optimal, the formulae (2.7) and (2.8) must be equal.
Computational tests. Although Fig. 3.1 correctly illustrates properties of op-
timal statistical tests, it is also slightly misleading. Namely, not all distribution
pairs have a simple decision boundary nor are the probabilities Pr [x|Hi] effi-
ciently computable. In short, likelihood ratio tests are often intractable and thus
it makes sense to consider only computationally feasible tests. Random variables
X and Y are (t, ε)-indistinguishable if for any t-time algorithm A
AdvindX,Y (A) = |Pr [x← X : A(x) = 1]− Pr [y ← Y : A(y) = 1]| ≤ ε . (3.8)
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We emphasise that the computational effort needed to create a sample x is irrel-
evant, as the running time of A depends only on its input and not on the way
the input was created. The computational distance cdtx(H0,H1) between two
hypotheses H0 and H1 w.r.t. the variable x is the minimal value2 of ε such that
the corresponding distributions are (t, ε)-indistinguishable. Observe that there is
a correspondence between statistical and computational distance:
sdx(H0,H1) = lim
t→∞
cdtx(H0,H1) . (3.9)
Secondly, we can easily derive a new triangle inequality
AdvindH0,H2(A) ≤ AdvindH0,H1(A) + AdvindH1,H2(A) , (3.10)
from the classical triangle inequality |a− c| ≤ |a− b| + |b− c| by substituting
a = Pr [A(x)=1|H0], b = Pr [A(x)=1|H1] and c = Pr [A(x)=1|H2] into it.
As the inequality holds for any algorithm A and any time bound t, we have
cdtx(H0,H2) ≤ cdtx(H0,H1) + cdtx(H1,H2) . (3.11)
Thirdly, note that if H0 and H1 determine different distributions, there exists a
value x0 such that Pr [x0|H0] 6= Pr [x0|H1]. Consequently, an algorithm Ax0
that outputs 1 only if x = x0 and 0 otherwise achieves
AdvindH0,H1(Ax0) = |Pr [x0|H0]− Pr [x0|H1]| > 0 . (3.12)
Now, if the time bound t is large enough to compare an input x and the hard-
wired constant x0, then the operator cdtx(·, ·) is positively definite
cdtx(H0,H1) > 0 ⇐⇒ H0 6≡ H1 . (3.13)
As cdtx(·, ·) is clearly symmetric, we have indeed established that cdtx(·, ·) is a
distance measure between output distributions for sufficiently large t.
3.2 NEGLIGIBLE EVENTS AND SEMANTIC SECURITY
Computational distance between H0 and H1 characterises the selectivity of fea-
sible computational tests. If A is a t-time test then analogously to the inequal-
ity (3.6) we can prove a lower bound γ(A) ≥ 1 − cdtx(H0,H1). However, the
bound on aggregate error is very non-intuitive. Hence, we pose the question
differently and ask whether the best feasible computational test is worth imple-
menting at all. Here, we view cryptology as a tool to make economically sound
and scientifically justified decisions. Usually, decisions are made by ignoring
events with insignificant probabilities. For example, a probability of an airplane
crash is roughly 2−23 but most of us are still willing to use air transportation.
More formally, let negligible denote a threshold for probabilities such that
a change of probability by a negligible amount does not affect economical de-
cisions. Clearly, the threshold depends on the exact setting. Nevertheless, the
famous Borel’s Law gives some rough estimates: probability 2−20 is negligible
on the personal scale, probability 2−50 is negligible on the terrestrial scale and
2Since there are only finite number of t-time algorithms, the minimum always exists.
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probability 2−166 is negligible on the cosmic scale [Bor62]. Note that many au-
thors use the term negligible also for characterising the asymptotic growth rate
of variables. In such settings, we always use the term asymptotically negligible
in order to avoid confusion, see Section 2.1 for the precise definition.
Let us now return to simple hypothesis testing and consider the classical sce-
nario where the null hypothesis H0 holds with a probability Pr [H0] ≥ Pr [H1].
Then a t-time test A provides a correct answer with probability
Pr [success] = Pr [H0] · Pr [A(x) = 0|H0] + Pr [H1] · Pr [A(x) = 1|H1]
≤ Pr [H0] + Pr [H1] ·
(
Pr [A(x) = 1|H1]− Pr [A(x) = 1|H0]
)
≤ Pr [H0] + Pr [H1] · cdtx(H0,H1) .
(3.14)
Now Pr [success] = Pr [H0] for a trivial test A∗ ≡ 0 and the optimal t-time test
A can exceed the trivial success probability only by cdtx(H0,H1). Consequently,
the effort needed to implement A is not justified if cdtx(H0,H1) is negligible.
Simple hypothesis testing is often inadequate for many real world scenarios.
Usually there are many plausible secret inputs s instead of two alternatives and
a partial disclosure of secrets is also harmful. Thus, given a public input f(s)
it should be infeasible to reliably predict the output g(s) for any non-constant
function g. Such inability to infer non-trivial information about secret inputs is
called semantic security. The corresponding security notion was first proposed
by Goldwasser andMicali in the context of probabilistic encryption [GM82] and
later extensively studied by others [Yao82, MRS88, Lub96, BDJR97].
The concept of semantic security can be modelled in the framework of hy-
pothesis testing. Let g(·) be a deterministic function. Then any hypothesis about
g(s) naturally splits all plausible values of s into two sets S0 and S1 so that the
null hypothesis H0 holds for all s ∈ S0 and the complementary alternative hy-
pothesis H1 for all s ∈ S1. Strictly speaking, the hypotheses H0 and H1 alone
do not determine the output distribution and we must assume the existence3 of
some unknown probability distributions over S0 and S1. Then the simple hy-
pothesis testing scenario still adequately describes the process and the inequal-
ity (3.14) holds wheneverPr [H0] ≥ Pr [H1]. Note that we can only upper bound
the value of cdtx(H0,H1), as the distributions on S0 and S1 are unknown. Let
H[s=si] denote an elementary hypothesis that s = si for i ∈ {0, 1}. Then
cdtx(H0,H1) ≤ sup
si∈Si
cdtx(H[s=s0],H[s=s1]) , (3.15)
since we can upper bound |Pr [A(x)=1|H1]− Pr [A(x)=1|H0]| by∑
s0∈S0
∑
s1∈S1
Pr [s0] · Pr [s1] · |Pr [A(x) = 1|s1]− Pr [A(x) = 1|s0]| (3.16)
and upper bound the absolute value by supsi∈Si cd
t
x(H[s=s0],H[s=s1]). By com-
bining the inequalities (3.14) and (3.15), we obtain the final upper bound
Pr [success] ≤ Pr [H0] + Pr [H1] · sup
si∈Si
cdtx(H[s=s0],H[s=s1]) . (3.17)
3In our context, such a semi-Bayesian assumption is completely natural although orthodox
statisticians would use the notion of universally most powerful tests instead.
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The inequality (3.17) holds also for randomised functions g(s) = g(s;ω) when
the random choices of f(s) and g(s) are independent. For proof, we must just
consider elementary hypothesesH[s=si,ω=ωi] instead ofH[s=si], repeat the deriva-
tion and use the independence assumption to verify
cdtx(H[s=s0,ω=ω0],H[s=s1,ω=ω1]) = cdtx(H[s=s0],H[s=s1]) . (3.18)
Finally, consider the scenario where an adversary does not test hypotheses but
predicts the output of g : {0, 1}∗ → {0, . . . , n} instead. Let Hi denote the
hypothesis g(s) = i and Si = {s : g(s) = i}. For simplicity, assume Pr [H0] ≥
Pr [Hi] for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then we can derive
Pr [success] ≤ Pr [H0] +
n∑
k=1
Pr [Hi]·
(
Pr [A(x)=k|Hk]− Pr [A(x)=k|H0]
)
,
where the terms in the parenthesis are again averages over unknown but existing
distributions. Obviously, we can test A(x) = k in time O(log n) and thus
|Pr [A(x)=k|Hk]− Pr [A(x)=k|H0]| ≤ sup
si∈Si
cdτx(H[s=s0],H[s=sk]) , (3.19)
where τ = t+O(log n). Therefore, we can conclude
Pr [success] ≤ Pr [H0] + Pr [¬H0] · sup
s0,s1
cdτx(H[s=s0],H[s=s1]) , (3.20)
where the supremum is taken over all possible secret inputs. To summarise,
we have established that for any function g(s) with a reasonable output length,
the inability to distinguish simple hypotheses implies the inability to predict the
output significantly better than choosing the most probable output. Hence, we
have established the classical result that indistinguishability implies semantic
security. Still, note that the proof technique is strictly non-constructive and the
function g(·) itself can be intractable. The latter is somewhat different from the
strictly constructive approach pursued in the article [BDJR97]. We re-examine
these issues in Sections 6.6 and 6.7 in the context of subjective security.
3.3 INTERACTIVE INFERENCE AND SECURITY GAMES
Thus far we have considered non-interactive inference where an adversary has no
control over public outputs. This model is adequate only if the adversary is an ex-
ternal party in the computational process, for example listens to network traffic or
breaks into a computational node after the computations have been completed.
Alternatively, the adversary can actively participate in the computations and thus
influence the sampling procedure itself. Such interactive scenarios are known as
games or experiments. Although games have been implicitly around since 1982
when Goldwasser, Micali and Yao first used hybrid arguments [GM82, Yao82],
a more formal treatment of games is rather recent. It gradually emerged together
with the notion of exact security and reached its maturity around 2004, when
several game-playing proof methodologies [BR04, Sho04, Hal05] were explic-
itly outlined. In some sense, this was an inevitable change forced by the ever-
growing complexity of cryptographic proofs and the nit-picking argumentation
style demanded by exact security.
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Although the basic ideas behind game-playing proofs are rather simple, it
is always nice to start with illustrative examples. Various security definitions of
public-key cryptosystems are a good starting point, since they have a simple struc-
ture and are still complex enough to illustrate all the basic ideas.
Security of cryptosystems as an example. A public-key cryptosystem is spec-
ified by three efficient randomised algorithms Gen,Enc,Dec. A key generation
algorithm Gen outputs a key pair that consists of a secret key sk and a public key
pk. Two other algorithms Encpk : M → C and Decsk : C → M ∪ {⊥} are
used to encrypt and decrypt messages. SetsM and C are known as message and
ciphertext spaces, respectively. A cryptosystem is functional if, for all key pairs
(pk, sk)← Gen and messagesm ∈M, the equality
Decsk(Encpk(m)) = m (3.21)
holds with overwhelming probability. Message and ciphertext space can depend
on the public key pk. Moreover, the decryption algorithm Decsk(·) can return
an error value ⊥ if non-ciphertext is used as an input.
Now, there are many security definitions for cryptosystems but all of them are
formalised using specific attack scenarios. Goldwasser and Micali were the first
to formalise the weakest classical security notion as indistinguishability under
chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA security), see [GM84]. In a chosen plaintext
attack, an adversary A has partial control over the encrypted messages. The
corresponding attack scenario is formally captured by security games G0 and G1
that have oracle access to a stateful adversarial algorithm A.
GA0
(sk, pk)← Gen
(m0,m1)← A(pk)
c← Encpk(m0)
return A(c)
GA1
(sk, pk)← Gen
(m0,m1)← A(pk)
c← Encpk(m1)
return A(c)
Since random variables GA0 and GA1 describe the output of A under two different
hypotheses, we can generalise the indistinguishability definition. We say that a
cryptosystem is (t, ε)-IND-CPA secure if for any stateful t-time adversary A
AdvindG0,G1(A) = |Pr [GA0 = 1]− Pr [GA0 = 1]| ≤ ε . (3.22)
Sometimes an adversary has limited access to the decryption procedure and thus
can conduct chosen ciphertext attacks. Therefore, we can also consider indistin-
guishability under chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA security). There are two
possible formalisations: IND-CCA1 security proposed by Naor and Yung [NY90]
and IND-CCA2 security proposed by Rackoff and Simon [RS91]. The corre-
sponding indistinguishability games are very similar to the IND-CPA games ex-
cept A has black-box access to oracles O1 and O2.
GA0
(sk, pk)← Gen
(m0,m1)← AO1(pk)
c← Encpk(m0)
return AO2(c)
GA1
(sk, pk)← Gen
(m0,m1)← AO1(pk)
c← Encpk(m1)
return AO2(c)
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In the IND-CCA2 games both oracles O1 and O2 decrypt inputs, i.e, Oi(cˆ) =
Decsk(cˆ). To avoid trivial attacks, the game is halted with ⊥ if A submits the
challenge ciphertext c to O2. In IND-CCA1 game, the oracle O1 decrypts inputs
and O2 does nothing. A cryptosystem is (t, ε)-IND-CCA1 or (t, ε)-IND-CCA2
secure if for any t-time adversary A the inequality (3.22) holds.
Basic properties of games. Formally, a game is a two-party protocol between
an honest challenger G and a malicious adversary A that satisfies some special
rules. Most importantly, the challenger and the adversary are executed in turns,
so that they are not active at the same time. The game is started by G that
sends some message to A and then stops. Next A wakes up reads the message,
composes a reply and stops. Then G wakes up, reads the message, composes a
reply and stops, and so on. The ping-pong with messages continues until either
A halts with ⊥ or G halts with out ∈ {0, 1,⊥}. The output of the game GA is
out, unless A outputs ⊥ then GA = ⊥. Note that such a ping-pong execution
ensures that A cannot measure the computational effort made by the challenger
and thus eliminates the possibility of timing-based side-channel attacks.4
Now it is straightforward to generalise the notion of computational distance
to games. The computational distance cdt⋆(G0,G1) between games G0 and G1 is
the minimal value ε such that for any t-time algorithm A
AdvindG0,G1(A) = |Pr [GA0 = 1]− Pr [GA1 = 1]| ≤ ε . (3.23)
The asterisk in the symbol cdt⋆(·, ·) emphasises the fact that the resulting interac-
tion pattern may vary depending on the actions of the adversary. Clearly, cdt⋆(·, ·)
is a semi-distance, as it is symmetric and the triangle inequality
cdt⋆(G0,G2) ≤ cdt⋆(G0,G1) + cdt⋆(G1,G2) . (3.24)
follows from the basic triangle inequality |a− c| ≤ |a− b| + |c− b| similar to
the inequality (3.11). Again, we can define statistical distance as a limit
sd⋆(G0,G1) = lim
t→∞
cdt⋆(G0,G1) . (3.25)
We say that games G0 and G1 are equivalent if sd⋆(G0,G1) = 0, since any adver-
sary A has an equal probability to win both games G0 and G1. Again, we can
set restrictions for the games so that for large enough t, the double implication
cdt⋆(G0,G1) > 0 ⇔ G0 6≡ G1 always holds and cdt⋆(·, ·) becomes a distance mea-
sure. Hence, the name computational distance is still justified.
Different description styles. Although a game is just a two-party protocol
between an honest challenger G and a malicious adversary A, different crypto-
graphic formalisms use different ways to describe games, see Fig. 3.2.
One viable option is to fully specify actions of the challenger together with a
rigid messaging schedule for the protocol as we specified for IND-CPA games.
Such a description style is the oldest and most widespread in cryptographic lit-
erature. More formally, a challenger-centric description specifies a game as
an oracle algorithm G that internally calls out a stateful subroutine A until G
reaches some output or is halted due to abnormal behaviour of A. Sometimes,
4Here, we just eliminate accidental exposure of timing artefacts, since we can re-introduce
timing information in a controlled way by modifying the description of the game.
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Figure 3.2: Duality between challenger- and adversary-centric game descrip-
tions. Both formalisations describe the interactive process shown in the middle.
the adversary A is even represented as a collection of different stateless algo-
rithms A1, . . . ,An that communicate by using shared variables.
The main virtue of the challenger-centric description is simplicity. For games
with a deterministic scheduling, it is the most natural approach. However, for
non-deterministic scheduling, the approach quickly becomes cumbersome and
tedious. A reader can easily verify this by formalising the description of IND-
CCA2 games without explicit use of decryption oracles.
Another compelling alternative is an adversary-centric description of games.
Compared to the challenger-centric description, the tables are turned—the algo-
rithm A internally calls out a subroutine G, until G provides the desired output.
Formally, the challenger code is split into smaller threads Os,O1, . . . ,On,Of that
are scheduled according to the adversary’s requests. The game is started by an
oracle Os that initialises all necessary variables and provides input to the ad-
versary A. Next, A can interact with oracles O1, . . . ,On by submitting queries
and receiving replies. To end the game, A calls out the finalisation procedure
Of that computes the output of the game out ∈ {0, 1,⊥}. Note that oracles
Os,O1, . . . ,On,Of as threads of the same program can communicate through
shared variables and thus force constraints on the adversarial behaviour.
As an example, consider the adversary-centric description of the IND-CPA
games. The corresponding initialisation oracle Os runs the key generation algo-
rithm Gen and stores the corresponding key pair (sk, pk). The oracle Os always
replies pk to all queries that A makes. The second oracle O1 can be queried
only once. Given a message pair (m0,m1), the oracle O1 replies Encpk(m0) or
Encpk(m1) depending on whether we are in the game G0 or in the game G1. The
finalisation oracle Of always outputs the first message sent by A.
We emphasise that both description styles have their advantages and draw-
backs and it is only a matter of taste which syntactic sugar we choose. In short,
the challenger-centric approach forces constraints explicitly through message
scheduling, whereas the adversary-centric approach forces constraints implic-
itly through cooperative behaviour of oracles. Generally, the adversary-centric
approach is better in the context of complex interactions, since it is well suited
for non-deterministic scheduling. However, a suitable compromise between the
two approaches can often be even more descriptive and concise.
Indistinguishability and semantic security. A game corresponds to an in-
teractive hypothesis testing scenario if the challenger G always outputs the last
reply from the adversary A. Note that the argumentation given in Section 3.2
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also holds for interactive hypothesis testing. More precisely, let {Gs}s∈S be a
set of games such that any pair of them is computationally indistinguishable. In
that case, the corresponding proofs in Section 3.2 still hold and consequently
bounded adversaries cannot restore even partial information about s. Hence,
confidentiality of secret inputs can be stated in terms of indistinguishability.
Naturally, the exact formulation is not as simple as that. Protocols usually leak
some information about secret inputs and thus the pairwise indistinguishability
of games is not always achievable. Moreover, interactive hypothesis testing forms
only a small subclass of games, i.e., games can specify more complex properties,
such as consistency and verifiability of protocol outputs. We discuss these issues
further in Chapters 5 and 7.
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4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROOF TECHNIQUES
Games are powerful tools for analysing interactive computations, as they are
flexible enough to capture any attack pattern needed to define a specific design
goal, such as authenticity, confidentiality or fairness. Moreover, the strength of a
cryptographic construction is often quantified as an advantage
AdvG(A) = Pr [GA = 1] (4.1)
against a specific game G. Therefore, we must often upper bound advantages
in order to prove the security of a primitive or a protocol. To establish these
bounds, we can use either direct or conditional proofs. Direct proofs use Peano
axiomatisation of arithmetic and nothing more, whereas conditional proofs rely
on additional assumptions, such as the hardness of factoring or P 6= NP.
Note that direct proofs are somewhat trivial in the settings where the running
times of all participants are bounded. Since there is only a finite number of
different adversaries and a finite number of relevant random bits, maximising the
advantage AdvG(A) is a discrete optimisation task over a finite set. Hence, for
most cryptographic problems there exists either an exhaustive proof or an explicit
counterexample. However, the verification time for such proofs is gargantuan,
compared to the time bounds established in them. Hence, direct proofs are
useful only if they are compact enough to be efficiently verifiable.
Unfortunately, no compact direct proofs have been discovered so far in cryp-
tography. One of the few non-trivial results is a construction of a permutation
that can be inverted approximately 2 times slower than computed [Hil92] and
any significant advance in this field is believed to be hard [Mas96].
As a way out, we take the existence of certain cryptographic primitives for
granted and build everything else on top of these basic primitives. As a result, we
can use indirect conditional proofs to establish security. More precisely, it is suf-
ficient to prove that a construction can be insecure only if some basic primitive
fails to meet the specification. Moreover, the approach separates abstract design
goals form practical implementation details. Still, we cannot completely ignore
complexity theoretical details, or otherwise we end up with basic primitives that
cannot be implemented at all. Consequently, the choice of basic primitives
should always reflect our beliefs in various complexity theoretical conjectures.
Also, note that the choice of basic primitives determines the abstraction level.
For example, we can use basic primitives to model high-level properties, such as
one-way functions or IND-CPA secure cryptosystems, or more specific compu-
tational assumptions, such as intractability of factoring RSA composites.
In this chapter, we show how to decompose conditional proofs into small ele-
mentary steps that are easy to apply and verify. The verification procedure itself
can be completely formalised. In fact, it is possible to construct a hypothetical
proof system CRYPROOF that automatically verifies a proof and computes the
corresponding security guarantees, see the discussion in Section 4.5.
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4.1 REDUCTIONS AS REWRITING RULES
Although the use of abstract security properties simplifies proofs and makes them
more universal, it also brings along some drawbacks. In particular, such a choice
restricts the structure of possible proofs. Let us consider the IND-CPA cryptosys-
tem as an illustrative example. Recall that a public-key cryptosystem is spec-
ified by efficient algorithms Gen,Enc,Dec and a functional requirement that
Decsk(Encpk(m)) ≡ m for every key pair (sk, pk) ← Gen. There are no re-
strictions as to how a cryptosystem must operate or what its internal structure is.
Hence, a new construction built on top of the (t, ε)-IND-CPA cryptosystem can-
not use any other operations than Gen,Enc,Dec to manipulate keys, messages
and ciphertexts. Of course, such restrictions do not extend to potential adver-
saries. As the construction assumes nothing about the implementation details,
the provable security guarantees must hold for all implementations of (t, ε)-IND-
CPA secure cryptosystems regardless of how bizarre they might seem. Thus, the
only way to prove security is to show that the insecurity of the construction im-
plies an explicit contradiction with the IND-CPA security premise.
More generally, the abstraction of security properties always leads to indirect
proofs with identical structure where one must prove cdt1⋆ (G0,G1) ≤ ε1 from
premises of type cdt0⋆ (Q0,Q1) ≤ ε0. The corresponding indirect proof shows
that an assumption cdt1⋆ (G0,G1) > ε1 implies a contradiction cdt0⋆ (Q0,Q1) > ε0.
The heart of the proof is a code transformation rule (reduction), which converts
any t1-time adversary A to a t0-time adversary B such that
AdvindG0,G1(A) > ε1 =⇒ AdvindQ0,Q1(B) > ε0 . (4.2)
Most of the reductions are black-box reductions, where B internally runs A in
the black-box manner to play the gamesQ0 andQ1. That is, B analyses only the
messages that A writes on the communication and input-output tapes. However,
B controls all external factors influencing A: inputs, random coins, received
messages and used timers. In particular, B can always restart A with different in-
puts, replies and random coins or just rewind A back to any other suitable state.
In white-box reductions, the dependence between A and B can be arbitrary, for
example B can actively alter the internal variables of A.
If game pairs (G0,G1) and (Q0,Q1) are similar enough, it is often advanta-
geous to construct a reduction where B simulates the game Gi to A. Fig. 4.1
depicts an illustrative example where games G0 and G1 differ only by a single
line c ← Encpk(m0) versus c ← Encpk(m1). More formally, in the game Gi the
challenger generates (sk, pk) ← Gen, interacts with A and somehow obtains a
valid message pair m0,m1 ∈ M. Next, the challenger computes an encryption
c ← Encpk(mi) and then continues with the game Gi. Now consider an ad-
versary B against IND-CPA games that first obtains pk from the challenger and
then simulates the game Gi to A until the line c ← Encpk(mi) is reached. Next
B outputs (m0,m1) and uses the reply as c and finally outputs GAi .
Note that the simulation of Gi is possible only if sk is not used in the game.
Similarly, the line c ← Encpk(mi) must be reachable only once, or otherwise B
violates the rules of IND-CPA gamesQi. If these two preconditions are satisfied,
B simulates the game Gi perfectly and thus Pr [GAi = 1] = Pr [QBi = 1]. Con-
sequently, we have proven that cdt⋆(G0,G1) ≤ ε if the cryptosystem is (t + τ +
O(1), ε)-IND-CPA secure, where τ is the running time of Gi. More precisely,
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B· · ·
Ask for pk.
· · ·
m0 ← · · ·
m1 ← · · ·
Output (m0,m1) and ask for c.
· · ·
return . . .
GA0
· · ·
(sk, pk) ← Gen
· · ·
m0 ← · · ·
m1 ← · · ·
c← Encpk(m0)
· · ·
return . . .
GA1
· · ·
(sk, pk) ← Gen
· · ·
m0 ← · · ·
m1 ← · · ·
c← Encpk(m1)
· · ·
return . . .
Figure 4.1: A schematic description of an IND-CPA reduction. By construction,
the adversary B = BA on the left simulates perfectly a game GAi on the right.
the claim only holds for RAM machines, since the simulation of GAi can take
more time on a Turing machine due to tape rewinding.
Note that the reasoning above holds for any game pair (G0,G1) that satisfies
the preconditions. Moreover, such semi-transparent reasoning is common in
cryptography. In fact, any valid reduction proof implicitly specifies a code trans-
formation T that preserves computational closeness under certain preconditions
P . The closeness guarantee S is often in the form: if the conditionP holds for G0
and G1 = T (G0) then cdt⋆(G0,G1) ≤ ε. For such reductions, we use shorthands
G0 T=⇒ε G1 to emphasise the bound on the computational distance.
Definition 1. A reduction schema is a triple (P , T ,S), where P is a precondi-
tion, T is a code transformation and S is the corresponding security guarantee.
These reduction schemata significantly simplify the derivation of security
proofs. It is much easier to test whether a certain precondition holds than to
construct the same reduction over and over again. However, we should note
that reduction schemata are not usually rigorously formalised and applied, rather
they are used informally to construct complex reductions as proofs.
Generally, each basic primitive introduces at least one reduction schema,
but there can be more than one schema for each of them. Since reductions
schemata can have different preconditions and security guarantees, the major
task in cryptography is to identify triples (P , T ,S) that are optimal, i.e., P can-
not be weakened or T generalised without changing S. Note that compiling a
security proof, given a proper set of optimal reduction schemata, is just a plain
engineering task. In other words, such an approach can be viewed as a further
modularisation of cryptographic proofs into trivial and non-trivial portions.
4.2 REDUCTIONS AND TIME-SUCCESS PROFILES
Any attack against a cryptographic construction or a protocol is a trade-off be-
tween desired goals and available resources. It is possible to break any con-
struction by applying a sufficient amount of computational resources, unless it
is information-theoretically secure. At the same time, additional computational
resources increase the cost of the attack and thus a rationally behaving attacker
must find a proper balance between estimated losses and potential gains.
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The time-success profile is the most obvious way to describe trade-offs be-
tween the losses and gains. For many security objectives, we can construct a
game G such that the advantage AdvG(A) = Pr [GA = 1] quantifies the success
probability of an adversary A. Now a time-success profile is a function
ε(t) = max
A∈A(t)
AdvG(A) , (4.3)
where A(t) consists of all t-time adversaries. Note that the time-success profile is
well-defined for every concrete construction or primitive. In fact, a time-success
profile is even computable by exhaustive inspection of all possibilities. However,
such a process is clearly intractable for all practical constructions and thus we
can only approximate time-success profiles. One possibility is to view a crypto-
graphic reduction as a rule that combines time-success profiles of basic primi-
tives into a time-success profile of a new construction. More precisely, we get an
upper bound on the time-success profile in terms of basic primitives.
Unfortunately, even the approximate shapes of time-success profiles are un-
known for all cryptographic primitives used in practice. Only some indicative
results have been established for uninstantiable generic models. For example,
the time-success profile of the discrete logarithm and Diffie-Hellman problem is
known to be Θ(t2) in generic groups [Nec94, Sho97, SJ00]. Analogous results
are known for the RSA root finding problem in generic rings [DK02, LR06].
Time-success ratio is a more conservative alternative for approximating time-
success profiles. The term itself was first proposed in the context of asymptotic se-
curity [HL92, Lub96], but it has a natural interpretation also for a fixed primitive
in the exact security setting. Namely, one can estimate the minimal time-success
ratio α for a primitive and thus fix a linear upper bound:
α = min
t
t
ε(t)
⇐⇒ ∀t : ε(t) ≤ t
α
. (4.4)
If the time-success profile has a globally convex-cup shape, then α is the mini-
mum time needed to completely break the primitive, see Fig. 4.2. For many low
level primitives, the adversary can compute the output GA by himself, e.g., verify
that he or she has factored a large number or has found a discrete logarithm. For
such primitives, the time-success profile becomes approximately convex-cup if
the adversary can restart1 the security game at any point. Then an estimate on
the minimal breaking time is a theoretically sound estimate of α.
A time-success profile captures the essential information about the crypto-
graphic construction. In particular, one can assess how secure the construction
is in real world scenarios. For a moment, consider the security against ratio-
nal adversaries that always choose the most beneficial attack. To analyse such
behaviour, we must rescale the time and success axes so that they represent ex-
pected losses and gains, see Fig. 4.2. Obviously, the cost of an attack depends
on the computational complexity. Let x(t) be the correspondence between run-
ning time and computing costs. Similarly, there is a connection between success
probability and the potential utility y(ε) in dollars. Note that besides direct ob-
jective costs, an adversary may have indirect subjective costs, such as a threat
1If the problem is randomly self-reducible, the adversary can restart the game internally.
Therefore, the profile is approximately convex-cup for the discrete logarithm problem.
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Figure 4.2: A hypothetical time-success profile for a discrete logarithm problem
and the corresponding cost-gain profile in the case of 1million dollar award. The
left graph is given in the linear and the right in the logarithmic scale.
to ruin his or her reputation by attacking. Analogously, the correspondence be-
tween success probability and potential gains may be nonlinear.
Evidently, a construction is secure against rational adversaries if the costs are
always greater than the potential gains. Since an adversary may also conduct
physical and social engineering attacks, the whole system may still be insecure,
even if the cryptographic construction is secure, see Fig. 4.2. Ideally, the crypto-
graphic strength should be comparable to other weaknesses, as the use of overly
complex cryptographic primitives leads to unjustified maintenance costs.
Not all entities behave rationally. Some of them may want to cause maximal
achievable damage even at any cost. To analyse such scenarios, we must turn
the tables and consider the situation from the perspective of legitimate users. In
particular, we must use different rescaling such that the x(t) axis still represents
the potential costs of an attack, whereas y(ε) counts potential losses of legitimate
users, including the resources needed to run the system. As a result, we can
estimate the losses in terms of available resources and thus compare different
protection mechanisms with different profiles. In particular, it may turn out that
the most cost-efficient solution is to have no protection at all.
Since time-success profiles are so important, it is crucial to understand how
cryptographic reductions change these profiles. In the simplest case, one can
prove that a (t1, ε1)-attack against a construction can be converted to a (t0, ε0)-
attack against the basic primitive. The corresponding tightness factor
β(ε1, t1) =
α1
α0
=
t1ε0
t0ε1
(4.5)
characterises the inevitable security loss, i.e., how much does the bound on the
total breaking time decrease. Again, the tightness factors have been used in the
context of asymptotic security [HL92, Lub96], but the corresponding classifica-
tion [Lub96, p. 21–34] of reductions is too coarse for our purposes.
For more precise classification, consider the correspondence between time-
success profiles. Fix a linear target bound ε1 = Θ(t1). In such case, a reduc-
tion is linear if it leads to a linear bound ε0 = Θ(t0). Most cryptographic
reductions are linear but complex reductions can lead to convex-cup bounds
ε0 = Θ(t
k
0). The constant k ≥ 1 determines the order of the reduction, for
example, a reduction is quadratic if ε0 = Θ(t20). Since we normally start with
linear bounds ε0 = Θ(t0) for basic primitives, we get convex-cap security guar-
antees ε1 = Θ
(
k
√
t
)
for the derived construction or primitive. Such a shape is
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GA0
(sk, pk) ← Gen
(m0,m1) ← A(pk)
c1 ← Encpk(m0)
b← A(c1)
if b ∈ {0, 1} then return b
c2 ← Encpk(m0)
return A(c2)
GA2
(sk, pk) ← Gen
(m0,m1) ← A(pk)
c1 ← Encpk(m1)
b← A(c1)
if b ∈ {0, 1} then return b
c2 ← Encpk(m1)
return A(c2)
Figure 4.3: Two-stage attack against a public-key cryptosystem.
quite unsuitable from game theoretical viewpoint, as it increases the potential
payoff in a low costs range and also increases the bound on α1.
Sometimes, it is possible to provide several reductions for the same problem.
Often, these reductions have incomparable structure and security bounds. Then
the comparison of tightness factors β(ε1, t1) provides some insight. Assume that
basic primitives have linear time-success bounds. Then a reduction with the
largest tightness ratio allows us to choose a primitive with the smallest α0 and
thus we gain efficiency without changing the security level.
Finally, the tightness ratio characterises the robustness of the bounds. As all
current estimates on the security of cryptographic primitives are heuristic, they
are likely to change in the future. The ratio β characterises how big the corre-
sponding changes in derived security guarantees are.
4.3 SURPRISING PROPERTIES OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES
Before we investigate standard proof techniques, it is instructive to consider com-
mon dangers first. In particular, note that conditional probabilities often behave
counter-intuitively and the corresponding confusion can cause subtle argumen-
tation flaws in security proofs. Let us start with a simple example and analyse
games G0 and G2 in Fig. 4.3 under the assumption that a cryptosystem is (t, ε)-
IND-CPA secure. Note that the adversary A must distinguish between cipher-
texts of messagesm0 andm1 but differently from IND-CPA games, the adversary
A can choose not to answer. Namely, if b ∈ {0, 1} then the challenger accepts b
as a final guess, otherwise a new ciphertext c2 is generated and the adversary A
gets a second chance. In other words, if b ∈ {0, 1}, then A plays the IND-CPA
game with the challenge c1 and otherwise A plays the IND-CPA game with chal-
lenge c2. Hence, it would be natural to assume that the following inequalities
should hold for any t-time adversary A:
Adv1(A) = |Pr [GA0 = 1|b ∈ {0, 1}]− Pr [GA2 = 1|b ∈ {0, 1}]| ≤ ε , (4.6)
Adv2(A) = |Pr [GA0 = 1|b /∈ {0, 1}]− Pr [GA2 = 1|b /∈ {0, 1}]| ≤ ε . (4.7)
However, neither of these inequalities (4.6) and (4.7) holds, as efficient adver-
saries A1 and A2 depicted in Fig. 4.4 achieve Adv1(A1) = Adv2(A2) = 1. For
the proof, note that if messages differ m0 6= m1, then a collision Encpk(mj) =
Encpk(mi) impliesmi = mj . Therefore,A1 outputs a correct answer if b ∈ {0, 1}
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A1
given pk
replym0 6= m1
given c1
cˆ0 ← Encpk(m0)
cˆ1 ← Encpk(m1)
if c1 = cˆ0 then reply 0
if c1 = cˆ1 then reply 1
if c1 /∈ {cˆ0, cˆ1} then reply 2
given c2
return 0
A2
given pk
replym0 6= m1
given c1
cˆ0 ← Encpk(m0)
cˆ1 ← Encpk(m1)
if c1 ∈ {cˆ0, cˆ1} then reply 2
if c1 /∈ {cˆ0, cˆ1} then reply 0
given c2
if c1 = cˆ0 then return 0
if c1 = cˆ1 then return 1
Figure 4.4: Adversaries A1 and A2 which achieve Adv1(A1) = Adv2(A2) = 1.
and A2 outputs a correct answer if b /∈ {0, 1}. Hence, we have proven that
Pr [GA10 = 1|b ∈ {0, 1}] = 0 , Pr [GA12 = 1|b ∈ {0, 1}] = 1 , (4.8)
Pr [GA20 = 1|b /∈ {0, 1}] = 0 , Pr [GA22 = 1|b /∈ {0, 1}] = 1 . (4.9)
Note that the drastic discrepancy between superficial estimates (4.6) and (4.7),
and true bounds (4.8) and (4.9) is caused by the unintentional mismatch of prior
probabilities in the reasoning. Namely, the inequality (4.6) follows from IND-
CPA security only ifPr [b ∈ {0, 1}] = 1, but the actual probabilityPr [b ∈ {0, 1}]
can be arbitrarily small. Flaws in the derivation of (4.7) are analogous.
A similar flaw, but in a much more subtle form appears in the classical proofs
of the PRP/PRF Switching Lemma (Theorem 5.1 in [IR88]). The error itself
was discovered alarmingly late, in 2004, by Kohno, see the discussion in [BR04].
The theorem estimates a statistical distance between two games G0 and G1. In
the game G0 the challenger chooses a function f uniformly from the set of all
functions f : X → X , whereas f is a uniformly chosen permutation on X in the
game G1. The task of an adversary A is do distinguish these games by adaptively
querying at most q values of f(xi). Note that any deterministic strategy A can
be formalised as a tree, where the nodes represent queries f(xi) and the edges
correspond to the responses as illustrated in Fig. 4.5. In the game G0 all paths
are possible, whereas no path that leads to a collision f(xi) = f(xj) is possible
in G1. In both games, the probability to reach a plausible node depends only on
the number of queries. Now if A always makes exactly q distinct queries, then
Pr [GA1 = 1] = Pr [GA0 = 1|¬Collision] (4.10)
as nodes are sampled with uniform probability. However, if A decides to stop
earlier in some paths, then conditional probabilities Pr [node|¬Collision] start to
differ between the games. For example, the conditional probabilities from left
to right on the decision border in Fig. 4.5 are
(
0
7
, 1
7
, 1
7
, 0
7
, 1
7
, 1
7
, 3
7
)
in the game G0
and
(
0
6
, 1
6
, 1
6
, 0
6
, 1
6
, 1
6
, 2
6
)
in the game G1. Therefore, the equation. (4.10) is not
guaranteed to hold when A halts prematurely in some paths. Consequently, in
the strict sense, the proofs given in [IR88, BKR94] are correct as they consider
adversaries that make exactly q distinct queries. If we consider adversaries that
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Figure 4.5: A querying strategy for X = {1, 2, 3} with premature stopping. The
dashed line denotes the decision border and αi, βi denote the probabilities of
plausible queries f(x1), . . . , f(xi) in the games G0 and G1, respectively.
can make up to q queries, then these proofs are indeed incorrect [BR04]. Nev-
ertheless, the final claim is still correct, as adversaries that make up to q queries
cannot outperform adversaries that make exactly q queries.
To summarise, reasoning about conditional probabilities is counterintuitive
and non-robust against microscopic changes in the security claims.
4.4 FROM GAME CHAINS TO PROOF TREES
Let us return to the first example posed in the previous section. Observe that the
description of G0 and G2 differ in two places, namely, ciphertexts c1 and c2 are
computed differently. As the secret key sk is not used in the games, we can apply
the IND-CPA reduction schema twice to G0 and obtain a game chain
GA0
(sk, pk) ← Gen
(m0,m1) ← A(pk)
c1 ← Encpk(m0)
b← A(c1)
if b ∈ {0, 1} then . . .
c2 ← Encpk(m0)
return A(c2)
GA1
(sk, pk) ← Gen
(m0,m1) ← A(pk)
c1 ← Encpk(m1)
b← A(c1)
if b ∈ {0, 1} then . . .
c2 ← Encpk(m0)
return A(c2)
GA2
(sk, pk) ← Gen
(m0,m1) ← A(pk)
c1 ← Encpk(m1)
b← A(c1)
if b ∈ {0, 1} then . . .
c2 ← Encpk(m1)
return A(c2)
where the grey boxes emphasise changes. To represent reductions, we can write
G0 IND-CPA====⇒ε G1 IND-CPA====⇒ε G2 . (4.11)
Now if the cryptosystem is (t, ε)-IND-CPA secure, there exists a time bound
t1 = t − O(1) such that cdt1⋆ (G0,G1) ≤ ε and cdt1⋆ (G1,G2) ≤ ε. Hence, the
triangle inequality yields
cdt1⋆ (G0,G2) ≤ cdt1⋆ (G0,G1) + cdt1⋆ (G1,G2) ≤ 2ε . (4.12)
More generally, we can use game chains as a systematic way to estimate compu-
tational distances. Moreover, note that for any t-time algorithm A
AdvG0(A) = Pr [GA0 = 1] ≤ cdt⋆(G0,Gn) + AdvGn(A) (4.13)
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GA0
(sk0, pk0) ← Gen
(sk1, pk1) ← Gen
x← {0, 1}
q ← A(pk0, pk1)
if q /∈ {0, 1} then return ⊥
c0 ← Encpk0(x)
c1 ← Encpk1(x)
return A(skq, c0, c1)
GA1
(sk0, pk0) ← Gen
(sk1, pk1) ← Gen
x← {0, 1}
q ← A(pk0, pk1)
if q /∈ {0, 1} then return ⊥
c0 ← Encpk0(x)
c1 ← Encpk1(1− x)
return A(skq, c0, c1)
Figure 4.6: A game pair derived from the Bellare-Micali protocol.
and thus we can use game chains to also upper bound advantages against in-
dividual games. Often, such proofs are compressed further by combining the
elementary reductions into a single aggregate construction. The latter is known
as a constructive hybrid argument, see Section 6.7. However, this is just a trade-
off between compactness and clarity: complex reductions are much harder to
comprehend and verify than the corresponding elementary reductions.
It is important to note that not all security proofs can be represented as game
chains. See Fig. 4.6 contains for a specific counterexample. We remark that the
game pair is not arbitrary—slightly more sophisticated game pairs appear in the
security proof of the Bellare-Micali oblivious transfer protocol [BM89].
As the adversary A can decrypt only a single value ci, he or she cannot learn
whether c1 and c2 are ciphertexts of the same message or not. However, we
cannot use the IND-CPA transformation, as we do not know in advance whether
A uses a secret key sk0 or sk1. Hence, we must define four auxiliary games Gij
where Gij denotes a game Gi that is halted with ⊥ if q 6= j. As
Pr [GA0 = 1] = Pr [GA0 = 1 ∧ q = 0] + Pr [GA0 = 1 ∧ q = 1] , (4.14)
Pr [GA1 = 1] = Pr [GA1 = 1 ∧ q = 0] + Pr [GA1 = 1 ∧ q = 1] , (4.15)
the straightforward application of the triangle inequality yields
cdt⋆(G0,G1) ≤ cdt⋆(G00,G10) + cdt⋆(G01,G11) . (4.16)
The analysis simplifies as games G00,G10 do not use sk1 and G01,G11 do not use
sk0. Consequently, we can now use IND-CPA transformation for both games:
G00 IND-CPA====⇒ε G10 and G01 IND-CPA====⇒ε G11 . (4.17)
Again, if the cryptosystem is (t, ε)-IND-CPA secure, there exists t1 = t − O(1)
such that cdt1⋆ (G00,G10) ≤ ε, cdt1⋆ (G01,G11) ≤ ε and thus cdt1⋆ (G0,G1) ≤ 2ε.
This horizon-splitting technique can be generalised to handle any finite set of
exhaustive but mutually exclusive hypotheses H1, . . . ,Hn about the interaction
pattern in the game G. Namely, we can define narrowings of the game G:
GA∣∣
Hi
=
{
GA, ifHi holds ,
⊥, otherwise . (4.18)
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AdvG0(A) ≤ ε1 + ε2
G0
G1 G2 G3
G4 G5
⊥
⊥ ⊥
H1 H2
H3
ε1 ε2
cd
t
⋆(G0,G1) ≤ ε23 + ε45
(G0,G1)
(G2,G3) (G4,G5)
(G6,G3) (G4,G7)
G6 ≡ G3 G4 ≡ G7
ε23 ε45
H1 H2
Figure 4.7: Game trees together with the corresponding bounds. Simple arrows
represent horizon-splitting and double arrows represent reduction schemata.
where the verification ofHi is done by the challenger. Now, the ordinary triangle
inequality induces two tight splitting bounds
AdvG(A) ≤ AdvG|H1 (A) + · · ·+ AdvG|Hn (A) , (4.19)
cdt⋆(G0,G1) ≤ cdt⋆(G0|H1 ,G1|H1) + · · ·+ cdt⋆(G0|Hn ,G1|Hn) . (4.20)
Horizon-splitting technique can be used whenever no elementary transfor-
mation is applicable due to the unknown behaviour of A. In a sense, splitting
bounds are more detailed analogs of the formal derivation rule
Γ, F ⊢ A Γ, G ⊢ A
Γ, F ∨G ⊢ A (4.21)
in logic that allows us to strengthen the assumptions by splitting the proof into
several branches. In our case, we get a game tree instead of a proof tree.
To summarise, we can bound the advantage AdvG(A) by constructing a game
tree such that all leaf level games Gi have trivial bounds AdvGi(A) ≤ εi, since we
can use triangle inequalities (4.13), (3.23) and splitting bounds (4.19)–(4.20) to
estimate AdvG(A). Moreover, we can find a tight upper bound on the running
times by aggregating all time constraints corresponding to the edges of the game
tree. Similarly, we can bound a computational distance cdt⋆(G0,G1) but the cor-
responding proof tree consists of game pairs. Namely, the pair (G0,G1) is a root
node and we can derive new nodes by applying reductions schemata to indi-
vidual components of a pair, or alternatively create several siblings by using the
horizon-splitting technique. Again, if all leaf level nodes (Gi,Gj) are bounded
cdt⋆(Gi,Gj) ≤ εij , then we can use inequalities (3.23) and (4.20) to compute the
final bound cdt⋆(Gi,Gj). See Fig. 4.7 for illustrative examples. Note that such a
proof technique is sound and complete. More formally, if we cannot represent a
valid handcrafted proof as a game tree, then we can view the proof itself as a new
reduction schema and thus obtain a two-element game chain.
This approach is particularly useful when we have to derive technically com-
plex proofs, since it is straightforward to apply and it is immune to argumenta-
tion flaws. At the same time, the corresponding proofs can be extremely boring
to read, since they are quite long and mechanical. Moreover, it is often easier
to construct reductions for specific games than to formalise respective reduction
schemata (P , T ,S). Thus, it is common to compress proof trees by providing
more complex handcrafted reductions after the proof is derived.
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4.5 FORMAL VERIFICATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROOFS
The methodology outlined above has slowly evolved together with the concept
of exact security. As the main emphasis has always been on practical results,
the meta-analysis of proof methodology itself is rather recent. Only in the year
2004, Bellare, Rogaway and Shoup started to talk about game-playing proofs as
a general methodology [BR04, Sho04]. Although some interesting proof meth-
ods, such as [LMMS98, Mau02], have been published before, none of them has
claimed to be universal, as the approach [BR04] proposed by Bellare and Rog-
away. Next, Halevi took a step further and suggested that cryptographers should
build an automatic tool for generating, analysing and verifying the game-playing
proofs [Hal05]. The first proposal CRYPTOVERIF [BP06] for such a formal proof
system is now available. Notably, the authors have taken effort to transform the
ordinary program analysis lingo into an adversary-centric description language,
which is almost understandable without any prior preparation.
Despite the existence of CRYPTOVERIF and the corresponding extensive
documentation [Bla06b, Bla07] and numerous other approaches that work in
the asymptotic setting (e.g. [CV01, Bla01, Low97, MRST06]), the author still
feels compelled to explain the high-level structure of such a formal proof system.
Firstly, a majority of these systems are quite unnatural from a cryptographer’s
viewpoint, as they are formalised by logicians, who have put proof theoretical
aspects in the first place. Secondly, all of them are rather limited as they utilise
only reduction schemata and not the horizon-splitting technique. In fact, the
linearity of proofs is one of the main reasons why current automatic provers are
so successful. To be fair, we note that horizon splitting is not a well known
technique. In fact, only a weak form of it has been semi-officially published by
Dent [Den06]. Finally, thinking in terms of proof systems makes certain proper-
ties and limitations of conditional proofs more apparent.
In the following, we describe a proof system in which the emphasis is placed
on cryptographic aspects. In particular, note that the derivation of proofs is not
the main problem in cryptography, the actual problem lies in the verification
of subtle details. Hence, the automatic derivation of proofs is not a key feature
at all, although the system should handle mundane tasks in the proofs, such as
verification of the preconditions for various reduction schemata.
High-level description. Our hypothetical computer environment CRYPROOF
should be a proof system in a strict sense, i.e., it is just an interactive environ-
ment for proving cryptographic statements about advantages and computational
distances of different games. Secondly, CRYPROOF should directly manipulate
games that are given in challenger- or adversary-centric description style similar
to [BR04, App. B]. Since the imperative programming paradigm is dominant in
cryptography, all alternative description styles based on various forms of process
calculi have an extremely high entrance cost.2 Finally, CRYPROOF should do
the automatic bookkeeping and output the resulting time-success profiles given
a characterisation of basic primitives used in the construction.
Let us now briefly describe how one should use CRYPROOF. As explained in
the previous section, any security proof is a game tree and the CRYPROOF envi-
2Repeated switching between different programming paradigms is annoying both from a tech-
nical and cognitive viewpoint. Engineers and cryptographers just do not do subtitles!
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Figure 4.8: High-level description of the proof system CRYPROOF.
ronment should assure that a game tree is properly formed. Hence, a single step
in CRYPROOF is either an application of a reduction schemata or a horizon-
splitting step. Testing the validity of horizon-splitting step is more straightfor-
ward, as we must check that hypotheses H1, . . . ,Hm are mutually disjoint and
exhaustive. The application of a reduction schema is more complex, see Fig. 4.8.
Essentially, we must check that a precondition Pi holds for the game G. Since
a precondition describes a non-trivial property of a program GA, the predicate
Pi(G) might be undecidable. Consequently, a user must be able to prove Pi(G)
by annotating the program G when automatic methods fail.
Any formal annotation method that makes the verification of Pi(G) easy is
suitable for the task. Hoare logic is one of the best choices, since it resembles
the way we actually reason about properties of a program. In a nutshell, Hoare
logic is a systematic way to label the code statements with pre- and postcondi-
tions. For example, a labelling {y ≤ 5} y ← y + 3 {y ≤ 8} means that if y ≤ 5
before the statement y ← y+3 then y ≤ 8 afterwards. Notably, only a small lan-
guage dependent set of derivation rules determines the labelling for the whole
algorithm. Thus, one can prove the correctness of the labelling by giving the
corresponding derivation tree. For more detailed discussion see [NN92].
Note that the challenger can always test whether Pi(G) holds for any partic-
ular run. Let G∗ be the description of a modified game, where the challenger
sets a flag bad ← 1 if the precondition Pi(G) does not hold. Then a valid Hoare
triple {∅} (G∗)A{bad 6= 1} proves that the condition Pi holds for all runs of GA.
Consequently, a valid annotation G∗∗ that proves {∅} (G∗)A{bad 6= 1} is also a
proof for Pi(G). Moreover, all provable properties of an algorithm are provable
also in Hoare logic provided that one allows a sufficiently rich description lan-
guage for the pre- and postconditions [NN92]. Therefore, the annotation G∗∗
exists if and only if the condition Pi(G) is indeed provable.
All other operations, such as applying the transformations, constructing the
proof trees and computing various bounds, are straightforward. Clearly, the
database of reduction schemata {(Pi, Ti,Si)} is the central part of CRYPROOF,
since it captures the domain knowledge. Also, it is likely to be incomplete at
the beginning. Therefore, we must update it when handcrafted security proofs
reveal missing reduction schemata, i.e., some proofs cannot be formalised in
the CRYPROOF environment. The task of the system maintainer is to carefully
verify handcrafted proofs to extract and generalise the corresponding reduction
schema. The latter is the only non-engineering task in the long run.
Axioms and deduction rules. Normally, a domain of knowledge is formalised
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by axioms. Indeed, all reduction schemata (Pi, Ti,Si) are axiomatic theorems.
However, it is far easier to interpret them as deduction rules and postulate that
one must apply reduction schemata until the leafs of game trees contain only
pairs Gi ≡ Gj or single games Gi ≡ ⊥, see again Fig. 4.7.
Note that our proof system must have deduction rules for code simplifica-
tions that do not change the behaviour of GA, such as algebraic manipulations
and dead code elimination. For advantage computations, we need a special
WRAP rule that formalises the intuition that advantage cannot decrease if we
push some computations from the honest challenger into the malicious adver-
sary. Similarly, the computational distance cannot increase if some messages
sent out by the challenger are dropped and never reach the adversary A.
The second group of transformations is used for manipulating cryptographic
primitives like Encpk(·) or Hash(·). As such symbols represent unknown func-
tions, we must finally eliminate them from a game G, otherwise it is formally
impossible to establish bounds on AdvG(A). Therefore, for every legitimate us-
age of a primitive, there must be an elimination rule. Consider a cryptosystem
(Gen,Enc,Dec) as an example. If a game G uses only the Gen symbol, then the
WRAP rule is sufficient to remove Gen. If a game G does not contain Decsk(·)
symbol, then IND-CPA and WRAP rule together are sufficient to eliminate Gen
and Encpk(·) symbols. For the Decsk(·) symbol, there are three alternatives.
The WRAP rule is sufficient if there are no Encpk(·) symbols, since key gener-
ation together with decryption can be wrapped into A. Secondly, in code lines
c← Encpk(m1), . . . ,m2 ← Decsk(c), we can simplifym2 ← m1. In the remain-
ing cases, we need IND-CCA2 transformation, as A can alter ciphertexts.
The third class of transformations is used in the probability analysis after all
cryptographic primitives are removed from the games. Such transformations are
extensively used in primitive design, where the elimination of all cryptographic
primitives can create difficult combinatorial problems. Notably, most of these
reductions are based on the BAD reduction schema, see [BR04]. In a nutshell,
we can substitute any code block seg0 with a block bad ← 1; seg1 provided
that seg0 is reached with low probability. Let GA0 (ω) and GA1 (ω) denote random
variables that correspond to the transformation G0 BAD=⇒ε G1, where ω = (ωA, ωG)
consists of all random coins used by the adversary and the challenger. Then
values GA0 (ω) and GA1 (ω) can differ only if bad = 1 and we obtain
AdvindG0,G1(A) ≤ Pr [ω←Ω∗ : GA0 (ω) 6= GA1 (ω)] ≤ Pr [ω←Ω∗ : bad = 1] .
To bound Pr [bad = 1], we have to specify a set Ω∆ ⊇ {ω ∈ Ω∗ : bad = 1} and
an estimate Pr [Ω∆] ≤ ε∆. Now if we omit the probability calculations, then
a valid annotation of the Hoare triple {ω /∈ Ω∆} GA1 (ω) {bad = 0} is sufficient.
Hence, we can formally verify combinatorial transformations, which seem to be
the major hurdle in symmetric primitive design [Mau02, Hal05].
Relativised models. A conditional security proof is meaningful only if there
exists a plausible instantiation of abstract primitives. Since direct proofs are prac-
tically out of reach, we must indirectly verify that various abstract demands for
the primitive are not contradictory. More precisely, we need a computational
model, where all instantiations of all basic primitives do exist and are provably
secure. As we use black-box specification for all primitives, it is straightforward
to build such a model by employing external oracles.
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For concreteness, we construct a model for IND-CPA secure cryptosystem.
Assume that an external oracle O provides replies to Gen, Enc and Dec queries.
To serve the ith query Gen, the oracle draws ri ← {0, 1}n, stores (i, ri) and
outputs a key pair ((i, ri), i). To serve Enc(i,m), the oracle stores m into the
first open slot of an array (mij)∞j=1 and returns the corresponding index num-
ber j0. Let Dec((i, r), c) = ⊥ if no recorded secret key coincides with (i, r)
and Dec((i, r), c) = mic otherwise. Note that the cryptosystem is functional
and (t · 2−n, t)-IND-CPA secure, since any t-time adversary can try out only t
potential secret keys and the ciphertext is independent from a message.
Limitations of conditional proofs. It is not trivial to guess whether a con-
ditional proof provides optimal security bounds or whether a security claim is
provable at all. To solve such conundrums, we can provide counterexamples
for establishing that we cannot have a conditional proof unless we add new as-
sumptions. Commonly, these proofs describe a relativised world, where all basic
primitives exist but a new construction is insecure. As a result, there are no
valid security proofs provided that the proof system itself is consistent. However,
these oracle separation results do not eliminate the possibility of direct proofs, as
the additional usage of Peano axioms might reveal additional relations between
abstract security properties that make these proofs possible.
For stronger separation results, we need to construct a counterexample from
the basic primitives that are assumed to exist. Namely, we must construct a
secondary set of weakened primitives that explicitly invalidates the hypothetical
security claim. Such a black-box separation proves that there are no valid security
proofs as long as the initial set of basic primitives exists and the proof system
itself remains consistent. The separation itself can be as artificial as needed.
For example, we can prove that IND-CPA security is insufficient for IND-CCA2
security by defining a new encryption rule Encpk(m) = b‖Encpk(m) where b ←
{0, 1}. To decrypt a message, one just has to omit the first bit. Clearly, the
new cryptosystem is (t, ε)-IND-CPA secure whenever the original cryptosystem
is (t+ O(1), ε)-IND-CPA secure, but not IND-CCA2 secure, as we can flip the
first bit of the encryption to fool the decryption oracle.
As there are many sub-optimal ways to prove security, separation techniques
are often employed to show that obtained security guarantees are tight or at least
near-optimal. At the same time, such separation results do not guarantee that
bounds remain optimal if we take a more fine-grained view on the construction
and break some basic primitives into smaller ones. Neither do these separation
results prove that some constructions are inherently insecure, sometimes they
just indicate underspecification of security premises.
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5 SECURITY OF INTERACTIVE COMPUTATIONS
For obvious reasons, we can rigorously analyse only the security of well-specified
distributed computations. Such well-specified distributed algorithms are com-
monly referenced as protocols. Security analysis of protocols is one of the main
tasks in cryptography. Essentially, we can talk about security in two different con-
texts. We can analyse the security of a protocol in a stand-alone setting, where
participants do not execute any other protocols. Alternatively, we can consider
the security of a protocol in a wider computational context, where several proto-
cols are executed to achieve more complex computational goals. In this chapter,
we consider only stand-alone security.
Superficially, the stand-alone setting is quite restrictive, since protocol outputs
cannot be processed further. In Chapter 7, we show that this restriction is purely
formal and stand-alone security is sufficient to achieve sequential composability.
In layman’s terms, a protocol remains secure if no other protocols are executed
in parallel. For many settings, such a requirement is naturally forced by the
design of the system and thus the provided security level is sufficient. We discuss
these issues more thoroughly in the following chapters, as even the stand-alone
security model is complex enough to confuse non-experts.
The number of potential security models is humongous even in the stand-
alone setting. There are literally hundreds of different security models that char-
acterise various practical settings. Although only few of them are well studied,
the others are equally meaningful. Therefore, we concentrate on the real versus
ideal world paradigm that forms the core of all security models.
The real versus ideal world concept itself is easy to formalise—a protocol in-
stance is secure if it is sufficiently similar to an ideal implementation. However,
it is somewhat nontrivial to describe what the similarity between real and ideal
world exactly implies or what happens if we change some minor details in the
formalism. Thus, we start with basic consistency principles that must hold for
any reasonable formalisation. Next, we consider what security levels are achiev-
able in the ideal setting. Although the latter may seem a rather absurd question
to ask as we cannot do any better, it is actually one of the most important ones.
If the risks caused by joining an ideal world protocol are not rewarded by the po-
tential gains, then the whole task is hopeless from the start and there is no reason
to design a cryptographic solution at all. Secondly, the ideal world behaviour
also reveals what kind of properties must be preserved by the correspondence
between real and ideal world adversaries.
As a result, we can justify all details of the ideal versus real world approach
from a game theoretical viewpoint. The latter provides stronger validity guaran-
tees, since all security definitions that contradict or ignore economical princi-
ples are meaningless in practice. Secondly, only a deep understanding of de-
sired security goals provides a justified way to choose a proper security model.
Essentially, there are four basic levels of security ranging form input-privacy to
complete security and all of them are covered in this chapter. More advanced
topics, like asymptotic security and setup assumptions, are left out and are treated
separately in remaining chapters.
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5.1 FORMAL REQUIREMENTS TO SECURITY DEFINITIONS
Before we actually start formalising various security goals, it is wise to contem-
plate what software and hardware designers mean by the terms ‘attack’ and ‘secu-
rity’ and what kind of results are expected from cryptographers. These questions
are often considered trivial and thus ignored. The ignorance is often rewarded
by aesthetically pleasing formalisations and beautiful theories. But at the same
time, these results can be cumbersome, not to say completely unrelated to the
demands of everyday life. Beautiful theories that are touching the limits of math-
ematical reasoning are not something to be ashamed of. However, we choose a
viewpoint that is as close to practice as possible.
Obviously, all security definitions must be well defined and non-contradictory
with itself. Briefly, a cryptographic construction either meets the security defi-
nition or not and alternative descriptions of a same construction are either all
secure or all insecure. This property is known as internal consistency.
However, the definition has to be appropriate also for practical settings, or
otherwise we have hopelessly departed from reality. To assure that a security
definition has a clear interpretation in practice, we postulate four restrictions to
capture external consistency. First, the effect of an attack must be observable
and unambiguously detectable, as emphasised by the restrictions (C1)–(C2).
Second, a security notion must be defined as a resistance level against potential
attacks, as emphasised by the remaining restrictions (C3)–(C4).
(C1) The effect of a successful attack must be observable. If an attack induces
changes that manifest only in the internal retrospection of a participant
and not in any observable outcome, then the attack is not successful.
(C2) For each protocol run and each attack against the protocol, it must be
possible to determine whether the attack was successful or not. More for-
mally, the overall success of an adversarial strategy A is quantified in terms
of an appropriate game G such that GA ∈ {0, 1,⊥} and the advantage
Pr [GA = 1] is the corresponding quantitative measure.
(C3) A construction is secure if no plausible adversarial algorithm is success-
ful enough. For example, a construction is (t, ε)-secure if the advantage
Pr [GA = 1] ≤ ε, for all plausible t-time adversaries A.
(C4) Adding restrictions to attack algorithms can only increase the security level.
For example, if a construction is (t1, ε)-secure and not (t2, ε)-secure for
t1 > t2, the corresponding success criterion is inconsistent.
Let us emphasise some details before going any further. First, it is really im-
possible to detect how a person or an algorithm internally perceives the situation
when there is no measurable outcome. Moreover, we as designers are often in-
terested only in certain behavioural aspects. For example, the output of a poker
automate does not have to be truly pseudorandom. A player may even register
certain regularities, but the latter is completely irrelevant as long as it does not
change his or her gaming behaviour or winning odds.
Secondly, the external consistency requirements are crucial only in the con-
text of practical security, where one has to make economical decisions based on
cryptographic results. Consequently, cryptographic definitions may violate some
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of the postulates (C1)–(C4), as long as they are used as tools to achieve exter-
nally consistent security goals. For example, the original definition of universal
composability [Can01] violates assumptions (C2)–(C3), and at first glance some
asymptotic definitions of statistical security [Gol04, Can00a] contradict postu-
lates (C3)–(C4). For clarity, we note that universal composability has also an
externally consistent formulation [Lin03b, Can00b], and that the problems with
statistical security are caused by ambiguities in the interpretation, see Section 7.6
and Section 6.2. Nevertheless, one can view the external consistency postulates
as a litmus test for detecting possible errors in the formalisations.
Thirdly, a bound of the total running time is often a too coarse measure for
defining a class of plausible adversarial strategies. For most protocols, an adver-
sary must provide replies to the other participants in a certain time frame and it is
justified to quantify online and offline complexity of the attack. Now, if we add
some additional constraints, then the conditions (C3)–(C4) must be modified
accordingly to capture all monotonicity requirements.
5.2 SECURITY OF IDEALISED COMPUTATIONS
Suitability of a cryptographic construction can be viewed as any other design
problem: we have to state some clear objectives and then assess the construction
in respect to them. For example, we may state that an e-voting scheme is secure
if one cannot submit incorrect votes, valid votes are correctly counted, and it is
impossible to disclose the choice made by an individual voter. However, such
a specification is incomplete, as it does not rule out other possible abuses. For
example, a voter may still be able to sell her vote, if she can disclose her vote
in an indisputable way to a potential buyer. We can add this restriction to the
black-list of malicious behavioural patterns but we can never be sure that the list
is complete. Also, it may be difficult to verify that such a black-list specification
is internally consistent, i.e., does not contain non-resolvable conflicts between
security goals. Therefore, a white-list based specification that explicitly states
what behavioural patterns are plausible is a far better alternative.
Let us start with some simplifying conventions. First, let symbols P1, . . . ,Pn
always denote the participants of a protocol. Second, a protocol must implement
some, possibly randomised, functionality f1, . . . , fn in order to be useful, i.e.,
each party should obtain yi = fi(x1, . . . , xn), where x1, . . . , xn are the inputs
of all participants. The computational process itself can be either non-adaptive
or adaptive. For non-adaptive protocols, the functionality f1, . . . , fn is known
ahead, whereas fi is determined dynamically during an adaptive protocol. In
this chapter, we consider only non-adaptive computations. Adaptive protocols
are normally composed from smaller non-adaptive basic blocks and thus it makes
sense to consider them together with composability in Chapter 7.
Additionally, we have to resolve the question whether the inputs x1, . . . , xn
are automatically deleted after the completion of a protocol or not. Both choices
are equally expressive but preserving the inputs is technically cleaner and looks
more natural. Therefore, we require that each non-corrupted node Pi outputs
zi = (xi, yi) at the end of the protocol. Such requirement makes it straight-
forward to consider the security in the scenarios, where the output zi is further
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Figure 5.1: Ideal implementation of a protocol π. An example attack on the left
and a schematic description as an abstract computational block on the right.
processed by Pi locally, or used as an input to another protocol.
Idealised computational process. Note that a protocol must reveal some
information about the inputs as long as it implements a desired functionality
f1, . . . , fn. Namely, if parties P1, . . . ,Pn run a protocol π, then each of them
must learn fi(x1, . . . , xn). Moreover, a malicious party Pi can always change
the outcome of Pj by choosing a different input xˆi instead of xi. Finally, a party
Pi may decide to halt in the middle of the protocol or not to participate at all.
Obviously, no cryptographic countermeasure can avoid these actions.
Cryptographers use a concept of ideal implementation to model such un-
avoidable attacks. The ideal implementation π◦ of a protocol is defined using
a trusted third party T that does all computations on behalf of the others, see
Fig. 5.1. That is, all participants P1, . . . ,Pn first submit their inputs x1, . . . , xn
securely to the trusted third party T. Next, the trusted third party T computes
the desired outcomes yi ← fi(x1, . . . , xn) and sends them securely back to the
participants P1, . . . ,Pn. In particular, if a party Pi does not submit his or her
input xi, the protocol is halted and T sends ⊥ to all participants. As a result,
either all participants will get their desired outputs or neither of them will.
Alternatively, we can fix a schedule how T must deliver the replies and allow
participants to stop T. More formally, a participant Pi must send zero-one verdict
to T after receiving yi. If a participant Pi sends 1, T continues as usual, otherwise
T halts and sends ⊥ instead of all remaining replies yj .
The second idealised model does not guarantee fairness, since a malicious
party Pi can force honest parties to compute fi(x1, . . . , xn) and halt compu-
tations before the others obtain their outputs. Clearly, it is easier to design
protocols without fairness. Moreover, fundamental limits already outlined by
Cleve [Cle86] imply that fairness is unachievable for two-party protocols and
protocols with honest minority. Although certain solutions like gradual release
of secrets [LMR83, BG89, GL90] and use of external referees [ASW98, CC00]
can alleviate the problem, none of them is universally applicable.
Tolerated adversarial behaviour. In many settings, participants can form coali-
tions to achieve their malicious goals. We model such behaviour by considering
an ideal world adversary A◦ which can corrupt some of the nodes P1, . . . ,Pn,
see again Fig. 5.1. The set of possible coalitions can be specified by listing all
possible subsets of parties that can be corrupted. The corresponding set of sets
A is called an adversary structure. Obviously, if it is possible to corrupt a subset
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A ∈ A, it is also possible to corrupt a subset B ⊆ A. Hence, we can always
assume that the adversarial structure A is monotone.
Exact details about the nature of a plausible corruption determine the maxi-
mal achievable damage. Adversarial behaviour can be static, adaptive or mobile.
A static adversary corrupts all participants already before the beginning of the
protocol. An adaptive adversary corrupts parties adaptively, based on the ac-
quired information; a mobile adversary can additionally retreat from corrupted
nodes. A mobile adversary respects the adversarial structure A if at any moment
in time, the adversary controls a subset of participants that belongs toA. We em-
phasise here that adaptive and mobile adversaries can corrupt participants also
after protocol values yi are sent out by T.
In a sense, the mobile adversary models the reality most precisely in large
infrastructures, whereas static and adaptive adversaries are more suited for small
well-protected networks. Two-party protocols always have static adversaries, as
the adversarial structure is simplistic A = {{P1} , {P2}}.
Non-standard ideal world models. Sometimes all parties P1, . . . ,Pn are guar-
anteed to be honest in the real world and the ideal adversary A◦ represents the
effects of malicious outsiders. For example, key agreement protocols [BR93a,
PV06b, LN06] try to resolve problems caused by malicious message transmis-
sion. In such cases, it is more natural to include A◦ as a direct participant in the
ideal computation instead of introducing a dummy corrupted party P0.
There are many similar minor details that can be varied to express design goals
more succinctly. For example, the idealised computational process for adaptive
tasks may have more than two rounds. In all these non-standard cases, the ideal
world model can still be decomposed into a model of idealised computational
behaviour and a model of tolerable adversarial behaviour.
Highest achievable security level. An ideal world implementation itself does
not guarantee privacy of inputs nor correctness of outputs. Themodel just shows,
which security goals are achievable for all protocols that correctly implement the
desired functionality. For example, if two parties both want to obtain y = x1+x2,
then the output y reveals the opponent’s input and thus privacy of inputs cannot
be preserved. Therefore, it is important to understand what kind of security guar-
antees are achievable at all. Although we cannot answer these questions without
making additional assumptions about the adversarial behaviour, it is still an im-
portant aspect to consider. If the ideal implementation fails to provide a desired
security level, there is no reason to design the corresponding cryptographic pro-
tocols. Secondly, a proper understanding of ideal world attacks provides an im-
portant insight into what kind of correspondence between ideal and real world
implementations is needed.
Recall that any externally consistent security goal can be formalised as a game,
see Section 5.1. Although protocol inputs are normally fixed, it is more instruc-
tive to first consider a game that measures average-case security.
GA◦
x← D
zobs ← GA◦id-atk(x)
return B(zobs)
That is, the challenger first draws inputs x = (x1, . . . , xn) from an input dis-
tribution D and then runs a sub-game Gid-atk(x) to simulate the ideal world
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Figure 5.2: Analysis of ideal addition protocol for an attack target x1 + xˆ2 = 42.
Dependence between the prior knowledge and the advantage on the left and
dependence between the advantage and the true value of x1 on the right.
attack, and finally evaluates a predicate B(·) on the set of observable outcomes
zobs = (z1, . . . , zn, za) to determine whether an attack was successful or not.
Now the maximal achievable advantage depends on the input distribution D
and on the maximal running time of A◦. Let us first consider the uniform distri-
bution Du where all plausible inputs are equiprobable. Then
AdvG(A
◦) =
1
|D| ·
∑
x∈D
AdvG(A
◦|x) , (5.1)
where
AdvG(A
◦|x) = Pr [zobs ← GA◦id-atk(x) : B(zobs) = 1] (5.2)
quantifies the success probability for a fixed input x.
As a concrete example, consider a scenario, where a cheating party P2 wins
if the output of ideal addition protocol is 42. For clarity, assume also that the
trusted third party T provides outputs to participants only if submitted inputs
x1, xˆ2 are in the range {0, 1, 2, . . . , 42}. As the output of P1 is z1 = (x1, y1),
the security goal B(z1, z2, za) = 1 iff y1 = x1 + xˆ2 = 42 is indeed legiti-
mate. Now the right sub-figure of Fig. 5.2 depicts graphically the dependence
of AdvG(A◦|x1) and shows clearly that different strategies can lead to different
trade-offs between maximal and minimal success. A sharp and peaky risk profile
AdvG(A
◦|x) indicates that the strategy is risky, since the success probability is
high for a few inputs. As the input x will rarely fall to the high success region,
the adversary executes an all-or-noting attack strategy. Conservative uniformly
flat risk profiles minimise the potential losses with the cost of decreasing the
maximal possible winning probability. That is, it is possible to win the game for
each input x, but the corresponding success probability is equally low.
As the time-success profile ε(t) w.r.t. Du limits the area under a risk profile, it
also determines the basic properties of various trade-offs. In particular, no t-time
strategy A◦ can guarantee AdvG(A◦|x) > ε(t) for all x and AdvG(A◦|x) ≈ ε(t)
for conservative strategies. Moreover, AdvG(A◦|x) ≥ c · ε(t) only for 1c fraction
of inputs and thus achieving high c values means taking a huge risk.
Situation can change drastically if an adversary has additional prior informa-
tion about the inputs. Formally, such prior information is modelled as a subjec-
tive input distribution D that characterises the adversaries beliefs on the likeli-
hood of various inputs. For example, the knowledge 7 ≤ x1 ≤ 17 is represented
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by the uniform distribution over {7, . . . , 17}. As the distribution D is fixed, the
adversary can find an optimal strategy A◦ that maximises AdvG(A◦) or evaluate
the subjective risk of missing a ε0-success region
Pr [x← D : Adv(A◦|x) ≤ ε0] . (5.3)
Again, the time-success profile ε(t) w.r.t. D describes basic choices for trade-
offs between risk and success. We emphasise here that using prior information
leads to sharper risk profiles and consequently a potential attacker may seriously
underperform if the used information is fraudulent. In other words, the potential
attacker must really believe in the validity of information.
For many tasks, we can even quantify the direct effect of prior information to
success probability. Namely, we can measure the information content in bits as a
difference between maximal and actual Shannon entropy of variables unknown
to the adversary, and compute the corresponding success bounds, see Fig. 5.2.
Similarly, we can quantify the inevitable privacy loss of a protocol as
∆H = H(Xprior)−H(Xpost) , (5.4)
where Xprior is the prior and Xpost is the posterior distribution of unknown vari-
ables and H(·) denotes Shannon entropy. Note that such bounds characterise
only average properties and may underestimate the privacy loss for concrete in-
puts. Nevertheless, if an ideal implementation causes a huge privacy loss mea-
sured in hundreds or thousands of bits, then it might be acceptable to have a
leakage of few extra bits in the real protocol to gain higher efficiency.
So far we have considered the situation from the adversarial viewpoint. The
choices of honest parties are even more difficult, as the expected attack strategy
depends on the risk tolerance and the prior knowledge of a potential adversary.
Therefore, one must make even more subjective assumptions about adversarial
behaviour. In principle, such choices can be summarised as a single randomised
adversarial strategy A◦. Consequently, we can use the corresponding security
profiles to make justified economical decisions about potential losses. In prac-
tice, one often makes the decision based on a hunch or has no choice at all. Still,
it is important to know that the basic security and the game theoretical properties
of the ideal model are captured by time-success and risk profiles.
5.3 THE REAL VERSUS IDEAL WORLD PARADIGM
Evidently, a protocol provides the highest achievable security level if it satisfies
all externally consistent security goals that are achievable in the ideal world.
Such a reductionist view is quite old and can be traced back to the early works of
Beaver, Micali and Rogaway [Bea91b, MR91b]. Our approach is based on the
formalisation given by Canetti and Goldreich [Can00a, Gol04]. However, there
are minor differences between our approach and the one pursued by Canetti
and Goldreich. We discuss these matters explicitly at the end of this section.
Formal definition of proximity. As a starting point, recall that any externally
consistent security goal can be formalised as a game between an adversary and
a challenger. More precisely, such a game can be split into online and offline
phases. The online phase of a gamemodels the attack against the protocol, where
5. SECURITY OF INTERACTIVE COMPUTATIONS 51
bb
b
Adv
t
t∗
0
ε∗
L
ow
er
bo
un
d
U
pp
er
b
ou
nd
b
b b
Upper bound
Lower bound
Adv
Input
Figure 5.3: Correspondence between ideal and real world models. A real world
time-success profile can be approximated with the corresponding ideal world
profile. Similarly, the risk profile of A◦ induces bounds for the risk profile of A.
all participants reach a final observable outcome zi. In the subsequent offline
phase, the challenger decides, based on the observable outcomes zobs whether
the attack was successful or not. Hence, the offline phase can be formalised as
a predicate B(·) that is independent of the implementation details and thus we
can compare ideal and real world implementations.
More formally, let Gre-atk and Gid-atk denote sub-games that model the execu-
tion of a real and an ideal protocol. Let A and A◦ be the corresponding real and
ideal world adversaries. Then, for any input distribution D, we can compare the
advantages of the corresponding security games:
GA
real
x← D
zobs ← GAre-atk(x)
return B(zobs)
GA◦
ideal
x← D
zobs ← GA◦id-atk(x)
return B(zobs)
The sub-game Gid-atk(x) is played as follows. The challenger runs the partic-
ipants P1, . . . ,Pn, T with inputs x = (x1, . . . , xn) and interacts with the ad-
versary A◦ according to the specification of the ideal world. In particular, the
challenger immediately halts the game if A◦ violates the description of tolerable
adversarial behaviour. Also, the challenger gives control over a participant Pi to
the adversary A◦ as soon as A◦ corrupts Pi. Finally, all participants P1, . . . ,Pn
and A◦ halt with some output values z1, . . . , zn and za and the corresponding
vector zobs = (z1, . . . , zn, za) is returned as an output of Gid-atk(x).
The specification of the sub-game Gre-atk(x) is similar. The challenger runs
the participants P1, . . . ,Pn with inputs x = (x1, . . . , xn) and interacts with the
adversary A according to the description of the protocol. Again, the challenger
halts the game immediately if A violates the description of tolerable adversarial
behaviour. Finally, all participants P1, . . . ,Pn and the adversary A halt and the
vector of observable outputs zobs is returned as an output of Gre-atk(x).
Now consider a situation where, for a fixed security goal B(·) and for any real
world adversary A, there exists a comparable ideal world adversary A◦ such that
the corresponding advantages are negligibly close
|Pr [GA
real
= 1]− Pr [GA◦
ideal
= 1]| ≤ ε (5.5)
for any input distribution D. Then the corresponding time-success profiles in
the real and ideal world are also close as illustrated in Fig. 5.3. More precisely,
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for any fixed input distribution and a time bound, we can execute the corre-
sponding optimal ideal world attack with a constant overhead in the real world.
The latter gives a lower bound for the time-success profile. The the correspon-
dence (B,A) 7→ A◦ that satisfies the inequality (5.5) explicitly determines the
corresponding upper bound. Moreover, as the correspondence (B,A) 7→ A◦
preserves closeness for all input distributions, then for any real world attack A,
there exists a generic attack A◦ with a similar risk profile and comparable run-
ning time that is applicable against any protocol that implements the functional-
ity. In other words, if an honest participant believes that a protocol π is insecure
due to the prior information acquired by other parties, then no other protocol
that implements the same functionality can be secure.
Note that the correspondence (B,A) 7→ A◦ must be independent of the in-
put distributionD, otherwise the ideal world attacker has more prior information
than the real world attacker. Namely, if the attack A◦ in the ideal world uses the
whole description ofD, then the dependence leaks information about inputs and
we lose privacy guarantees. Similarly, one should assume that A◦ corresponding
to A corrupts the same set of participants, otherwise the attack strategies A and
A◦ are incomparable. At the same time, the dependence on B(·) does not in-
troduce any side-effects, since the predicate B(·) is assumed to be known to all
attackers. In fact, an attacker is assumed to behave optimally w.r.t. B(·).
More generally, let the set of relevant security objectives B(·) be denoted as
B. Then a real and an ideal world model are (tre, tid, ε)-close w.r.t. the predicate
set B if for any tre-time A and B(·) ∈ B, there exists a tid-time ideal world
adversary A◦ such that for any input distribution D
|Pr [GA
real
= 1]− Pr [GA◦
ideal
= 1]| ≤ ε . (5.6)
Alternatively, we can view (tre, tid, ε)-closeness w.r.t. B as a reduction schema1
GA
real
MPC-SEC
====⇒
ε
GA◦
ideal
(5.7)
that can be applied to simplify analysis of security games, where the predicate
B(·) ∈ B is computed interactively after the completion of the protocol π; tre
limits the online complexity of an attack A and the inequality (5.6) limits the
discrepancy between GA
real
and GA◦
ideal
. See Sections 7.2-7.5 for further details.
Finally, note that the exact dependencies tid = tid(tre) and ε = ε(tre) are
important, as they determine the correspondence between the ideal and the real
world time-success profiles ε0(t) and ε1(t). Indeed, let tπ be the total running
time of the protocol π and ε(tre) the right hand side of (5.6). Then any ideal
world attack can be carried out in the real world with a constant tπ-time over-
head. Similarly, the correspondence (B,A) 7→ A◦ assures that any tre-time real
world attack has tid-time ideal world counterpart. Consequently, we get
ε0(tre − tπ) ≤ ε1(tre) ≤ ε0(tid(tre)) + ε(tre) . (5.8)
In short, the time-success profiles are comparable ε0(t) ≈ ε1(t) only if ε(tre) is
small and time bounds tre and tid are comparable. Note that the inequality (5.8)
1The name of the reduction schema MPC-SEC emphasises the fact that the reduction
schemata can be applied as the protocol pi is secure in the multi-party sense.
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is more precise if we assume that the computational effort done by the trusted
third party T is free for the ideal world adversary A◦.
The choice of relevant predicates. The most conservative alternative is to
include all predicates B : {0, 1}n+1 → {0, 1} into the set B. Such a choice
implicitly states that the real world and the ideal world implementations lead to
comparable outputs even if the computational process following the protocol is
unbounded. We can talk about statistical (tre, tid, ε)-closeness of the real world
and the ideal world if B consists of all possible predicates. Alternatively, we
can assume that the adversary is computationally unbounded. Then bounds on
the online complexities tre and tid become irrelevant and we can talk about ε-
closeness of the real and the ideal world. Both notions of statistical closeness lead
to externally consistent security models. However, the nature of these security
guarantees is completely different, see Section 6.2 for further discussion.
Statistical closeness is unachievable for most cryptographic tasks, since many
cryptographic primitives, like (asymmetric) encryption, hash functions and dig-
ital signatures, are secure only due to our limited computational abilities. Also,
one often needs security guarantees only for limited time intervals. For exam-
ple, in many countries secret governmental information is usually declassified
after 25–75 years. Therefore, it makes sense to consider the set of time-bounded
predicates B or add even more severe restrictions. In particular, we can talk
about computational (tre, tpr, tid, ε)-closeness between the real and the ideal
world when the set B consists of all tpr-time predicates. The latter gives se-
curity guarantees for all scenarios, where the total time needed to post-process
the protocol outputs and to evaluate the success criterion is less than tpr.
Comparison with the standard approach. As said before, our approach is
slightly different from the mainstream formalisation [Can00a, Gol04]. In the
classical formalisation, the correspondence A 7→ A◦ between real and ideal
adversaries must be universal for all predicates B(·) ∈ B and input distributions
D. In other words, given an adversary A, we can find a corresponding universal
adversary A◦ that works equally well for all possible security objectives B(·) and
we get a seemingly stronger security guarantee. However, such an appearance
is deceptive, since for each security goal B(·), time bound tid, level of prior
information specified as D and risk tolerance, there exists an optimal generic
attack A◦∗ that already depends on B(·). Hence, even if the map A 7→ A◦ is
independent of B(·), we must still estimate the success in terms of A◦∗:
AdvGreal(A) ≤ AdvGideal(A◦) + ε ≤ AdvGideal(A◦∗) + ε . (5.9)
Consequently, the independence from B(·) does not have any effect on time-
success or risk profiles. Also, one cannot rationally eliminate the possibility that
an attacker actually knows his or her attack target B(·) and can thus use both
schemes to convert his or her attack to the universal attack A◦.
In Section 7.3 we also show that both formalisations are quantitatively equiv-
alent for static adversaries, i.e., the choice of formalism is just a matter of taste.
From a practical viewpoint, there is no difference anyway, as standard security
proofs provide a construction of A◦ that depends only on A. Recall that reduc-
tion schemata are usually stated in terms of computational distance and conse-
quently we get natural bounds for cdtpr
zobs
(GA
re-atk,GA◦id-atk).
Another small but still important difference lies in the way we treat corrup-
tion. Note that corruption is not objectively observable, since it describes the
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internal state of a participant, which may or may not influence the observable
outcomes. In particular, a predicate B(·) cannot treat zi differently depending
on whether Pi is corrupt or not, since such a dependence would lead to exter-
nally inconsistent security goals. In practice, one can detect corruption with
high probability by forcing each participant Pi to prove in zero-knowledge that
he or she knows an input xi and randomness ωi that would lead to the observed
protocol transcript. However, the latter is already a new protocol.
Various levels of security. The correspondence between the real and the ideal
world implementations is amazingly flexible. The description of the ideal world
model, the tolerated adversarial behaviour and the set of relevant predicates B
are the three fundamental factors that determine the corresponding security
guarantees. Intelligent variation of these basic factors can produce myriads of
relevant security models. However, four of them are more essential than the oth-
ers, since they formalise somewhat canonical security objectives. The following
four sections are dedicated to these fundamental models.
5.4 SECURITY IN SEMI-HONEST MODEL
Semi-honest model provides the weakest but still meaningful security guaran-
tees. Briefly, semi-honest participants follow the protocol description, but qui-
etly store all intermediate values and later try to deduce some extra information
about the remaining inputs or outputs. Hence, semi-honest behaviour is always
possible, unless we take extreme organisational measures to assure that inter-
nal computational results cannot be stored. Moreover, note that the following
formal definition captures only the basic privacy requirements, as malicious be-
haviour is prohibited and the outputs cannot be tampered with.
Definition 2. A protocol π is (tre, tid, tpr, ε)-private w.r.t. the idealised function-
ality f1, . . . , fn and the adversarial structure A in the semi-honest model if the
corresponding real and ideal world models are (tre, tid, tpr, ε)-close. That is, for
any tre-time adversary A and for any tpr-time predicate B(·), there exists a tid-
time ideal world adversary A◦ such that for any input distribution D
|Pr [GA
real
= 1]− Pr [GA◦
ideal
= 1]| ≤ ε . (5.10)
Some important details in the definition are worth stressing. First, the time
difference tid− tre quantifies the maximal computational gain that the adversary
may achieve. Second, the bound tpr determines the maximal time complexity
of a post-processing phase that preserves security. Third, ideal world model is
flexible enough to accommodate any general purpose security objective.
Non-cryptographers often complain that the formalism is overly restrictive
in practice, since participants may tolerate bigger information leakage than is
needed to compute the outputs. However, it is surprisingly simple to model
such protocols by providing a proper description of an ideal world model. More
precisely, assume that participants need to compute a functionality fˆ1, . . . , fˆn,
however, they are willing to leak f1, . . . , fn instead. This setting is meaningful
only if the desired outputs can be computed from the leaked ones:
fˆi(x1, . . . , xn) = gi
(
fi(x1, . . . , xn)
)
. (5.11)
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Consequently, we can consider an ideal world model, where the participants
P1, . . . ,Pn first use a trusted third party T to get replies fi(x1, . . . , xn) and after
that locally compute yˆi = gi(yi). That is, a non-corrupted party Pi deletes yi and
outputs zi = (xi, yˆi). The computational closeness between the real and the
ideal world models implies that the semi-honest node Pi cannot learn anything
beyond yi but at the same time the protocol π must correctly reproduce only
the values yˆi. Therefore, we can easily analyse protocols where the outputs are
strictly less informative than potentially leaked information. In the limiting case,
one can reveal enough information, so that each participant can compute all
protocol messages, i.e., the methodology is universally applicable.
As a concrete example, consider private evaluation of randomised approxima-
tion algorithms [FIM+06]. In such settings, the distribution of approximations
fˆi(x1, . . . , xn) can be simulated knowing only fi(x1, . . . , xn) and we can for-
malise the maximal leakage as f1, . . . , fn. Similarly, we can formalise security
for the protocols that sometimes fail to produce the correct output. In fact, we
can state the correctness requirement as a separate property.
Definition 3. A failure probability δ for a protocol π is the maximal probability
that the obtained outputs yˆi differ from the intended outputs fi(x1, . . . , xn) in
the semi-honest model. A protocol π is called correct if there are no failures.
One can often achieve significant gains in efficiency by allowing negligible
failure probability. For example, many protocols for private predicate evaluation
based on homomorphic encryption and oblivious polynomial evaluation have a
small tunable failure probability. See the articles [Fis01, FNP04, BK04, KS05]
for the most prominent examples and [LLM05, LL07] for the author’s results.
We emphasise that any efficiently computable functionality can be privately
evaluated. Yao was the first theoretician to state these completeness theorems
for the semi-honest model [Yao82, Yao86]. We refer to the manuscript [LP04]
for the corresponding proofs and historical remarks. For the multi-party pro-
tocols, these completeness theorems were first proven by Goldreich, Micali
and Wigderson for the computational setting [GMW87]. The information-
theoretical setting where the adversary is unbounded was covered only a year
later [BOGW88, CCD88]. See the articles [MR91b, Bea91b, Can00a, Gol04]
for further historical references.
5.5 INPUT-PRIVACY IN MALICIOUS MODEL
Before going any further, note that the privacy in the semi-honest model captures
two different security goals: input-privacy and output-privacy. Moreover, these
goals are quite loosely coupled. As an example, consider a randomised proto-
col, where participants generate outputs locally without using inputs. Then the
protocol preserves the privacy of these inputs even if participants broadcast all
outputs. Similarly, the privacy of outputs is preserved when participants broad-
cast all inputs. For deterministic functionalities, output-privacy implies input-
privacy, since additional knowledge about inputs leaks information about out-
puts. Also, it is evident that output-privacy and correctness guarantees are tightly
coupled when the adversary can deviate from the protocol description, since the
ability to influence outputs violates privacy constraints.
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Consequently, input-privacy is one of the weakest security objectives that still
makes sense in the malicious model, where a coalition of corrupted parties can
arbitrarily deviate from the protocol description. Moreover, input-privacy itself
is an economically justified design goal for some settings.
Consider a video on demand service as an illustrative example. Assume that a
single subscription server delivers content decryption keys to all potential clients.
The functionality and the threats are asymmetric for this setting. As there are
thousands, if not millions, potential subscribers, it is impossible to guarantee
semi-honest behaviour for all clients. However, we can still use organisational
methods to assure that the server is semi-honest. Also, the service provider itself
is economically motivated to ensure that an honest client gets the desired out-
put. On the other hand, the service provider must limit potential information
leakages against a coalition of malicious clients.
Input-privacy is formally defined in terms of interactive hypothesis testing,
where a malicious adversary tries to verify hypotheses about protocol inputs. Al-
though it is sufficient to bound the total running time, we separate online and
offline attack complexities to achieve more precise classification. More formally,
let the set Bza(tpr) consists of all tpr-time predicates B(z1, . . . , zn, za) = B(za)
that can be computed offline by the adversary in the following definition.
Definition 4. A protocol is (tre, tid, tpr, ε)-input-private w.r.t. the idealised func-
tionality f1, . . . , fn and the adversarial structureA in the malicious model if the
corresponding real and ideal world models are (tre, tid, ε)-close w.r.t. Bza(tpr).
That is, for any tre-time adversary A and for any tpr-time predicate B(·) in the
form B(z1, . . . , zn, za) = B(za), there exists a tid-time ideal world adversary A◦
such that for any input distribution D
|Pr [GA
real
= 1]− Pr [GA◦
ideal
= 1]| ≤ ε . (5.12)
Input-privacy is strictly weaker than the complete security in the malicious
model and thus input-private protocols are often more efficient. In particular,
no non-trivial protocol can be secure in the malicious model and have only two
rounds, see the discussions in [GK96b, KO04]. Nevertheless, many two-round
protocols do achieve input-privacy. For example, standard security definitions
of oblivious transfer [NP99a, AIR01] require input-privacy with respect to un-
bounded receivers and computationally bounded senders. The same security
requirements are often posed for other two-round client-server protocols, where
only one participant obtains the output. One of the articles included into the
thesis [LL07] investigates a certain subclass of two round client-server protocols
and provides an automatic compilation technique, which converts any private
protocol in the semi-honest model to an input-private protocol in the malicious
model. The transformation preserves round complexity and has a relatively small
overhead for many practical protocols.
5.6 OUTPUT-CONSISTENCY IN MALICIOUS MODEL
For many applications, input-privacy is not enough as honest parties need also
explicit correctness guarantees. In particular, malicious behaviour should be de-
tectable and one should be able to issue verifiable complaints about cheating.
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Figure 5.4: Ideal world model of output-consistent computations.
Now such correctness guarantees come in two flavours: honest parties may ei-
ther detect malicious behaviour in general, or only the malicious changes in the
outcomes. The second design goal can be viewed as output-consistency.
Observe that output-consistency is strictly weaker than complete security.
Namely, if a malicious participant can alter his or her behaviour so that the
outputs are changed only for few inputs x ∈ X , then a public complaint about
such a change reveals that x ∈ X . The latter is not true for complete security,
since the corresponding complaint only implies that the outputs could have been
altered for some inputs. Therefore, output-consistency usually causes a signifi-
cantly smaller overhead than complete security. Moreover, output-consistency is
an economically justified design goal for scenarios, where trustworthy reputation
is worth more than the potential gain achieved by cheating.
Informally, a protocol is output-consistent if a malicious adversary cannot
tamper the outputs without causing honest parties to halt. More formally, an ad-
versary has partial control over the ideal protocol π◦. A non-corruptible trusted
party T still computes the outcomes of a protocol, however, a halting-machine
H controls the delivery of outputs, see Fig. 5.4. That is, the halting-machine H
gets inputs x1, . . . , xn from T and sends back zero-one verdicts s1, . . . , sn. Next,
the trusted third party T sends the output yi to the participant Pi only if si = 1.
The communication between the halting-machine H and the adversary A◦ is
unidirectional—only the adversary A◦ can send messages to H. Formally, it is
sufficient to assume that H is a universal computing device such that the ad-
versary A◦ can start H by sending the initial program code φ and possibly later
fine-tune H by sending additional instructions.
Definition 5. A protocol is (tre, tid, tpr, ε)-output-consistent w.r.t. the idealised
functionality f1, . . . , fn and the adversarial structure A in the malicious model
if the corresponding real and ideal world models are (tre, tid, tpr, ε)-close. That
is, for any tre-time adversary A and for any tpr-time predicate B(·), there exists a
tid-time ideal world adversary A◦ such that for any input distribution D
|Pr [GA
real
= 1]− Pr [GA◦
ideal
= 1]| ≤ ε . (5.13)
First, observe that an output-consistent protocol must also be private in the
semi-honest model and input-private in the malicious model. Second, the exact
interaction pattern between A◦ and H determines the maximal expressiveness of
leaked predicates when an honest participant issues a rightful complaint. There-
fore, it makes sense to characterise the underlying structure of these predicates.
Sometimes one can show that H always evaluates predicates that have a simple
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structure, see our manuscript [LL06] for further discussion. Finally, the com-
putational effort done by H should be free for A◦ to make the correspondence
between the ideal and the real world time-success profiles more tight.
The concept of output-consistency can be traced back to the classical works
on secure multi-party computation [FY92, CFGN96, CO99], where authors
consider detectability of malicious behaviour. However, none of them clearly
formulates the ideal world model. The concept has also implicitly surfaced as a
natural design property for adaptive oblivious transfer [NP99b], since it is almost
trivial to achieve. Recently, Aumann and Lindell generalised these early notions
and proposed three alternative security models [AL07]. However, their formu-
lations are strictly weaker than output-consistency, as none of them guarantees
even input-privacy nor the ability to detect altered outputs.
Output-consistency also alleviates the problem of false accusations. When a
complaint is issued about malicious behaviour in an input-private protocol, one
has to prove his or her innocence. Since tampering with outputs is detectable
in an output-consistent protocol, the burden of proof lies on persons who raise
complaints. In particular, malicious coalition cannot frame honest participants
if one can use digital signatures to protect the authenticity of protocol messages.
This property is specially useful in the client-server scenarios, where clients have
different access rights and the server may rightfully fail for some queries, e.g.
private inference control problem [WS04]. However, there is a slight difference
between two- and multi-party protocols. In two-party protocols, an output failure
exposes the malicious participant, whereas the latter is not a priori true in the
multi-party setting. Hence, we can talk about a stronger form of consistency that
also reveals some maliciously acting participants.
5.7 COMPLETE SECURITY IN MALICIOUS MODEL
The highest attainable security level in the malicious model is of course the com-
putational closeness between the real world and ideal world without a halting-
machine H. In this case, malicious participants can cause only non-selective
protocol failures and public complaints reveal nothing about inputs.
Definition 6. A protocol is (tre, tid, tpr, ε)-secure w.r.t. the idealised functionality
f1, . . . , fn and the adversarial structure A in the malicious model if the corre-
sponding real and ideal world models are (tre, tid, tpr, ε)-close. That is, for any
tre-time adversary A and for any tpr-time predicate B(·), there exists a tid-time
ideal world adversary A◦ such that for any input distribution D
|Pr [GA
real
= 1]− Pr [GA◦
ideal
= 1]| ≤ ε . (5.14)
A major drawback of secure protocols is the overhead needed to achieve se-
curity, since all participants have to prove that they obey the protocol without
disclosing their inputs and random coins. The latter can be done with zero-
knowledge proofs of correctness, using the famous GMW-compiler [GMW87],
or with verifiable secret sharing [BOGW88, CCD88] in the information theo-
retical setting. See also the state of the art results [Pin03, KO04, LP07] for Yao’s
two-party computation and its extensions to multi-party case [BMR90].
It is well known that secure protocols can be practically intractable when the
input size is large and functionalities have a large circuit complexity. Also, the
5. SECURITY OF INTERACTIVE COMPUTATIONS 59
⊘· · ·
Ideal implementation
pi
◦
A
◦
Pn· · ·P1 P2
z1 z2
zn za
S
za
Services
Figure 5.5: Canonical constructive correspondence between adversaries.
strength of organisational and physical methods is often enough to protect the
computational processes and thus lower security levels are sufficient.
In particular, the difference between output-consistency and complete secu-
rity can be marginal. Recall that issuing a complaint in output-consistent pro-
tocols reveals one bit of extra information. Consequently, such a leak may be a
reasonable sacrifice for additional efficiency, if the protocol output itself reveals
hundreds or thousands of bits. Moreover, adversaries must take a tremendous
subjective risks to learn beyond 20 bits of new information. Namely, let D be
a subjective probability distribution that describes the adversaries prior knowl-
edge about the inputs. Then the maximal entropy loss due to selective halting
is H(s1, . . . , sn), where s1, . . . , sn are halting decisions made by H and the en-
tropy is computed with respect to D. Hence, the adversary must take a risk of
being exposed with a subjective probability 2−k to learn k bits.
Another interesting aspect that is worth commenting is the issue of correct-
ness guarantees raised by Micali and Rogaway [MR91a]. Namely, the compu-
tational closeness between the real and the ideal world models does not guar-
antee that honest participants obtain the correct values, rather they are tpr-
indistinguishable from the values obtained in the ideal world. We can naturally
strengthen the correctness constraints, if we considers only the subclass of nice
adversaries that append a flag corrupted to outputs of all corrupted participants.
Namely, we must consider an additional set of predicates Bcor that consists of all
predicates that ignore the inputs zi with the flag corrupted, i.e., require that the
outputs of honest parties are statistically indistinguishable from the ideal world.
Formally, this strengthening is externally inconsistent, since the corruption is not
an externally observable phenomenon. Nevertheless, any hostile adversary can
be converted to the corresponding nice adversary with minimal overhead so that
the end result of a security game does not change. Hence, in principle such a
strengthening can be incorporated into the model.
5.8 CANONICAL CONSTRUCTIVE CORRESPONDENCE
Note that all security definitions given above require a correspondence between
the real and the ideal world adversaries. A canonical way to achieve such a
correspondence is based on code wrappers that internally run a real world adver-
sary and translate their actions into legitimate ideal world attacks, see Fig. 5.5.
Briefly, a code wrapper Sim is guaranteed to succeed if it manages to simulate
the protocol execution for an adversary A. Thus, it is more common to use a
term simulator instead. We emphasise that a simulator Sim has complete con-
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trol over the real adversary A. In particular, the simulator Sim provides random
coins and timer services to A. The simulator Sim can also restart or rewind A to
acquire extra knowledge or to bypass security checks in the protocol. All other
participants see the algorithm pair (Sim,A) as an ideal world adversary A◦, i.e.,
Sim can corrupt ideal world participants and interact with the halt machine H.
Most security proofs are based on black-box simulation, where the simula-
tor Sim does not inspect nor manipulate the internal state and random coins of
the adversary A. Necessary information is gathered from the protocol messages
exchanged between Sim and A. The latter is not compulsory in white-box
reductions, where Sim may act arbitrarily. Nevertheless, white-box reductions
must be somehow constructive, or otherwise we are no closer to the correspon-
dence (B,A) 7→ A◦. Generally, white-box reductions use some sort of adversary
dependent information to interact with the adversary A.
Simulatability as a security criterion appeared only after the discovery of zero-
knowledge proofs [GMR85] and early definitions of secure multi-party compu-
tations [Yao82, Yao86] were given in terms of maximal indistinguishability. For
clarity, consider two-party computations with a corrupted node P1 in the semi-
honest model. Then an adversary A should be unable to distinguish protocol
runs corresponding to the inputs x2 and xˆ2 whenever f1(x1, x2) = f1(x1, xˆ2).
Now, if the adversary A is good in predicting a function g(x1, x2), then g must
be constant over the class of inputs
Mx1,y = {(x1, x2) : f1(x1, x2) = y} (5.15)
or we get a contradiction with the basic properties of semantic security, see Sec-
tion 3.2. Consequently, A cannot predict anything that is not expressible in
terms of x1 and y. However, the limitation does not apply for the functions g
that can be computed from x1 and y. For example, assume that F is a permu-
tation that is hard to invert and consider a protocol, where the participant P2
sends a message e = F−1(x2) to P1 who outputs y1 = F (e) = x2. Then the
protocol runs corresponding to the same output y1 are indistinguishable by the
construction. However, the participant P1 learns F−1(x2), which is difficult to
obtain from the output x2 alone. Therefore, the approach based on the maxi-
mal indistinguishability is unsuitable, since it does not provide adequate security
guarantees for all target functions g(x1, x2).
Simulating the protocol execution in the ideal world can be quite challeng-
ing. Fortunately, the semi-honest model has two important properties that make
the task easier. First, the adversary A cannot change the inputs of corrupted par-
ties. Second, the adversary A must follow the protocol and it is sufficient if the
simulator Sim can simulate all messages sent to corrupted parties. Let C be the
set of corrupted parties and C be its complement. Then simulating a static ad-
versary A is particularly straightforward. The simulator Sim first corrupts nodes
that belong to C, submits their inputs (xi)i∈C to the trusted third party T and
uses the received values (fi(x))i∈C to simulate all messages sent to C in the real
execution. Adaptive and mobile corruption makes the task more difficult, since
the simulator Sim must decide when to submit inputs to T and assure that the
adversary’s view remains consistent after a new corruption instruction.
Providing a good simulation in the malicious model is more demanding, as a
simulator Sim cannot automatically submit inputs (xi)i∈C . Namely, a malicious
adversary A can always replace the initial input xi of a corrupted node Pi by
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Figure 5.6: Canonical structure of a simulation procedure.
a new value xˆi and thus Sim must reconstruct the actual inputs (xˆi)i∈C . Con-
sequently, the simulation must follow a specific structure depicted in Fig. 5.6.
Briefly, the simulator must first extract all inputs of corrupted parties and then,
given corresponding outputs, continue the simulation appropriately.
Extractability. If we want to achieve a black-box simulation, the simulator must
extract inputs from the messages sent by corrupted participants. In particular,
one should be able to extract the inputs of a semi-honest coalition. Such an ex-
traction property seems to contradict input-privacy. However, such impression is
misleading, as the powers of a simulator and adversary are always asymmetric. In
the multi-party setting, the asymmetry is achieved by the clever choice of the ad-
versarial structureA. Namely, the adversarial structureA is often chosen so that
a complement C of a plausible coalition C ∈ A can never be corrupted. Thus,
the simulator can form a malicious coalition C that is large enough to extract the
inputs (xi)i∈C from the received protocol messages, whereas the coalition C is
impossible in the real protocol.
The same trick does not work for protocols with honest minority, where an
adversary can corrupt as many or even more parties than a simulator. Corre-
sponding security proofs use another important asymmetry. Namely, the simula-
tor Sim can always rewind A to previous states and then change messages sent to
A. Thus, the simulator Sim can restore xˆi by observing many correlated protocol
transcripts, whereas the latter is impossible for an adversary A.
Equivocability. Observe that a protocol is input-private only if a protocol binds
all participants to their future outputs. For the sake of contradiction, assume that
an adversary A can legitimately change the inputs after the extraction of inputs
(xˆi)i∈C . Namely, A can efficiently find yet another set of inputs (x˜i)i∈C and
random coins (ωi)i∈C such that messages exchanged so far are consistent with
the protocol. Then the adversary A can clearly learn (y˜i)i∈C instead of (yˆi)i∈C
obtained by the simulator. Consequently, the new set of outputs (y˜i)i∈C must
be efficiently computable from the old ones (yˆi)i∈C . For most protocols, this
implies that (y˜i)i∈C ≡ (yˆi)i∈C for all legitimate input changes (x˜i)i∈C .
For many protocols, such an implicit or explicit commitment to the outputs
creates another problem, since the simulator Sim itself does not know (yˆi)i∈C in
the extraction phase. As a result, Sim must be able to legitimately retrofit the out-
puts (yˆi)i∈C . More precisely, the simulator Sim must produce a continuation for
the protocol run that leads to (yˆi)i∈C if A behaves honestly after the extraction.
Hence, we have a similar asymmetry as before. For malicious parties, the pro-
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tocol must be binding, and for the simulator, the protocol must be equivocable.
Again, a clever choice of the adversarial structureA can create the desired asym-
metry of powers for multi-party protocols. For two-party protocols, we must use
rewinding to bypass consistency checks that force (y˜i)i∈C ≡ (yˆi)i∈C . Moreover,
it is often impossible to rewind the entire extraction phase to retrofit the desired
outputs, as the latter may change the extractable inputs (xˆi)i∈C .
Trusted setup. Many protocols use a special setup procedure, where a trusted
dealer either broadcasts a single message or provides a trustworthy public key
infrastructure. Note that the trusted dealer exists only in the real world model
and thus a simulator can corrupt the trusted dealer in the ideal world to achieve
extractability and equivocability. Hence, we can construct non-rewinding sim-
ulators also for two-party protocols where rewinding is otherwise unavoidable.
Since the rewinding techniques do not scale well for parallel compositions, the
trusted setup procedures are the only known way to achieve composability in the
two-party setting, see Section 7.7 for more detailed discussion.
To summarise, the canonical constructive correspondence is achievable only
by explicit embedding of trapdoor mechanisms that violate both input-privacy
and output-consistency. The latter causes a tension between the security and
simulation, which is always resolved by introducing the asymmetry of powers
between the simulator and the adversary. In less formal terms, no protocol can
be “unconditionally” secure in all settings.
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6 ALTERNATIVE SECURITY MODELS
Exact quantification of security properties is only one of many paradigms used
in cryptography. Therefore, it is important to know the connections between
exact security and its alternatives. We start from asymptotic security, since it is
probably the most popular and widely studied alternative approach. Note that
the initial simplicity of asymptotic security models is highly deceptive. In fact,
even the notion of polynomial security varies in cryptographic literature. There-
fore, we first formalise the limiting process that is needed to define asymptotic
security and then explore common formalisations. As a result, we obtain the de-
scription of eight asymptotic security models and a corresponding hierarchy that
characterises the qualitative relations between these models.
Subjective security models are another common alternative to exact security.
The main difference between objective and subjective security models lies in
the choice of possible adversaries. Objective security models can only restrict
available computing resources, whereas subjective security models can place ad-
ditional constraints on the set of potential adversaries. For example, all security
definitions that consider only uniform adversaries are actually subjective, since
a potential attacker is not allowed to choose algorithms that are optimal for con-
crete security parameters. We remark here that subjective security models are
quite popular in cryptographic literature. For example, the random oracle, the
ideal cipher and the generic group model are all subjective security models,
since the corresponding security guarantees are meaningful in practice only if
we are willing to make certain subjective assumptions about the set of possible
adversarial algorithms. Finally, subjective security notions are also appropriate
when we consider protocols with trusted setup, see Section 6.4.
Subjective and objective security models share many technical similarities
but there are also important conceptual differences. Most importantly, it is im-
possible to formalise certain natural security properties without using the notion
of subjective security. In Section 6.4, we discuss these limitations more thor-
oughly and explain why objective approach is destined to fail in some settings.
In Section 6.5, we rigorously formalise the notion of subjective security that al-
lows us to escape these limitations. We also show that the corresponding security
proofs are technically very close to standard proofs. Namely, a standard security
proofs is also valid in the subjective setting if it is strictly constructive. Neverthe-
less, it might be challenging to find strictly constructive proofs, especially since
the proof methodology presented in Chapter 4 is actually non-constructive. For-
tunately, most of these non-constructive proof steps can be eliminated. We de-
scribe the corresponding semi-automatic techniques in Section 6.7. As a result,
we can still describe proofs by using game trees and reduction schemata, and
thus hide tedious technical details.
6.1 SCALABILITY AND POLYNOMIAL SECURITY
It is easy to see that all conditional security proofs just reduce the amount of
unjustified trust by isolating few essential simplistic assumptions that guarantee
the security of the entire construction. However, all instantiations of these basic
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primitives are currently heuristic and the corresponding security guarantees are
essentially unknown. Although there are some numerical security estimates for
these basic primitives, they are based on empirical experiments or on heuristic
claims, and thus likely to change over time. Moreover, the amount of available
computing power is also likely to increase in time. Therefore, it is not wise to
design protocols so that the underlying primitives cannot be replaced.
Fortunately, cryptographic constructions and protocols are seldomly tied to
specific building blocks, such as the 128-bit MD5 hash function, and can thus
be “regularly” updated to take advantage of more powerful computing devices
and ensure the proper safety margin against plausible attacks. As conditional se-
curity proofs abstract away all unnecessary implementation details, we can view
a cryptographic construction as a parametrised template, i.e., we can increase
the security level by using stronger but slower basic primitives.
Let k be a security parameter that indexes both a sequence of basic primi-
tives and the construction in question. For clarity, assume that security can be
characterised by the advantage
ε(k) = max
A∈A(k)
AdvG
k
(A) , (6.1)
where G
k
captures the attack against the construction π
k
and A(k) is the set of all
t(k)-time adversaries. W.l.o.g. we can assume that t(k) is an increasing function
and ε(k) is a decreasing function. Let us also define a relative security margin
δ(k) =
t(k)
τ(k)
, (6.2)
where τ(k) denotes the overall running time of π
k
. Note that essential algorith-
mic and cryptographic properties of the construction family (π
k
) are determined
by the functions τ(·), t(·), ε(·), δ(·). For example, one can determine appropri-
ate security level k. To achieve (t0, ε0)-security, one has to choose minimal k0
such that ε(k0) ≤ ε0 and t(k0) ≤ t0 provided that running time τ(k0) is still
feasible in practice. To make similar economical decisions, one must consider
rescalings that characterise true costs and gains. Since the underlying principle
of analysis remains the same, we consider only the algorithmic aspects.
The choice of the security parameter is quite arbitrary, usually it describes
important implementation details, such as the bit length of the RSA modulus.
From a theoretical viewpoint it is advantageous to identify k with the maximal
running time τ(k) that is needed to complete the protocol π
k
. Then we must
consider only the properties of ε(·) and δ(·). For obvious reasons, a decreasing
safety margin δ(·) implies that the construction becomes more vulnerable in
the future. More generally, a construction is sustainable in the long run only if
the function δ(k) is increasing and ε(k) is decreasing fast enough. Hence, it is
tempting to analyse only the limiting behaviour of δ(·) and ε(·).
When one considers asymptotic behaviour, polynomial-time algorithms are
special. Mostly, because the class of polynomially bounded functions poly(k)
is the first nontrivial class of functions that contains the identity function and
is closed under the multiplication and superposition. The latter is sufficient to
prove that the notion of polynomial-time algorithms is machine independent
and the corresponding set of algorithms is closed under recursive composition.
Mainly because of these reasons, Cobham and Edmonds postulated already in
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Figure 6.1: A construction may be completely insecure, although for each poly-
nomial time bound t(k) the advantage εAi(k) ∈ negl(k) for any algorithm Ai.
the early 1960s that the set of feasible and polynomial algorithms must coin-
cide [Cob64, Edm65]. This description of tractability was quickly adopted by
other theoreticians and it led to the birth of the complexity theory.
Cryptographers reached an analogous consensus and postulated that a con-
struction family (π
k
) is asymptotically secure if for all polynomial safety bounds
δ(k) ∈ poly(k) the corresponding advantage decreases faster than a recipro-
cal of any polynomial, i.e., ε(k) ∈ negl(k). More precisely, we can talk about
uniform and non-uniform polynomial security model. The essential difference
between the models is in the definition of the set A(k). In the non-uniform
model, the set A(k) consists of all t(k)-time algorithms and thus represents ob-
jective security. The uniform model is a subjective security model, since the
model assumes that an adversary uses a single self-tunable algorithm A for all
attacks. Formally, the set A(k) consists of a single t(k)-time algorithm A
k
that
is obtained from A by feeding k as the first argument. As the universal algo-
rithm A is unknown, the advantage εA(k) must be asymptotically negligible for
all algorithms A and polynomial time bounds t(k) ∈ poly(k).
The uniform security model is completely natural under a super-strong artifi-
cial intelligence assumption. If we believe that any intelligent behaviour can be
outperformed by an artificial intelligence—an algorithm A, then we may indeed
set A(k) = {A
k
} and study the limitations of intelligent reasoning. For more
conservative readers, it is evident that uniform security model provides ques-
tionable security guarantees. Namely, security in the uniform model does not
exclude the possibility that a potential adversary may achieve constant advantage
by cleverly choosing algorithms for each instance, as depicted in Fig. 6.1. From
this perspective, the naming convention is awfully misleading, as the uniform
model assures only pointwise convergence of security guarantees, whereas the
non-uniform model assures fast uniform convergence over all algorithms.
On a more practical note, observe that advances in computing technology
show rather interesting trends. Although available computing power has grown
in an exponential pace, the approximate ratio between ordinary and maximal
available computing power has always been more or less constant with occa-
sional fluctuations. Fig. 6.2 illustrates these trends by comparing the computa-
tional capabilities of widely accessible computing devices and the fastest super-
computers throughout the entire history of computing. In particular, note that
the available adversarial power t has always been in the range
10 · τ ≤ t ≤ 100, 000 · τ , (6.3)
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of conventional and supercomputers on the left and the
corresponding dependence between honest and adversarial power on the right.
Computing power measured in MIPS and the data is taken from [Mor98].
where τ is the power of an ordinary computing device. Of course, the capabil-
ities of the fastest supercomputer do not adequately characterise the total com-
puting power available in the world. On the other hand, this measure clearly
indicates how much monetary resources organisations are willing to spend on
extremely important computational tasks and thus the estimate is adequate for
practical purposes. Consequently, one can argue that the polynomial security
model is overly conservative in the context of short-term security. In particular,
non-existence proofs in the asymptotic security models are not convincing, un-
less they hold for all superlinear time bounds t(k) ∈ ω(k). The latter was the
main reason why we established such strong non-existence proofs in [LN06].
Note that the ratio between ordinary and adversarial power is bounded even
for longer time periods provided that the growth rate is not super-exponential. Of
course, we cannot make irrefutable conclusions, since the empirical evidence is
rather limited and not collected for cryptographic purposes. Still, one should
be extremely careful in interpreting results that are obtained in the asymptotic
setting. Both positive and negative results obtained in the asymptotic security
model are usually inconclusive, unless they have explicitly stated and practi-
cal time bounds. For example, the first proposal for the public key cryptosys-
tem [Mer78]—so called Merkle’s puzzle system—has only a quadratic relative
safety margin and thus it is insecure in polynomial security model. However, in
practice an ordinary computer can do 1011 operations in minutes, whereas 1022
operations takes roughly 1 year on Blue Gene/L. In other words, a quadratic se-
curity margin is already sufficient for short time security and the gap is growing
with every year, since the computing power becomes cheaper and cheaper.
On the other hand, many constructions that are asymptotically secure under
reasonable assumptions, such as Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem [AD97], are insecure
for all practical parameter sizes [NS98]. Going even further, note that a generic
encoding of an NP-problem as a CNF-SAT formula leads to quadratic blow-
up and thus a quadratic safety margin might be preserved even if CNF-SAT
problems can be solved in linear time. As a result, even a constructive proof for
the statementP = NP does not rule out the existence of practical cryptographic
primitives. Similarly, the existence of asymptotically secure cryptography does
not rule out the existence of efficient adversarial algorithms for all practical time
bounds. To summarise, life is not so dull as Impagliazzo’s famous five world
model [Imp95] predicts: cryptography might be a booming business even in
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Figure 6.3: Relations between asymptotic security models. Hatched arrows de-
note implications with known separations, the others are believed to be strict.
Symbols -u- and -n- denote uniform and non-uniform complexity.
Algorithmica, where the statement P = NP holds; whereas obtaining exact
security bounds might be troublesome in Cryptomania, where asymptotically
secure one-way trapdoor permutations are guaranteed to exist.
6.2 ASYMPTOTIC SECURITY FOR PROTOCOLS
Classifying protocols according to asymptotic properties is not as simple as it
seems at first glance. As before, assume the maximal total running time of all
honest participants τ(k) = k. We emphasise here that the bound τ must hold
for any plausible attack pattern, i.e., τ quantifies the maximal workload that
attacker can cause. Now regardless of the ideal world description, the security of
a protocol π is characterised by a quadruple (tre, tid, tpr, ε). More precisely, the
standard way to define the advantage1 is the following
ε(k) = cdtpr(k)⋆ (Gkre-atk,Gkid-atk) , (6.4)
where games Gk
re-atk and Gkid-atk capture the effects of active attacks. The game
Gk
re-atk models the attack of tre(k)-time real world adversary A against the protocol
π
k
. Similarly, Gk
id-atk models the attack of tid(k)-time adversary A
◦ in the ideal
world. Observe that time bounds tre(·), tid(·) and tpr(·) can be arbitrarily fixed
and thus there are several ways to define the limiting process k→∞.
Strong and weak polynomial security model. Recall that actual security goals
are always specified by individual security games and the ideal world model is
just a mind experiment that simplifies the reasoning for such games. Hence,
the polynomial security model for protocols should be consistent with the defi-
nition given in the previous section. Indeed, the standard definition postulates
that a protocol family (π
k
) is secure in a (strong) polynomial model if for any
tre(k), tpr(k) ∈ poly(k) there exists tid(k) ∈ poly(k) such that ε(k) ∈ negl(k).
Hence, for any polynomial-time security game the advantage in the real and the
ideal world differ by a negligible amount. As the ideal world adversary is also
polynomial, the corresponding advantage εA◦(k) cannot be avoided for any cor-
1In the previous chapter, we used a slightly more liberal notion, where the construction of
A◦ could depend on the target relation B. But Section 7.3 shows that the latter is equivalent to
the classical definition if we discard polynomial factors.
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rect implementation of the desired functionality. Thus, a properly scaled advan-
tage that omits the trivial success probability is indeed negligible.
However, soon after the wide acceptance of polynomial security model, cryp-
tographers failed to prove the security of many interesting protocols. Remark-
ably, the first zero-knowledge proof [GMR85] is not secure in the strict polyno-
mial model. The corresponding journal article [GMR89] had to explicitly relax
security requirements and thus implicitly defined a weaker security model.
The weakened model bounds only the expected running time tˆid of the ideal
adversary A◦, where the average is taken over its coin tosses. The corresponding
security definitions for zero-knowledge [GMR89, GMW91] and proofs of knowl-
edge [BG92] require that for any tre(k), tpr(k) ∈ poly(k) there exists a bound
on average running time tˆid(k) ∈ poly(k) such that ε(k) ∈ negl(k). Although
this change is seemingly marginal, it leads to several unexpected consequences,
see [BL04, KL05]. The main drawback lies in the fact that a sequential com-
position theorem for zero-knowledge proofs [GO94] holds only in the strong
polynomial model. Moreover, Barak and Lindell showed that there can be no
constant round black-box zero-knowledge proofs for non-trivial problems in the
strong polynomial model [BL04] and thus achieving constant round complexity
and composability simultaneously is difficult. As a small consolation, they also
showed that under reasonable cryptographic assumptions, there exists a constant
round zero-knowledge protocol for anyNP language with a white-box reduction
but the corresponding security guarantees were quite loose.
Such a sad state of affairs has led to several technical refinements [KL05,
Gol07] that avoid the unpleasant dilemma. Briefly, the refinements show that
if the distribution of running time satisfies certain specific constraints, then the
composition theorems hold for the model, where only the expected running
times tˆre(k) and tˆid(k) are known to be polynomial. More importantly, almost
all zero-knowledge proofs, including classical constant round proofs [GMW91,
GK96a, FS89] for all NP languages, satisfy these constraints. Therefore, one
can indeed avoid the choice between round efficiency and composability.
However, if one looks deeper into the issue, he or she soon discovers that the
expected running time is just a camouflage for hiding unpleasant facts. Namely,
certain properties of proofs of knowledge make the strict polynomial time black-
box zero-knowledge impossible. In a nutshell, if a cheating prover succeeds with
a probability εpok, then the corresponding knowledge-extraction algorithm must
work in time Θ(ε−1pok) to succeed with overwhelming probability. Such a lower
bound on the running time has a natural explanation: a black-box knowledge-
extractor can succeed only if it gets a valid proof of knowledge and the latter
requires on average Ω(ε−1pok) repetitions. A corresponding zero-knowledge proof
that uses a proof of knowledge as a sub-protocol runs in expected polynomial
time only because with probability 1 − εpok a cheating verifier fails in the proof
of knowledge, and thus one has to run the slow knowledge-extraction algorithm
with probability εpok. Consequently, the unknown probability εpok cancels out
and we are left with the expected running time tˆid(k) ∈ poly(k).
However, such a trick does not solve the underlying intrinsic difficulties with
knowledge extraction, since “useful computations” are done only in long runs.
Moreover, the corresponding security guarantees are machine dependent, pro-
vide only average-case security, and have thus questionable interpretation in
practice [BL04, p. 785]. Therefore, we choose a more obvious and sincere ap-
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proach to relax polynomial security model. We say that a protocol family (π
k
) is
weakly secure in the polynomial model if for any asymptotically non-negligible
bound ε(k) ∈ Ω(k−c) and for any tre(k), tpr(k) ∈ poly(k) there exists an ideal
world adversary with a strict running time tid(k) ∈ poly(k).
The corresponding security model is not novel at all. In fact, the original
definition of proofs of knowledge [FFS87] was indeed given in the weak poly-
nomial security model. Later the same concept resurfaced under the name of
ε-knowledge [DNS04]. It is straightforward to show that the classical definition
for proof of knowledge [BG92] also satisfies the original definition [FFS87] and
thus all troublesome zero-knowledge proofs are secure in the weak model. More
importantly, the security guarantees have clear interpretations and all composi-
tion theorems that hold in strong polynomial model also hold in the weak model.
Hence, the author believes that the explicit definition of weak polynomial secu-
rity model is better than various technical tweaks [KL05, Gol07].
Evidently, the strong polynomial security model is contained in the weak
polynomial security model. Moreover, Barak and Lindell have proven the non-
existence of constant round black-box zero-knowledge proofs for all languages
L /∈ BPP [BL04]. Thus, the aforementioned inclusion is strict for black-box
reductions under a widely believed assumption NP 6= BPP. For white-box re-
ductions, it is not known whether the inclusion is strict or not. At the same time,
it is straightforward to prove that if a protocol is secure in a weak non-uniform
polynomial security model, then for any tre(k), tpr(k) ∈ poly(k) there exists an
ideal world adversary with super-polynomial but sub-exponential running time
tid(k) ∈ kω(1) ∩ 2o(k) such that the advantage is negligible ε(k) ∈ negl(k).
The proof is based on a simple diagonalisation argument. Fix bounds on the
running times tre(k), tpr(k) ∈ poly(k) and consider the sequence of decreasing
bounds εi(k) = k−i. Then, by the definition, we also get a corresponding se-
quence of asymptotic polynomial time bounds tid,i(k) ≤ kci for large enough k.
Now, if we fix a sequence of switching points (ki)
∞
i=1 and use the i
th reduction
in the range k ∈ [ki,ki+1), then by the construction the resulting bound on the
advantage ε(k) ∈ negl(k). To complete the proof, we must choose switching
points so that the running time is sub-exponential. If we take ki = 2ci+1 , then
tid ∈ O(klog k) but in principle, any super-polynomial bound is achievable.
Analogously, we can define the strong and the weak uniform polynomial se-
curity model. However, these notions make sense only if the protocol inputs are
generated by a uniform polynomial algorithm. Otherwise, the adversary can use
the inputs of corrupted participants as an external advice and we are still in the
standard non-uniform setting. This additional requirement for inputs makes it
difficult to interpret the resulting security guarantees. Hence, uniform security
models are seldomly used. Nevertheless, it is the only plausible choice when the
basic primitives are secure solely in the uniform model.
Three alternatives for statistical security. The first and the most obvious
choice is to consider adversaries that are computationally bounded on the online
phase of the attack, but afterwards have infinite time to analyse the obtained
results. More formally, let us consider redefined advantage
ε(k) = sd⋆(Gkre-atk,Gkid-atk) . (6.5)
Then a protocol family (π
k
) is secure against polynomial online and unbounded
post-processing attacks if for any tre(k) ∈ poly(k) there exists tid(k) ∈ poly(k)
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such that ε(k) ∈ negl(k). Similarly to the discussion above, we can relax the se-
curity conditions, i.e., a protocol family (π
k
) is weakly secure against polynomial
online and unbounded post-processing attacks if for any non-negligible error
bound ε(k) ∈ Ω(k−c) and for any tre(k) ∈ poly(k) there exists a polynomial
bound tid(k) ∈ poly(k). Since the adversary can store all received messages,
two-party protocols that implement non-trivial functionality cannot be secure
against unbounded post-processing attacks, see for example [CK89]. Neverthe-
less, these models are meaningful for certain two-party protocols that implement
limited functionality. Various settings for statistical and perfect zero-knowledge
(such as [BC86, Cha86, For87]) are most utilised examples but there are others,
such as data authentication, see for example [BR93a].
Many multi-party protocols can also handle online attacks with unbounded
time complexity. However, there are two ways of relaxing the online complex-
ity. The most simplistic way is to postulate that the adversary has an indeed
infinite computing power and thus the computational complexity is irrelevant.
Under such assumptions it is natural to say that a protocol family (π
k
) is secure
in the weak statistical security model if for any time bound tre(k) there exists a
corresponding time bound tid(k) that achieves ε(k) ∈ negl(k). Although the
definition limits the amount of extra information the adversary can gain, it does
not limit the extra computational power that he or she can achieve by participat-
ing in the protocol. As a result, a protocol that is secure in the weak statistical
model can still be insecure in the polynomial model. An excellent example of
such a protocol is given in the seminal article [Can00a, p. 159].
Alternatively, we can require that the running times of the real and the ideal
world adversaries are comparable for all functions tre(k). More formally, a proto-
col family (π
k
) is secure in the strong statistical security model if for any function
tre(k) there exists a bound tid(k) ∈ poly(k) · tre(k) such that ε(k) ∈ negl(k).
This definition assures that the adversary cannot use the protocol to significantly
speed up his or her computations. Thus, the strong statistical security model
is a natural strengthening of all other asymptotic security models. The latter
makes it the most dominant in the literature [Gol04, Can00a]. Also, all generic
multi-party computation techniques [BOGW88, CCD88, GRR98] satisfy this
definition. We emphasise that the strong statistical security model limits the
discrepancy between the time-success profiles of the real and the ideal world.
Intuitively, strong statistical security assures that a collapse of a computational
basic primitive cannot cause abrupt jump in the time-success profile.
The weak statistical security model loses this correspondence between the
time-success profiles of the real and the ideal world. As a result, the weak statis-
tical security model has several weird and unexpected properties. Nevertheless,
the definition is externally consistent. If one really assumes that the adversary
has infinite computational resources, the gain in computational power is irrele-
vant and the honest parties must accept consequences of all possible attacks in
the ideal world. In some practical applications, honest parties indeed care about
specific properties that hold in the ideal world even for unbounded adversaries.
For example, the concept of weak statistical security is often used in the con-
text of oblivious transfer [AIR01, Lip05] and other two-party privacy-preserving
operations, see for example [FNP04, FIPR05, KS05, LL07].
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6.3 GENTLE INTRODUCTION TO SUBJECTIVE SECURITY
At first glance, the concept of subjective security seems a bit odd, not to say inap-
propriate, for a rational scientific discipline, such as cryptography. As scientists,
we should seek impartial and well-justified descriptions of security threats and
avoid any subjective and questionable assumptions on the adversarial behaviour.
However, a closer inspection reveals that such models are quite common in
mainstream literature. Even the celebrated uniform security model is strongly
subjective, as there are no objective reasons to assume that an attacker will al-
ways use the same generic solution for all instances of a protocol.
The random oracle model is another widely used but often misunderstood
security model that provides only subjective security guarantees. Bellare and
Rogaway proposed the random oracle model [BR93b] as an idealised computa-
tional model to mimic hash functions. More formally, assume that a function
h is chosen uniformly from the set Hall where Hall = {h :M→ T } consists of
all functions from the setM to the set T . Now, let O be an oracle that provides
black-box access to the function h, i.e., given m ∈ M the oracle replies h(m).
As a result, we have defined a computational model, where the oracle O can be
used as an idealised hash function from the setM to the set T .
Assume that a game G describes the desired properties of a construction or a
protocol. Then the definition of the random oracle model yields
AdvromG (A) =
1
|Hall| ·
∑
h∈Hall
Pr
[GA,O = 1|O(·) = h(·)] . (6.6)
In practice, one must substituteHall with another function familyH ⊆ Hall that
has a more succinct description and can be efficiently evaluated. As a result, the
advantage in the standard model is computed over a much smaller sample
AdvstdG (A) =
1
|H| ·
∑
h∈H
Pr
[GA,O = 1|O(·) = h(·)] . (6.7)
A small sample size |H| ≪ |Hall| by itself is not a problem. If a family H is
randomly sampled fromHall then by the central limit theorem
AdvromG (A) ≈ AdvstdG (A) (6.8)
holds with overwhelming probability over the choice of H. However, the func-
tion family H must have a very short description and the latter introduces a pos-
sible bias into the estimate (6.8). Hence, a security proof in the random oracle
model is convincing only under a subjective equivalence assumption that the
approximation (6.8) still holds for the set of all relevant adversaries A.
Here, the concept of relevant adversary A ∈ A needs further clarification.
Although humans have admirable intellectual abilities, these powers are still
limited. Therefore, humans are likely to choose a suboptimal adversarial strate-
gies and one should not worry about optimal attacks that never materialise. The
set A is meant to denote all algorithms that a mankind can devise. Of course, it
is impossible to describe the set A ahead and thus we can objectively verify the
claim (6.8) only after the attacks have taken place.
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Nevertheless, one can try to describe a set of algorithms such that the sub-
jective equivalence assumption is satisfied for this set. Assume that H is a (t, ε)-
pseudorandom function family, i.e., the security games
QA0
h← H
return AO
QA1
h← Hall
return AO
are (t, ε)-indistinguishable. Now, consider a class of generic t-time attack algo-
rithms Abb that always evaluate h in a black-box manner. By definition
AdvstdG (A) ≤ AdvromG (A) + ε, (6.9)
for any A ∈ Abb, otherwise we can use the adversary GA,· to distinguish between
the gamesQ0 andQ1. Thus, any attack that significantly violates the bound (6.9)
must use the description of h in an essential way. As such an attack is specialised
for h, it is likely not to succeed for other functions h∗ ∈ H. At the same time,
a black-box adversary A ∈ Abb can still exploit the description of the family H
and thus the corresponding attacks can be quite specific. Hence, security in the
random oracle model is a reasonable starting point whenever the hash function
must exhibit pseudorandom properties in the construction.
The fact that the random oracle model is a subjective security model makes
it quite different from objective security models. In particular, the validity of the
subjective equivalence assumption (6.8) is not automatic and must be individ-
ually re-evaluated for each specific construction. Even a single decision is not
universal, since different persons may reach different conclusions. As a result, a
specific subjective equivalence assumption that is associated with a specific con-
struction π can be falsified only by showing a concrete algorithm A0 that for this
concrete construction π achieves
AdvromGπ (A0)≪ AdvstdGπ (A0) . (6.10)
Since one must make an individual subjective decision for each construction
separately, the subjective equivalence assumption cannot be falsified by showing
the existence of specially crafted protocols π∗ that indeed satisfy (6.10). If we
acknowledge this essential property of the model, the wave of critique [CGH04b,
GK03, BBP04, MRH04, CGH04a] started by Canetti, Goldreich and Halevi
falls apart. Essentially, all these results show that the subjective equivalence
assumption (6.8) is not universal. But the latter is an expected result, otherwise
the assumption (6.8) would be a valid mathematical claim.
The random oracle model is not the only widely used computational model
that forces cryptographers to make subjective assumptions in order to interpret
the results. All so-called black-box models starting from the ideal cipher model
already proposed by Shannon [Sha49] and ending with the generic group and
ring models [Nec94, Sho97, LR06] force cryptographers to make subjective
equivalence assumptions similar to the approximation (6.8). Again, several ex-
tensions [Den02, Bla06a] of basic techniques [CGH04b, MRH04] indeed show
that the corresponding equivalence assumption is not universal.
Finally, let us show that such a subjective equivalence assumption can be dis-
puted in a more persuading manner. Assume that instead of a random oracle one
uses standard iterative hash function family like SHA-1 and WHIRLPOOL. The
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Figure 6.4: Real and ideal world models for a protocol with a trusted setup phase.
vanilla hash function f ∗iv without an appropriate padding is computed iteratively
according to the Merkle-Damgård construction
h(x) = f ∗iv(x1, . . . , xk) = f(f
∗
iv(x1, . . . , xk−1), xk) , (6.11)
where f : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a round function, iv is a m-bit initial
value and x is parsed as a vector (x1, . . . , xk) of n-bit blocks. Consequently, we
have a hash function family that is indexed by the initial value iv:
Hf = {f ∗iv : {0, 1}n
∗ → {0, 1}n}iv∈{0,1}m . (6.12)
Now given a value f ∗iv(x1) and the black-box access to the round function f , it
is straightforward to compute f ∗iv(x) and thus it becomes trivial to distinguish
between the function families Hf and Hall.2 Hence, the inequality (6.9) fails
for a general class of adversaries that access functions f ∗iv and f in a black-
box manner. In more explicit terms, there might exist a universal black-box
algorithm A that breaks the construction for all possible iterative hash func-
tions. Hence, one should use a one-way function g to get the final hash value
h(x) = g(f ∗iv(x1, . . . , xn)) in order to reduce the amount of subjective trust.
6.4 SETUP ASSUMPTIONS AND SUBJECTIVE SECURITY
In a certain sense, it is impossible to avoid subjective security. Even if we try to
prove the security in the objective non-uniform computational model, we soon
reach fundamental limitations of hypothesis testing. Many cryptographic proto-
cols are specified as a part of a communication standard, such as the DSS stan-
dard [Nat00] for digital signatures, or the TLS v1.1 standard [Net06] for secure
web browsing. Such standards almost always explicitly fix some cryptographic
primitives, for example, state that messages must be hashed with SHA-1. Hence,
contrary to the belief of most theoreticians, almost all cryptographic applications
are implemented in the common reference string model, where all protocol
participants can access authentically distributed setup parameters.
Such a setting is formally modelled by a trusted setup procedure, where a
non-corruptible party Pts sends some initial parameters to the participants of the
protocol. Usually, it is sufficient if the communication between the dealer Pts
and other participants is authentic but some settings also require confidentiality.
2The argumentation can be generalised for the actual hash functions with a padding.
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For example, the Digital Signature Standard fixes some recommended param-
eters including SHA-1 as a preferred hash function. Another class of similar
examples consists of various theoretical models for public-key infrastructure.
From a technical viewpoint, analysis of a protocol with a trusted setup proce-
dure is not different from ordinary protocol, except that the real world model has
an extra phase that is missing in the ideal world, see Fig. 6.4. A bigger, not to say
an essential, problem lies in the fact that the corresponding objective security
model does not faithfully reflect the reality:
• For many standards, the setup procedure is run only once. Consequently,
one really cares how successful a potential adversary is for this particular
outcome of the setup procedure, whereas the objective security finds only
an average-case success bound over all possible runs of the setup.
• Public setup parameters psp are often fixed for years. Thus, an adversary
can and should in principle devise a specific attack that utilises the prop-
erties of psp. No objective security model can capture such a dependence,
as the algorithms are always chosen before the parameters are generated.
We emphasise that the problem lies in the fundamental mismatch between in-
dividual and collective properties of the setup procedure and thus cannot be
resolved by clever modifications of security games.
It is instructive to consider a couple of concrete examples before giving more
abstract reasoning. Recall that a function familyH is (t, ε)-collision resistant if
AdvcrH(A) = Pr [h← H, (x0, x1)← A(h) : h(x0) = h(x1) ∧ x0 6= x1] ≤ ε
for any t-time adversary A. Observe that collision resistance is a collective prop-
erty of the function family H. For a fixed non-injective function h, the notion
of collision resistance does not make sense, since there exists a trivial adversary
Ax0,x1 that outputs a fixed collision h(x0) = h(x1). Such discrepancy between
individual and collective properties leads to a hashing paradox:
• It is impossible to objectively use collision resistant hash functions, even
if one has an explicit description of a collision resistant function familyH.
• Any protocol that is compromised by a hash collision h(x0) = h(x1) be-
comes insecure in the objective sense as soon as h is chosen from H, as
we can then use a fixed algorithm Ax0,x1 to break the protocol.
The problem is not specific to any practical hash function, such as SHA-1 or
WHIRLPOOL, nor to the way they have been designed. The hashing paradox
holds for any imaginable compressing function. In particular, it is impossible to
talk about the objective security of a digital signature scheme that uses a fixed
hash function to compress messages before signing them.
As a second example, we present a similar paradox for asymmetric encryption.
Observe that IND-CPA security is again a collective property of a cryptosystem.
For a fixed public key pk there exists a trivial adversary Ask that uses a hard-
wired secret key sk to successfully decrypt all messages encrypted by Encpk(·).
Consequently, we can state an encryption paradox:
• It is impossible to use an objectively confidential asymmetric enciphering
method even if one has explicit description of an IND-CPA cryptosystem.
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Figure 6.5: The advantage AdvG(A|ωts) as a function of randomness ωts used by
the dealer Pts for various different types of attacking algorithms.
• Any protocol that uses asymmetric encryption becomes insecure in the
objective sense as soon as the public key pk is officially published.
A similar paradox emerges for digital signatures. Moreover, this problem cannot
be ignored as a weird theoretical observation that has no practical consequences,
since the public-key infrastructures are common in everyday life. We have en-
joyed secure web-browsing from 1994, when Netscape developed the first ver-
sion of SSL protocol, and many countries are deploying country-wide official
public-key infrastructures. All such infrastructures collapse if one obtains a mas-
ter secret key that is used to guarantee the authenticity of all public keys. Hence,
a potential adversary needs to crack a single fixed master key.
For clarity, assume that the master secret key is a full factorisation of an
RSA modulus N = p · q. Now finding a factorisation of a specific integer N
might be much easier than the factoring problem in general. For example, the
state of the art factoring efforts have produced a full factorisation of a 1039-bit
Mersenne number, whereas the current record of factoring RSA moduli is 640-
bits [AFK+07, RSA07]. However, if an adversary can specify an algorithm for the
concrete modulus N , then we cannot exclude a trivial algorithm Ap,q that just
prints out the corresponding factors p and q. Thus, no objective security model
can capture the intractability of factoring for a particular modulus N .
The essence of the trusted setup problem is revealed, if we consider an advan-
tage of a t-time algorithm A as a function of random coins used by Pts
AdvG(A|ωts) = Pr [GA = 1|Pts uses randomness ωts] . (6.13)
As the overall advantage can be computed as an average
AdvG(A) =
1
|Ωts| ·
∑
ωts∈Ωts
AdvG(A|ωts) , (6.14)
the objective security bounds limit only the area under the profile, as illustrated
in Fig. 6.5. Now the advantage for a fixed setup run is just a single point in the
profile of AdvG(A|ωts). Consequently, objective setting for a fixed setup run is
meaningful only if for all t-time adversaries A and randomness ωts ∈ Ωts
AdvG(A|ωts) ≤ ε0 ≪ 1 . (6.15)
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But then the setup procedure is redundant, as we can fix all random coins
ωts = 0 . . . 0 and let all parties compute the setup messages by themselves. Anal-
ogously, we can remove the setup procedure even if the inequality (6.15) holds
only for a single choice of random coins ω∗ts ∈ Ωts.
Hence, for any meaningful setup procedure, there must exist a trivial attack
for any protocol run. We can eliminate them, but the corresponding choice be-
tween weakly specialised and trivial attacks is inherently subjective. Fortunately,
there is a heuristic bridge between objective and subjective security.
Fairness Postulate. If the setup procedure has been properly carried out, it
is rational to assume that the value AdvG(A|ωts) exceeds an objective bound
AdvG(A) ≤ ε only by several magnitudes for all relevant algorithms A ∈ A.
Of course, it is impossible to prove the postulate, we can only justify it. Since
the area under the profile is bounded by ε, the advantage AdvG(A|ωts) can ex-
ceed c · ε only for a fraction 1
c
of all ωts ∈ Ωts. Hence, algorithms with ultra-high
advantages must be extremely specialised and should be left out. Also, if an at-
tacker manages to find an ultra-specialised algorithm A for a significant fraction
of ωts ∈ Ωts, then the attacker itself as a self-tuning attacking strategy exceeds the
objective security bound. Evidently, we cannot exclude such super-intelligent
adversaries but in that case there is nothing we could do anyway.
Finally, we emphasise that objective and subjective security are not conflict-
ing concepts but rather complementary formalisations. Objective security pro-
vides a rigorous way to design protocols that are resistant to general purpose
attacks, whereas subjective security is unavoidable if we want to analyse security
guarantees after some parameters are fixed. A similar duality between the de-
sign and the actual usage also appears in the statistics. It is possible to design
statistical estimation algorithms that behave well on average, but a meaningful
interpretation of the resulting outputs must use subjective probabilities.
6.5 RIGOROUS FORMALISATION OF SUBJECTIVE SECURITY
The fairness postulate has the same drawbacks as the subjective equivalence as-
sumption used in the random oracle model. Both of them rely on inherently
subjective decisions, which might turn out to be inappropriate in retrospection.
Therefore, one should apply them only in very simplistic settings and use the
resulting subjective security premises as stepping stones in the analysis of more
complex constructions. Such an approach reduces the amount of subjectivity by
locating the essential subjective security premises one must believe.
A proper formalisation of subjective security premises and proofs is needed for
other more technical reasons as well. First, it is not evident at all that excessive
application of the fairness postulate or its analogues does not lead to inconsisten-
cies. Moreover, there are no objectively secure cryptographic primitives known
so far and thus the fairness postulate is de facto inapplicable. Additionally, it
is not apparent at all that compact direct proofs do exist in the computational
setting, even if primitives like one-way functions exist. In other words, we do
not know whether one can ever provide a complete security proof for a specific
cryptographic primitive that is verifiable in reasonable time. As a result, the sub-
jective security might be truly unavoidable. Finally, a proper formalisation of
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subjective security is interesting in its own right, as it clarifies what we actually
mean by subjective security. In particular, what is the main difference between
security proofs in objective and subjective settings.
It turns out that most proofs can be freely translated from the objective setting
to the subjective setting and vice versa, and that the main difference is only in
the exact bounds on the running times. The latter is somewhat expected, as
the uniform polynomial security model is also subjective and so far most of the
published security proofs hold for both polynomial security models.
Formalisation of subjective security. At first glance, it seems impossible to
formalise the intuition that some algorithms are not accessible to adversary, since
we do not know how the algorithms are generated. Indeed, we showed above
that such a formalisation is impossible in the classical frequentistic setting. How-
ever, if we accept the subjectivity of probabilities, the solution becomes evident.
Namely, we must assign subjective occurrence properties to all possible adver-
sarial algorithms to exclude ultra-specialised attacks.
More formally, one must specify a distribution of algorithms A for a particular
problem. A choice of the corresponding distribution is entirely subjective, as
it reflects personal beliefs on which algorithms are more likely to be used in
potential attacks. In practice, one does not have to specify the entire distribution,
it is sufficient to fix several unquestionable beliefs about adversarial distribution
and then use principles of coherent reasoning. A fully determined distribution
A is needed to formally define a relative advantage against a game G
AdvG(A) = Pr [A ← A : GA = 1] (6.16)
and a relative distinguishing advantage for a game pair G0 and G1
AdvindG0,G1(A) = |Pr [A ← A : GA0 = 1]− Pr [A ← A : GA1 = 1]| . (6.17)
We emphasise that the distribution A does not have to be not uniform. Hence,
the success probabilities of more probable algorithms A have a much bigger
impact to AdvG(A) and AdvindG0,G1(A) than other less probable algorithms.
3
Observe that it is reasonable to specify different distributions for different time
bounds t, as some attacks might require a certain amount of time to be useful at
all. Hence, we use a shorthand A(·) to denote a family of distributions, where
A(t) denotes a distribution of t-time adversaries. Now a relative computational
distance with respect to a time bound t is defined as
cdA(t)⋆ (G0,G1) = AdvindG0,G1(A(t)) . (6.18)
As an example, recall that in the uniform polynomial model, a distribution
family A(·) consists of a single adversary A that gets a security parameter k as
an extra argument. Also, note that even a non-uniform adversary can be mod-
elled by a distribution family, where A(t) consists of a single adversary At that is
optimal over the set of all t-time adversaries.
Now, as the distribution family A(·) puts restrictions on the set of plausible
adversaries, the security with respect to fixed parameters becomes meaningful.
3Of course, there are no objective measures for determining the right occurrence proba-
bilities for all algorithms, since we cannot objectively predict what “useful” algorithms will be
discovered and used in the future. Hence, these notions are inherently subjective.
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In particular, the following instantiations of IND-CPA games
QA0
(m0,m1) ← A(pk)
c← Encpk(m0)
return A(c)
QA1
(m0,m1) ← A(pk)
c← Encpk(m1)
return A(c)
where pk is a fixed valid public key, might lead to nontrivial bounds on the
relative computational distance cdA(t)⋆ (Q0,Q1). In other words, the subjective
notion of IND-CPA security is meaningful also for a fixed public key pk.
Principles of coherent reasoning. Since a rational entity is free to choose
subjective probabilities, it is impossible to formally prove the (in)validity of secu-
rity assumptions. We can only try to eliminate inconsistencies between various
beliefs in order to achieve coherence. Therefore, we are going to mimic the
classical approach that is used to formalise subjective probabilities, see hand-
books [Jay03, Jef04]. In a nutshell, we assume that all subjective probability
distributions are assigned by a rational entity who is willing to correct his or her
assignments if he or she finds out that they contradict common sense. We specify
this vague definition by fixing a set of axioms (R1)–(R3) that directly follow from
the common-sense understanding of attack strategies.
For brevity, we only consider probability assignments for game pairs, since
a relative advantage AdvG(A) can be restated as a relative computational dis-
tance AdvindG,⊥(A), where⊥ denotes a game that always ends with⊥. Assume that
a rational entity has specified different adversarial distributions A,B,C, . . . for
different problems. In other words, the rational entity acknowledges that an at-
tacker can sample an algorithm from these candidate distributions A,B,C, . . ..
Then it is irrational to assume that a potential attacker cannot use the candidate
distribution A for other problems. Similarly, it is irrational to assume that an
attacker cannot use a well-known code transformation T to convert a sampled
adversarial algorithm A to a different algorithm B ← T (A). For example, there
is no reason to refute the possibility that an attacker may encode a factoring task
as a Boolean formula if he or she has access to a very efficient solver for Boolean
formulae. In other terms, well-known transformations introduce new candidate
distributions T (A), T (B), T (C), . . .. However, such transformations are not for
free, since the application of the transformation itself takes time. Shortly, if
B ← T (A), then the time needed to compute T (A) is added to the running
time of B. As a result, we have discovered three basic coherence axioms that
reveal inconsistencies between subjective probability assignments:
(R1) Let T be a code transformation known to a rational entity and A be a
candidate distribution for distinguishing G0 and G1. Then a distribution
B = T (A) induced by T and A must also be a candidate distribution.
(R2) Let B = T (A) as specified above. Then the time needed to compute
T (A) from a sample A ← A must be added to the running time of T (A).
(R3) Let A(t) and B(t) be two candidate distributions for distinguishing G0 and
G1. Now if the entity knows that cdA(t)⋆ (G0,G1) < cdB(t)⋆ (G0,G1) then the
entity must prefer the distribution B(t) to the distribution A(t).
The verb ‘know’ and the term ‘knowledge’ are used here to denote explicit
awareness, i.e., an entity who reasons about security must literally know the
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description of a transformation T or possess a valid proof that the inequality
cdA(t)⋆ (G0,G1) < cdB(t)⋆ (G0,G1) holds. In particular, a person who knows noth-
ing about cryptography can arbitrarily assign adversarial distributions to various
problems, since any assignment is coherent with his or her knowledge about
these problems. When the person gains more knowledge, then certain assign-
ments become irrational and thus he or she must sometimes accept that certain
constructions are secure. Nevertheless, note that a set of facts rarely determines
unique candidate distributions for all problems and thus entities can reach differ-
ent conclusions even if they share the same set of facts. In other words, a rational
entity can and should discover inconsistencies according to his or her knowledge,
but a certain amount of subjectivity is unavoidable in his or her assignments.
Note that all security proofs must be strongly constructive in the subjective
setting, since a rational entity must explicitly know a distribution B that is a
better alternative than a distribution A. A mere existence of a better alternative
does not cause inconsistencies as long as the rational entity is not informed. Such
a position is unavoidable, or otherwise we cannot escape the objective setting. If
we require consistency for all possible transformations, then we also allow trivial
transformations that ignore the input code and output an optimal adversary for
a particular problem and we back in the objective setting.
Finally, observe that the axiomatisation cannot lead to contradictory restric-
tions for adversarial distributions as long as the objective security model itself is
non-contradictory. Namely, a rational entity can always assume that a distribu-
tion A(t) for a game pair G0 and G1 consist of a single t-time adversary A that
maximises the advantage AdvindG0,G1(A). Consequently, there can be no better al-
ternatives for the distribution A(t) and none of the axioms (R1)–(R3) is violated.
Note that this conservative assignment of adversarial distributions corresponds to
the objective setting and thus must be well defined.
6.6 REDUCTIONS AND SUBJECTIVE SECURITY PREMISES
The axioms of coherent reasoning (R1)–(R3) alone are not sufficient to prove
the subjective security of a protocol or a construction, as they just reveal the in-
consistencies. A decision how such inconsistent assignments should be changed
is also a subjective decision and can depend on personal preferences of rational
entities. To solve the ambiguity, one must fix a small set of fundamental beliefs
that is never changed if it is possible to achieve coherence otherwise. These
beliefs will play the role of subjective security assumptions. Formally, a basic
security premise [[Q0 ∼= Q1|(t, ε)]] is an unquestionable belief that the relative
computational distance satisfies cdA(t)⋆ (Q0,Q1) ≤ ε for any achievable distri-
bution family A(·). As a result, we can formalise the subjective (t, ε)-collision
resistance for a function h and (t, ε)-IND-CPA security for a public key pk by
adding the corresponding security premises into the set of fundamental beliefs.
We emphasise here that fundamental beliefs are empirically falsifiable. For
example, the MD5 hash function was believed to be collision resistant in 1992
but the publication of successful attacks has forced us to change our beliefs.
Technically, subjective security proofs are very similar to classical proofs. As-
sume that a security premise [[Q0 ∼= Q1|(t0, ε0)]] is fundamental. Then an effi-
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cient constructive reduction T that maps an algorithm A to B so that
AdvindG0,G1(A) > ε =⇒ AdvindQ0,Q1(B) > ρ(ε) (6.19)
for a known function ρ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] introduces an upper bound on the com-
putational distance cdA⋆ (G0,G1). Namely, if the security guarantee ρ is convex-
cup, the corresponding distribution B = T (A) satisfies
cdB⋆ (Q1,Q1) =
∑
A∈A
Pr [A] · AdvindQ0,Q1(T (A)) ≥ ρ
(
cdA⋆ (G0,G1)
)
, (6.20)
as the definition of ρ and Jensen’s inequality assure∑
A∈A
Pr [A] · AdvindQ0,Q1(T (A)) ≥
∑
A∈A
Pr [A] · ρ (AdvindG0,G1(A)) , (6.21)
∑
A∈A
Pr [A] · ρ (AdvindG0,G1(A)) ≥ ρ
(∑
A∈A
Pr [A] · AdvindG0,G1(A)
)
. (6.22)
Therefore, we obtain an average-case security guarantee
AdvindG0,G1(A) > ε =⇒ AdvindQ0,Q1(B) > ρ(ε) . (6.23)
If the security guarantee ρ is not convex-cup, the pointwise guarantee (6.19) does
not automatically imply the average-case guarantee (6.23) and we have to bound
AdvindQ0,Q1(B) by using other methods. Given a fundamental security premise
[[Q0 ∼= Q1|(t0, ε0)]] and an average case security guarantee (6.23) that respects
the time bound t0, we can conclude
cdA⋆ (G0,G1) ≤ ρ−1(ε0) , (6.24)
otherwise we violate either the axiom (R3) or the security premise. Hence,
subjective security proofs are technically identical to traditional objective secu-
rity proofs, provided that the code transformation T has an explicit description.
Moreover, as all common pointwise reductions have convex-cup security guar-
antees, and even the quantitative success bounds of traditional and subjective
security estimates coincide. The difference appears only in running times, since
we must also consider the complexity of the code transformation T .
We remark here that the same issues have also been addressed by Rogaway
who tried to solve the hashing paradox described in Section 6.4. However, the
corresponding article [Rog06] does not provide a proper mathematical founda-
tion of subjective security (human ignorance). In fact, Rogaway believes that
rigorous formalisation of subjective security is impossible [Rog06]:
What is meant is that there is no efficient algorithm known to man that outputs a
collision inH . But such a statement would seem to be unformalizable—outside
the realm of mathematics.
We have clearly shown that such a formalisation is possible as soon as one is
willing to accept subjective interpretation of probabilities. Moreover, our treat-
ment of subjective security also provides a formal justification to the method-
ology used in [Rog06]. More precisely, Rogaway required that all reductions
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should be strictly constructive and accompanied with appropriate pointwise se-
curity guarantees (6.19). As a result, both formalisations give qualitatively equiv-
alent security guarantees for most constructions and protocols.
However, there is still a major conceptual difference that makes our formali-
sation different from the traditional objective setting and the formalisation given
by Rogaway. Namely, the axioms (R1)–(R3) are applicable only if a concrete
security premise is known to be violated. Therefore, we cannot prove
cdA(t)⋆ (G0,G2) ≤ ε1 + ε2 (6.25)
from premises [[G0 ∼= G1|(t, ε1)]] and [[G1 ∼= G2|(t, ε2)]], although the violation of
the inequality (6.25) implies that one of the inequalities
cdA(t)⋆ (G0,G1) > ε1 or cdA(t)⋆ (G1,G2) > ε2 (6.26)
holds. The problem lies in the fact that we do not know which disjunct is true
and thus the distribution A(t) that violates the inequality (6.25) does not con-
tradict the axioms (R1)–(R3) nor security premises. Hence, a non-constructive
use of triangle inequality is not allowed. One might think that such a strong
constructivity requirement is artificial and redundant. However, a consistent
formalisation of subjective security without this assumption is impossible, other-
wise we end up in the objective setting. For example, we can always consider
singleton distributions Ai(t) that consist of a single t-time algorithm Ai. Now if
A1(t), . . . ,As(t) cover all t-time algorithms, the formula
cdA1(t)⋆ (G0,G1) > ε ∨ cdA2(t)⋆ (G0,G1) > ε ∨ · · · ∨ cdAs(t)⋆ (G0,G1) > ε (6.27)
holds whenever ε < cdt⋆(G0,G1). Hence, we cannot conclude the contradiction
from the formula (6.27), or otherwise the non-contradictory assignment must
satisfy
cdA(t)⋆ (G0,G1) = cdt⋆(G0,G1) . (6.28)
Since formulae (6.26) and (6.27) are analogous, we must treat them similarly.
In many occasions, we can circumvent the problem by finding more explicit
reductions, but when a construction is based on different basic primitives, it is
often impossible to eliminate non-constructivity. Therefore, we allow explicit
strengthenings of fundamental beliefs. More formally, let
[[Q0 ∼= Q1|(t1, ε1)]] ∧ [[Q2 ∼= Q3|(t2, ε2)]] (6.29)
denote a strengthened premise that distributions A and B are inconsistent if
cdA(t1)⋆ (Q0,Q1) > ε1 or cdB(t2)⋆ (Q2,Q3) > ε2 (6.30)
even if it is not known which disjunct of the statement holds. Such explicit way
of strengthening keeps the amount of non-constructiveness under tight control
and we do not lose the connection with theoretical foundations.
Moreover, it is possible to express strengthened beliefs as a belief about a
special game if we use a signed advantage
cdA(t1)⋆ (G0,G1) = Pr [A ← A : GA0 = 1]− Pr [A ← A : GA1 = 1] (6.31)
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instead of the computational distance cdA(t1)⋆ (G0,G1). We omit the correspond-
ing technical details, since it is just a theoretically pleasing reassurance that the
axioms (R1)–(R3) are expressive enough and does not give additional insight.
Subjective security for protocols. Recall that the classical ideal real world
comparison was just a convenient way to define security with respect to all rele-
vant security goals B. More precisely, the classical definition allowed to replace
the real world adversary A with an ideal world adversary A◦ in order to get a
contradiction. The subjective security setting also adds an efficiency restriction.
The real and ideal world are constructively (tre, tid, ε)-close w.r.t. a distribu-
tion of adversaries A and a distribution of security goals B if there exists a code
transformation T that satisfies the following constraints. First, T transforms a
distribution of real world adversaries A into a distribution of ideal world adver-
saries A◦. Secondly, the time needed to compute A◦ = T (A) is included in the
running time of A◦. Finally, for the time bounds tre and tid on the running times
of A and A◦ and for any feasible input distribution D:
|Pr [GA
real
= 1]− Pr [GA◦
ideal
= 1]| ≤ ε , (6.32)
where the probability is also taken over the distributions A, A◦ and B.
Observe that we must limit the set of security goalsB that are used to compute
the outputs of Greal and Gideal or otherwise the requirements may be too strict.
For example, consider a protocol where an honest party P1 sends an encryption
Encpk(x1) to corrupted P2. If pk is a fixed public parameter, then there exists an
efficient predicate B that uses hardwired sk to decrypt the output of A. Hence
a trivial adversary A that outputs Encpk(x1) clearly violates input-privacy. To put
it in another way, the distribution B must be restricted as it captures also the
further offline behaviour of an adversary.
Now assume that one has provided a universal simulator construction Sim
and shown that a tre-time distribution A and tpr-time distribution B that vio-
late inequality (6.32) for some input distribution D can be used to construct an
adversary distribution that violates a subjective security premise. Then for all
coherent distributions A, B and D the reduction schema
GA
real
MPC-SEC
====⇒
ε
GA◦
ideal
(6.33)
still holds and the real and the ideal worlds are subjectively (tre, tid, tpr, ε)-close
w.r.t. the security premises. To summarise, the proximity is still defined by the
reduction schema (6.33) but the latter may fail for incoherent distributions.
Consider the uniform polynomial security model as an illustrative example.
Evidently, not all input distributions are allowed or otherwise an adversary can
use the inputs of corrupted parties as an external advice and we are back in the
non-uniform model. Hence, all inputs should be generated by uniform polyno-
mial algorithm. Also, note that the security goal B(·) must be a uniform algo-
rithm or otherwise reductions may fail, too.
6.7 STRICTLY CONSTRUCTIVE PROOF TECHNIQUES
Classical security proofs can be invalid in the context of subjective security, since
they may contain non-constructive steps. In particular, one cannot use game
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trees in the classical manner, as an application of a triangle inequality or a hori-
zon splitting is a non-constructive proof step. Fortunately, most non-constructive
proof steps can be substituted by constructive counterparts.
Let us start with the constructive hybrid argument. The technique itself is
quite old and can be traced back to the early works of Yao and Goldreich [Yao82,
Gol98]. Namely, consider a classical non-constructive game chain
G0=⇒G1
Q00,Q01
G1=⇒G2
Q10,Q11
· · ·
· · ·
Gn−1=⇒Gn
Qn−1,0,Qn−1,1
T1 T2 Tn
where each game has an efficient reduction Ti to another more elementary game
pair Qi,0 and Qi,1 and the reduction provides perfect simulation
QTi(A)i,0 ≡ GAi−1 and QTi(A)i,1 ≡ GAi . (6.34)
Then we can express cdA(t)⋆ (G0,Gn) as a telescopic sum∣∣∣∣∣∑
A∈A
n∑
i=1
Pr [A] · Pr [QTi(A)i,0 = 1]−
∑
A∈A
n∑
i=1
Pr [A] · Pr [QTi(A)i,1 = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ . (6.35)
In the simplest case, all elementary game pairs coincide (Qi,0,Qi,0) ≡ (Q0,Q1).
A randomised transformation that given a code sample A from A applies the
transformation Ti with probability 1n produces a distribution B such that
cdA⋆ (G0,Gn) ≤ n · cdB⋆ (Q0,Q1) , (6.36)
since the term n · cdB⋆ (Q0,Q1) can be also expressed as the sum (6.35). Gen-
erally, we have nj different transformations Ti that lead to the same game pairs
(Q2j−2,Q2j−1). Now for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we can generate an adversar-
ial distribution Bj by choosing uniformly at random a transformation Ti that
leads to the game pair (Q2j−2,Q2j−1). The resulting adversarial distributions
B1, . . . ,Bk satisfy the inequality
cdA⋆ (G0,Gn) ≤ n1 · cdB1⋆ (Q0,Q1) + · · ·+ nk · cdBk⋆ (Q2k−2,Q2k−1) , (6.37)
since the right hand side can again be lower bounded by the sum (6.35).
To complete the picture, we also consider a non-constructive horizon splitting
step for cdA⋆ (G0,G1) under the analogous simulatability assumption
QTi(A)i,0 ≡ (G0|Hi)A and QTi(A)i,1 ≡ (G1|Hi)A . (6.38)
Again, we can express cdA(t)⋆ (G0,Gn) as a telescopic sum (6.35) and use similar
regrouping techniques to obtain
cdA⋆ (G0,Gn) ≤ n1 · cdB1⋆ (Q0,Q1) + · · ·+ nk · cdBk⋆ (Q2k−2,Q2k−1) , (6.39)
where the distributions B1, . . . ,Bk are generated by analogous uniform choice
over the transformations corresponding to the same game pair.
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To summarise, under the perfect simulation assumptions (6.34) and (6.38),
we can use both game chains and horizon splitting to bound the computational
distance cdA(t)⋆ (G0,Gn) by using only a strengthened security premise
[[Q0 ∼= Q1|(t1, ε1)]] ∧ . . . ∧ [[Q2k−2 ∼= Q2k−1|(tk, εk)]] .
Naturally, we must take into account the running times of Ti and additional
O(log n) time needed for random sampling, but these are minor details.
Note that the perfect simulatability assumptions is satisfied for elementary
reductions that define computational indistinguishability for a primitive, for ex-
ample various encryption schemes and pseudorandom generators have the cor-
responding reductions. Other primitives are normally defined in terms of ad-
vantage in a single game Qi like collision resistance and one-wayness. Conse-
quently, the corresponding game hops rely on constructive reductions
AdvindGi−1,Gi(A) > εi =⇒ AdvQi(Ti(A)) > ρi(εi) . (6.40)
Again, consider the simplest case where all games coincide Qi ≡ Q. Then the
corresponding triangle inequality
cdA⋆ (G0,Gn) ≤ cdA⋆ (G0,G1) + · · ·+ cdA⋆ (Gn−1,Gn) (6.41)
for a game chain still holds, although we do not know the computational dis-
tances εi = cdA⋆ (Gi−1,Gi). Nevertheless, we can get an adversarial distribution
B by applying a transformation Ti with uniform probability 1n . The correspond-
ing advantage can be lower bounded by solving the optimisation task
AdvQ(B) ≥ min
ε1+···+εn≥ε
ρ1(ε1) + · · ·+ ρn(εn)
n
, (6.42)
where ε = cdA⋆ (G0,Gn). This approach can be directly generalised to handle sev-
eral premises or horizon splittings. Linear bounds ρi(·) lead us back to classical
inequalities, otherwise we get slightly more loose bounds.
To summarise, most non-constructive black-box proofs can be made construc-
tive by following the corresponding game tree. Moreover, the type of required
security assumptions do not change, although the resulting time bounds and
advantages may differ. The latter also applies for the white-box reductions that
are efficiently constructible, i.e., the borderline between translatable and non-
translatable proofs is not determined by the reduction type.
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7 MODULAR DESIGN OF COMPLEX PROTOCOLS
Appropriate abstraction level and modular design are the key factors to success in
cryptographic protocol design. In particular, it is not enough to have a definition
that adequately describes the desired security goals. We also need intermediate
security definitions that support modular design and analysis. More precisely, the
security of a compound protocol should automatically follow from the security of
its sub-protocols, or otherwise the analysis of complex protocols quickly becomes
intractable. To achieve such modularity, we must consider more complex attack
models than used for defining stand-alone security.
Since there are various decomposition methods, we also need protocols with
different usage restrictions. In the simplest case, small sub-protocols are executed
one by one to accomplish the final goal, and therefore we need a security defini-
tion that is closed under sequential composition. Alternatively, we can consider
compound protocols that schedule sub-protocols dynamically and possibly exe-
cute them in parallel to minimise the total running time. In such cases, we need
universally composable protocols that preserve security in such ultra-liberal set-
tings. Of course, there are many other alternatives between these two extremes
and each of them induces a new related security definition.
We emphasise that the choice of an appropriate protocol is a trade-off be-
tween various conflicting requirements and usage restrictions are an important
but not the only relevant aspect. In a nutshell, various composability theo-
rems [Ore87, Can00a, DM00, Can01] provide just a formal methodology that
is needed to establish simple and natural-looking usage restrictions. Moreover,
the precise knowledge of the expected usage patterns is important, as it poses
structural restrictions to the corresponding protocol, see Sections 7.5–7.6.
Alternatively, we can use composability theorems for making security proofs
more modular. In particular, we can use universal composability as a tool to de-
sign complex protocols in a systematic way. The corresponding methodology has
three stages. First, we construct universally composable protocols for all neces-
sary sub-tasks. More precisely, we can employ trusted setup to achieve universal
composability with minimal overhead. In the second stage, we combine these
sub-protocols into a round optimal solution and utilise universal composability
in the corresponding security proofs. As the final design step, we replace the
trusted setup phase with a corresponding sub-protocol that is secure in the stand-
alone model. As a result, we obtain a round efficient protocol that is secure in
the stand-alone model and has a short and modular security proof.
The formalism needed to describe and analyse various attack models is rather
complicated. Hence, we start from the main concepts in Section 7.1 and only
then formalise the corresponding computational model in Section 7.2. After-
wards, we gradually describe various subtle details in Sections 7.3 and 7.4 until
we can establish important composability results. Last two sections are dedicated
to the non-standard issues arising from our design methodology.
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Figure 7.1: Computational context ̺〈·〉 is a template, which describes all com-
putations preceding, co-occurring and following the protocols π and π◦.
7.1 DUALITY BETWEEN PROTOCOL DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
A protocol that implements a complex functionality is not only difficult to design
but also difficult to analyse. To alleviate the underlying complexity, such proto-
cols are commonly split into a collection of well-defined sub-protocols. The
corresponding security proof is modular if it gradually replaces all sub-protocols
with the ideal implementations until we obtain the desired ideal functionality.
As a result, we have to consider the security of a protocol π in a computational
context ̺〈·〉 that uses the protocol π in order to compute something else.
In the following, we always consider contexts that use protocols in a black-
box manner, i.e., a context first provides inputs to the protocol and later uses
the resulting outputs in subsequent computations. In fact, a context ̺〈·〉 is like
a template that can be instantiated by specifying the missing protocol. The re-
sulting compound protocols ̺〈π〉 share the same general structure. Participants
first precompute some values, then execute the protocol π together with side-
computations σ and finally do post-processing, see Fig. 7.1 for schematic de-
scription. In particular, note that the adversarial behaviour can cause an infor-
mation flow between the computational processes π and σ, although they are
formally separated from each other by the specification. Such coupling effects
can make the security analysis extremely difficult.
The security of a protocol π in a context ̺〈·〉 is defined by comparing the
corresponding real and ideal world implementations. Let ̺〈π〉 denote the real
world implementation and ̺〈π◦〉 the corresponding ideal world implementa-
tion. Then, for any input distribution D and for any security objective B(·), we
can define the corresponding security games
GA
real
x← D
zobs ← GAre-atk(x)
return B(zobs)
GA◦
ideal
x← D
zobs ← GA◦id-atk(x)
return B(zobs)
where zobs is the vector of observable outcomes and the sub-games Gre-atk and
Gid-atk model online attacks against the protocols ̺〈π〉 and ̺〈π◦〉. We omit the
exact details here and discuss them separately afterwards.
More precisely, note that a context ̺〈·〉 defines only the usage of a protocol π
and not the exact scheduling of protocol messages. As a result, we must formally
define security in terms of game pairs, since each context might create several
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game pairs (Greal,Gideal). More formally, fix a set of relevant contexts ̺〈·〉, a set of
relevant security objectives B and possible message schedulings. Let G be the
set of corresponding game pairs. Then the ideal and real world implementations
are (tre, tid, ε)-close w.r.t. all game pairsG if for any pair (Greal,Gideal) ∈ G and for
any tre-time real world adversary A there exists a tid-time ideal world adversary
A◦ such that for any input distribution D
|Pr [GA
real
= 1]− Pr [GA◦
ideal
= 1]| ≤ ε . (7.1)
Alternatively, we can view (tre, tid, ε)-closeness w.r.t. G as a reduction schema
GA
real
G -SEC
===⇒
ε
GA◦
ideal
(7.2)
that can be applied to any game pair (Greal,Gideal) ∈ G. Moreover, one often de-
fines the set of relevant contexts implicitly by specifying usage restrictions for the
protocol π. For example, we can consider all game pairs, where the participants
execute the protocol π sequentially or in parallel with some other protocols, i.e.,
we can talk about sequential and parallel composability.
In principle, we can arbitrarily choose the set of game pairs. However, only a
few of these choices lead to modular security proofs. We remark that a standard
design methodology creates a chain of hybrid protocols
π◦ ≡ ̺0 π1=⇒ ̺1 π2=⇒ . . . πs−1===⇒ ̺s−1 πs=⇒ ̺s ≡ π (7.3)
that gradually change the ideal implementation into a practical protocol without
calls to the trusted third party. More precisely, each step in the chain introduces
a new sub-protocol πi that implements some task needed to complete the desired
functionality. Note that the sub-protocol πi itself may utilise additional ideal sub-
protocols that are implemented with the help of the trusted third party. These
calls must be eliminated by the subsequent steps in the chain, so that the final
protocol π does not depend on the trusted third party.
The corresponding modular security proof uses appropriate reduction sche-
mata to traverse the chain in the opposite direction
GA
real
≡ GAss Gs -SEC===⇒εs GAs−1s−1
Gs−1 -SEC
=====⇒
εs−1
. . .
G2 -SEC====⇒
ε2
GA11
G1 -SEC====⇒
ε1
GA00 ≡ GA
◦
ideal
, (7.4)
where the game Gi captures the tolerated adversarial behaviour against the hybrid
protocol ̺i〈πi〉. As a result, the game chain converts a real world adversaryA step
by step to an ideal world adversary A◦ such that
|Pr [GA
real
= 1]− Pr [GA◦
ideal
= 1]| ≤ ε1 + · · ·+ εs (7.5)
and thus there exists a composite reduction schema
GA
real
⋆⋆⋆
=====⇒
εs+···+ε1
GA◦
ideal
(7.6)
provided that (Gi,Gi−1) ∈ Gi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s} and all reduction steps can be
carried out. As a result, security guarantees of all protocols π1, . . . , πs implicitly
determine a set of valid game pairs G, where the compound protocol π remains
(tre, tid, ε)-secure. For example, we often want to establish that the compound
protocol π is secure in the stand-alone model.
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Figure 7.2: Layered description of a compound protocol ̺〈π1, . . . , πs〉.
Note that there are many trade-offs between efficiency and generality. Evi-
dently, we obtain the most efficient solution when we tailor a protocol π specif-
ically for a pre-specified context ̺〈·〉. However, such design cannot be reused
and the corresponding security proof might be difficult to find. Alternatively, we
may design a protocol π that is secure in almost any context. However, such a
protocol might be impossible to devise or it might be highly inefficient. Thus,
one has to find a proper balance between these extreme cases.
As a way out from this anarchy of security models, we require that each pro-
tocol is specified with usage restrictions that determine the supported contexts.
Namely, one should fix a set of composition rules that determine the basic struc-
tural properties of plausible contexts; for example, whether the protocol shares
some variables with the context or what kind of pre-, post- and side-computations
are supported. Secondly, one should fix a tolerated adversarial behaviour and the
maximal running time for computational contexts. Of course, any other unam-
biguous specification methodology is also appropriate.
7.2 LAYERED DESCRIPTION OF COMPUTATIONAL CONTEXTS
Although the general concept of computational context is quite intuitive, it is
somewhat difficult to give a formalisation that is not plagued by the abundance
of technical details. Various types of interactive computations share the same
general description but differ in many minor details, for example compare the
manuscripts [MR91b, Can00b, PSW00, BPW04]. To make technical details
more tractable, we specify the computational model step by step. First, we define
a basic model of computations that is absolutely minimal. Next, we formalise all
other more complex artefacts, like asynchronous and non-authentic communi-
cation, in terms of this basic model. More precisely, we model these artefacts
by adding extra nodes into the network and by adjusting the description of pro-
tocols and contexts. As a result, we can gradually formalise complex settings
by grouping similar technical details together into separate layers, as illustrated
in Fig. 7.2. Moreover, our task here is to specify only the basic computational
model, since an appropriate formalisation of higher level artefacts is the respon-
sibility of the person who analyses a concrete protocol or a context. Secondly, we
can state and prove many theorems independently from higher level artefacts, as
we can always analyse the basic level description of the protocol.
Basic computational model. The basic model consists of a fixed number of
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participants P1, . . . ,Pm and a fixed number of trusted third parties T1, . . . ,Ts
that have no inputs and no outputs. A trusted third party Ti is active only in
the context, where participants are supposed to execute an ideal implementa-
tion π◦i . All participants of a context are modelled as interactive Random Access
machines that run simultaneously at the same clock speed. Communication
between participants is synchronous and secure. Moreover, a sender cannot pro-
ceed further until the message has been written on the recipients communica-
tion tape. Hence, the communication tape behaves as an unlimited buffer and
the recipient does not have to process messages at the arrival time. The low-level
message delivery procedure is a deterministic and a fairly low cost operation,
which is described more thoroughly in Section 2.4.
Adversaries and security games. We treat adversaries as external entities and
not as participants of a computational context. There are several important rea-
sons for such a choice. First, our main aim here is to study attacks that utilise
only acquired data and do not employ timings or other side information. Sec-
ond, we formalised a computational context as a real-time system, where par-
ticipants obey many real-time constraints. Hence, putting an adversary into the
computational context would create many implicit limitations on the adversarial
behaviour, which are normally neglected in cryptography. Third, timing-based
attacks can be formalised also in our simplified model.
In our model, the adversary can influence computations by sending oracle
calls to the challenger. Namely, the adversary can either corrupt participants,
send some messages, or give his or her final output za directly to the challenger.
A semi-honest corruption call provides read-only access to the internal state of
the participant. A malicious corruption query gives a complete control over the
participant Pi and stops the local computations, i.e., the adversary must do all
computations instead of Pi. Additionally, we require that the adversary can send
messages only on behalf of maliciously corrupted participants.
The challenger’s primary task in the game is to correctly simulate the execu-
tion of a computational context and to serve the queries of an adversary. For
the faithful execution, the challenger can allocate a separate thread for each par-
ticipant and then simulate the execution in micro-rounds, where each thread
completes only a single basic operation. Additionally, the challenger tests all
queries and halts with ⊥ if the adversarial behaviour is not tolerable. As be-
fore, the security game itself is a ping-pong protocol started by the adversary. To
avoid leakage of temporal information, the adversary is activated only when the
challenger provides a reply or a corrupted participant receives a message.
Computational complexity. As a final detail, we must specify several important
time bounds. Let tπ denote the time complexity of a protocol π, i.e., the number
of the elementary steps needed to complete π. Similarly, let tcnt denote the time
complexity of a computational context ̺〈·〉, i.e., the number of elementary steps
made by all non-adversarial parties in the game Gideal. The latter can be further
decomposed into the online and the offline time complexity:
tcnt = t̺ + tpr , (7.7)
where t̺ counts all elementary steps made by P1, . . . ,Pm,T1, . . . ,Ts for evaluat-
ing ̺〈π◦〉 and tpr is the time complexity of the corresponding security objective
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B(·). As before, let tre and tid denote the running times of real and ideal world
adversaries. Also, note that t̺ may depend on the adversarial behaviour.
Message delivery. Different algorithmic models of message delivery can be
easily specified sending messages through a dedicated courier node Pnw. The
courier node Pnw is an ordinary participant in the basic model, where commu-
nication is synchronous and secure. However, as all other participants send their
messages via Pnw, the effects of insecure, non-reliable, non-instantaneous and
non-authentic communication can be modelled by an appropriate choice of the
message delivery algorithm executed by Pnw. For example, non-authentic com-
munication can be formalised by using maliciously corrupted Pnw. Similarly, a
semi-honest corruption of Pnw represents the ability to eavesdrop all communi-
cation channels without the possibility to alter messages.
Most importantly, the courier node Pnw is an ordinary protocol participant
and thus the accuracy and correctness of all these message delivery models is
not our responsibility. Of course, the delivery model has to be specified, but
such non-essential technical details do not clutter the basic formalism.
Dynamic networks. Dynamic evolution of computational contexts is another
technical detail, which is emphasised a lot in Canetti’s manuscript [Can00b].
Again, such behaviour can be modelled by a dedicated administrator node Pna
that creates and deletes network nodes. More formally, only few nodes are ini-
tially active in the context and the remaining nodes are waiting for start-up mes-
sages from Pna. Now any active node Pi can send a special message with a
program code to Pna to activate a participant. The administrator Pna loads the
code into first free node Pj and sends the node label j back to Pi. Analogously,
we can give nodes the ability to halt other nodes. Note that the bound on the
total running time also limits the maximal number of activated nodes and thus
Pna never runs out of free nodes if the context has enough participants.
Message scheduling. Recall that a computational context ̺〈π〉 specifies only
a black-box usage of π. Such a specification is sufficient for the ideal imple-
mentation π◦, since the protocol execution is determined by a black-box usage
pattern. However, normal protocols usually have a more complex structure and
thus the message scheduling is not uniquely fixed. There are two principal ways
to solve this ambiguity. First, we might fix the explicit scheduling for ̺〈π〉 and
consider the corresponding game pairs. However, such a choice is often un-
suitable for practical applications, where messages are scheduled dynamically
in order to minimise network delays. Similarly, a rigid scheduling is unsuitable
for adaptive computations, where the execution itself depends dynamically on
the non-deterministic choices made by the participants. As a way out, we allow
flexible schedulings as long as they are completely deterministic. More formally,
if we fix random coins of all participants and the adversary, then the message
scheduling should be uniquely fixed for the protocol ̺〈π〉. We remind here that
all artefacts are defined in the basic model and thus these random coins uniquely
fix the networking behaviour and message delays.
Other relevant artefacts. Many other factors can influence the outcome of
interactive computations starting from different clock speeds and ending with
power consumption and sound made by the computational device. Neverthe-
less, all these artefacts can be implemented as dedicated nodes with a prescribed
corruption level, or as extra messages in protocols. Nevertheless, the layered de-
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scription of computational contexts is not a silver bullet. It just provides a more
modular way to specify features and at the end of the day the overall complexity
is comparable to Canetti’s formalism [Can00b]. In fact, Canetti’s model can be
viewed as a canonical formalisation of interactive computations.
7.3 TWO FLAVOURS OF STAND-ALONE SECURITY
Although the stand-alone security model is a quite restrictive computational con-
text, it is still a good starting point for illustrating many intricate concepts. In fact,
simplicity is the main virtue of the stand-alone model, since the corresponding
security proofs are quite straightforward and without subtle details. Hence, com-
plex security notions have often alternative description in the stand-alone model
to escape tedious technical details. In particular, it is important to characterise
computational contexts that preserve stand-alone security.
First, note that participants P1, . . . ,Pn may possess more information than
is actually used in the protocol. That is, let x = (x1, . . . , xn) denote partial
inputs used by the protocol and let φ = (φ1, . . . , φn) denote the corresponding
complete inputs. We emphasise here that such a distinction is purely syntactic
and not a redefinition of the stand-alone security model. Namely, we can always
investigate protocols that first extract sub-inputs x from the true inputs φ and
then use x in later computations. Similarly, we use ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψn, ψa) to
denote the final output states of all participants and the adversary.
Second, note that our and the classical formalisation of stand-alone security
are qualitatively equivalent for static adversaries. Recall that a correspondence
between the real and the ideal world adversaries (B,A) 7→ A◦ may depend
on the security goal B(·) in our formalism, whereas the classical formalism re-
quires a mapping A 7→ A◦ that is independent of B(·), see Section 5.3. Now
assume that Pi is a non-corruptible node with an input φi = (βi, xi) and let
ψi = (βi, xi, yi) be the corresponding output. Then we can consider a universal
security goal Biu(·) that interprets βi as a formal description of B(·) and outputs
B(ψ1, . . . , ψn, ψa). Due to the properties of RAM machines, there exists a con-
stant c > 0 such that any tpr-time predicate B(·) can be interpreted in time c·tpr.
Hence, if for any input distribution D and c · tpr-time predicate Biu(·)
|Pr [GA
real
= 1]− Pr [GA◦
ideal
= 1]| ≤ ε , (7.8)
then the mapping (Biu,A) 7→ A◦ produces ideal world adversaries such that
cdtpr⋆ (GAre-atk,GA
◦
id-atk) ≤ ε (7.9)
whenever Pi remains uncorrupted. Consequently, there also exists a universal
mapping A 7→ A◦ for all adversaries that corrupt a fixed set of nodes, as always
assumed in the classical formalisations [Can00a, Gol04]. We emphasise that the
equivalence does not hold for input-privacy in the malicious model.
Third, note that it is irrelevant whether a predicate B(·) is computed in cen-
tralised or distributed manner. Hence, stand-alone security is sufficient for all
computational contexts ̺〈·〉, where all participants first execute a protocol and
then interactively post-process the outputs ψ. However, the models are equiv-
alent only if we can embed the post-processing phase into B(·). For obvious
92 7. MODULAR DESIGN OF COMPLEX PROTOCOLS
Pn· · ·P1
· · ·
P2
za
P3
ψ1
ψ2
ψ3
ψn
pi
̺〈·〉
z1 z2 z3 zn
A
ψa
Pn· · ·P1
· · ·
P2
za
P3
ψ1
ψ2
ψ3
ψn
pi
̺〈·〉
z1 z2 z3 zn
A
ψa
Figure 7.3: Synchronisation errors that break the equivalence with the stand-
alone setting. Escaping messages are on the left and invading messages on the
right. The execution time goes from top to bottom.
reasons, such an embedding does not exist for input-privacy but there are other
more surprising exceptions. Namely, the adversarial behaviour might cause syn-
chronisation errors, where protocol messages are mixed together with the post-
processing phase, see Fig. 7.3. The grey area in the figure represents the time
when the participants execute the protocol, the white area represents the post-
processing phase and the arrows represent misinterpreted messages.
In short, messages can either escape or invade the stand-alone setting. A mes-
sage escapes from the stand-alone setting if it is sent to a participant that has
already completed the protocol. A message invades the stand-alone setting if it
is sent by a node that has already completed the protocol. To avoid ambigu-
ity, we say that all maliciously corrupted nodes finish the protocol together with
the last (semi-)honest node. Escaping messages have no influence on outputs ψ
in the stand-alone model, since the low level message delivery just writes them
on the communication tapes of halted participants. Therefore, we cannot con-
struct the corresponding predicate, since the post-processing phase may actually
use these messages. Invading messages cause a similar incompatibility with the
stand-alone model. Moreover, it is straightforward to construct examples, where
such synchronisation errors cause the complete failure of a protocol that is secure
in the stand-alone model. We leave this as an exercise to the reader.
We emphasise here that it is relatively easy to eliminate problems caused by
escaping messages. For example, we can use special tags to denote the proto-
col messages and drop all these messages in the post-processing stage. Invading
messages, on the other hand, cause more severe problems, since they bring extra
information to the stand-alone setting. In particular, a post-processing context
̺〈·〉 may force a participant Pi to publish the state ψi after completion of the
protocol and such synchronisation errors are extremely dangerous.
As an illustrative example consider a lottery protocol πsl depicted in Fig. 7.4,
where P2 tries to guess a random number s1 generated by P1 and the number
s1 is sent to the arbiter P3 to prevent P1 from cheating. In the ideal implemen-
tation, the trusted third party does all computations by herself and sends the
results back to the participants. Now assume that only P2 can be corrupted and
that all communication channels are secure. Then the protocol is 2−k+1-secure
in the malicious model. The corresponding simulator Sim just ignores the mes-
sages sent by T and P2 and outputs whatever A does. However, the protocol πsl
is clearly insecure in the post-processing context, where P2 queries s1 from P3.
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Figure 7.4: Protocol πsl that models a simple lottery with an arbiter P3.
Namely, P2 can first pretend that πsl is completed to get the invading message s1
from P3 and then forward s1 to P1 and thus always win the lottery. At the same
time, the ideal implementation remains secure in this context. Moreover, the
underlying problem cannot be solved with message tagging.
Such protocol failures are extremely dangerous and should be avoided by
design. A protocol π has a robust message scheduling if no tolerable attack
can force (semi-)honest nodes to make synchronisation errors. In particular,
honest participants can always detect when all other honest participants have
finished the protocol. A robust scheduling is always achievable in the presence
of an authentic broadcast channel, as each participant can broadcast a specific
message when he or she completes the protocol. Of course, there are other
alternatives, such as fixed round protocols or limits on the duration of π.
Strong stand-alone security model. The example above clearly shows that
a protocol π must have a robust scheduling, or otherwise it might lose security
in post-processing contexts. However, the latter is not always sufficient when a
context has a pre-processing phase. In particular, note that the adversary might
gain some knowledge φa in the pre-computation phase that helps to attack the
protocol afterwards. In the following, we describe a strong stand-alone security
model that together with robust messaging assures security in all contexts ̺〈·〉,
where the protocol π is executed without any side-computations.
The ideal attack phase Gid-atk coincides with the standard formalisation de-
scribed in Section 5.3 but there is a minor change in the real attack phase Gre-atk.
Namely, the challenger must always notify the adversary when some participant
halts. Secondly, we consider the extended inputs φe = (φ1, . . . , φn, φa) instead
of normal inputs φ = (φ1, . . . , φn) but otherwise there are no other differences
with Section 5.3. In particular, a real and an ideal world model are (tre, tid, ε)-
close w.r.t. a set of relevant predicates B in the strong stand-alone model if for
any security objective B(·) ∈ B and for any tre-time real world adversary A
there exists a tid-time ideal world adversary A◦ such that for any extended input
distribution φe ← De:
|Pr [GA
real
= 1]− Pr [GA◦
ideal
= 1]| ≤ ε . (7.10)
As a result, we get a slightly stronger reduction schema
GA
real
MPC-SEC+
=====⇒
ε
GA◦
ideal
. (7.11)
Note that we can always pack an extended distribution De into a standard in-
put distribution D by treating the input of Pi as a pair (φ′i, φ
′
a) and the other way
around. As a result, it is straightforward to show that the additional knowledge φa
obtained in the pre-computation stage does not increase the adversary’s ability to
attack a protocol in the case of static corruption. Consequently, the extra input
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φa is essential only if an adaptive or mobile adversary uses it to find “optimal”
candidates for further corruption, see [Can00a, p.179].
Secondly, we can make a mapping (B,A) 7→ A◦ algorithmic for any fixed
security goal B(·). Let Au be a universal adversary that interprets φa as a formal
description of an adversarial strategy A. Then the corresponding ideal adversary
A◦u can be viewed as a compiler that devises an appropriate attack strategy for
the code φa. However, the algorithmic correspondence is not for free, since the
adversaries A◦u(φa) and A
◦ have different running times tid(c · tre) and tid(tre)
where the constant c > 0 is the interpreting overhead.
For static adversaries, we can combine two results by considering the univer-
sal security goal Biu(·) and the universal adversary Au. The corresponding com-
piler Aiu(·) assures also the computational indistinguishability of outputs when
node Pi is not corrupted. Hence, our and classical formulation of stand-alone
security coincide even if the set of corrupted parties is randomly fixed by the
adversary. For the proof, consider a super-compiler A∗u(·) that first fixes random
coins ω for the adversary A and obtains the list of corrupted participants C. Next,
A∗u(·) chooses i such that Pi /∈ C and uses the compiler Aiu(·) to transform the
deterministic algorithm A(ω) and executes the end result.
Finally, we want to emphasise that the existence of efficient compiler con-
structions is not formally sufficient for the constructive proofs needed for sub-
jective security. Although such claim seems to be contradictory at first sight, it
has a straightforward explanation. The classical security proof might prove non-
constructively that the correspondence (B,A) 7→ A◦ exists. The latter proves
also the existence of the universal compiler A◦u(·) but does not provide an ex-
plicit code for it. Consequently, the subjective security proof is still incomplete
as we cannot explicitly write down the code of a universal compiler A◦u(·). The
latter is not a mere theoretical discussion, as some cryptographic proofs actually
use inefficient counting arguments, e.g. [BL07].
Also, the existence of such compilers A◦u(·) does not contradict classical im-
possibility results for program analysis, since the compiler handles only programs
with a fixed size. As a result, the compiler A◦u(·) may use an ultra-compact ad-
vice string—Philosopher’s Stone—to speed up the online code analysis phase.
Buldas and Laur [BL07] showed that such a Philosopher’s Stone must exist for
a very specific problem, but the corresponding counting argument itself is quite
universal. In a nutshell, white-box proofs exist even for cryptographic primitives
that satisfy only abstract security properties.
7.4 CANONICAL DECOMPOSITION TECHNIQUES
High-level security proofs often split interactive computations into isolated sub-
phases to simplify the security analysis. For example, stand-alone security guar-
antees are sufficient for all interactive post-processing phases that can be embed-
ded into the predicate B(·). Although this claim seems trivial, the corresponding
formal proof must separate post-processing phase from the protocol execution
and formalise it as a sub-formula in the predicate B(·). However, the robust
scheduling only assures that the computational process is logically separable,
i.e., messages are always sent and received in the same computational phase and
we can view internal states ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψm, ψa) at the end of the phase as
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Figure 7.5: Three basic ways to decompose interactive computations into two
sub-phases without altering the final output vector zobs.
inputs φ = (φ1, . . . , φm, φa) in the next phase. However, different participants
can finish the same phase in different time moments, as depicted in Fig. 7.5.
Therefore, the knowledge of the internal states ψ alone might be insufficient to
reconstruct the computations in the following phase. Only a slight change in
timings may influence the ordering of messages and thus have an effect on the
final outputs zobs even if the protocol and the context are specified in terms of
received messages and their order, and not on their arrival times.
There are three principal solutions for this problem. First, we can guarantee
that all participants always finish sub-phases simultaneously and thus the timing
issues become irrelevant. In the corresponding synchronised communication
model, messages are sent in only during short rounds that occur in fixed time
intervals, and the exact order of messages in a round is discarded. Such a sim-
ple model for message delivery is used in many classical works, see for exam-
ple [GMW87, BOGW88, CCD88, Bea91b, MR91b, DM00, Can00a].
As a second alternative, we can include timing effects directly to our compu-
tational model. More formally, we assume that the challenger is equipped with
a clock1 that is set to zero at the beginning of computations. In this model, ob-
servable outputs are pairs (zi, τi), where zi is a classical output and τi is the exact
halting time. As a result, we can talk about time-preserving correspondences
between real and ideal world models, since a security goal B(·) now depends
on exact halting times τ1, . . . , τm. Naturally, such a correspondence is possible
only if the adversary has some control over timings. In the corresponding for-
mal model, the challenger always adds timing information to his or her replies
and the adversary can specify the exact time when the challenger must carry out
the corresponding oracle queries. However, the corresponding real-time model
of computations is quite technical and takes us away from our main goal—the
study of time-invariant protocols and contexts. Hence, we do not discuss this
model further, although the following proofs can be directly generalised to han-
dle exact timing in computations.
A third alternative is to eliminate all timing artefacts from the model so that
knowledge of internal states ψ alone is sufficient to reconstruct the proceeding
computations. For example, we can postulate that the order of messages is in-
dependent of the inputs and the adversarial behaviour. Then the knowledge of
ψ uniquely determines the output, since the order of messages is fixed but un-
known. However, adversarial forces can often influence message delivery and
1The clock models a global physical time in the actual computations.
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thus such models with fixed message schedulings are overly optimistic. Evi-
dently, we can route messages through special courier nodes P1nw, . . . ,P
v
nw in
order to model network delays. However, slight changes in timings can change
the order of messages received by courier nodes Punw and the correct decompo-
sition is still impossible without the exact timing information τ .
In more formal terms, a computational process with several parallel threads
is often time-sensitive even if the individual threads are time-invariant. There-
fore, we cannot escape timing artefacts, unless we consider pseudo-parallel ex-
ecutions, where only a single participant is active at the same time moment.
Let Psc be a special malicious scheduler node that can activate other partici-
pants in any order as long as no two nodes are simultaneously active. That is,
all other participants are initially waiting for a special activation messages from
Psc. When a semi-honest node receives an activation message, the node does
some computations and gives control back to Psc. If the activated node is ma-
licious, the control goes back to the adversary. As a result, the adversary has
full control over the scheduling and the knowledge of internal states ψ is suf-
ficient for correct decompositions as desired. The corresponding asynchronous
model of computations has many variations, since there are many reasonable
alternatives for scheduling and network behaviour. Still, some formalisations are
more fundamental than the others. In particular, all classical computational
models [BOCG93, Can00b] require that an activated node stops when it starts
to read the next incoming message. Such a scheduling has optimal granularity,
since the adversary can dynamically choose any valid message ordering, but the
scheduling is coarse enough to hide exact timing.
7.5 CHARACTERISATION OF SEQUENTIAL COMPOSABILITY
In the following section, we study the limitations of strong stand-alone security.
In particular, we formally prove that strong stand-alone security is sufficient for
all computational contexts, where honest participants stop all other computa-
tions during the protocol. Although such an isolated execution policy is quite
restrictive, it is still adequate for many practical settings. In a sense, this result for-
mally validates the strong stand-alone security model, as it shows that the model
provides practically meaningful security guarantees.
For clarity, we divide the corresponding security analysis into two phases.
First, we formally prove that any post-processing phase can be embedded into
the security goal B(·) if a protocol has a robust message scheduling. Second,
we show that the effects of pre-computation phase can always be modelled as an
extended input distribution De. As a result, the security of an isolated protocol
execution follows from the strong stand-alone security. In particular, a com-
pound protocol that executes sub-protocols one by one remains secure in the
strong stand-alone model as long as sub-protocols are also secure in the strong
stand-alone model, i.e., strong stand-alone security is sequentially composable.
We emphasise here that these claims hold only for the computational models
that support errorless decompositions, i.e., the knowledge of internal state ψ is
sufficient to determine the final outputs zobs.
Lemma 1. If a protocol has a robust message scheduling, then any post-proces-
sing phase can be embedded into the security goal. The corresponding overhead
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is linear in the total complexity of the post-processing phase.
Proof sketch. For the proof, we split a pair (Greal,Gideal) of corresponding security
games into two sub-phases. In the first phase, (semi-) honest participants execute
the original context until the real protocol π or the ideal protocol π◦ is com-
pleted and output their internal states ψi. After all participants have finished,
the corresponding output vector ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψm, ψa) is used as an input vec-
tor for the second phase, where (semi-)honest participants restore their internal
states and continue with the execution. The vector of final outputs zobs is used
as an input to the original security goal B(·). Let us denote the corresponding
two-phase security games by G∗
real
, G∗
ideal
and the corresponding sub-adversaries by
A1, A2 and A◦1, A
◦
2. Next, we define constructive mappings A 7→ (A1,A2) and
(A◦1,A
◦
2) 7→ A◦ that achieve perfect correspondence
GA
real
≡ (G∗
real
)A1,A2 and (G∗
ideal
)A
◦
1,A
◦
2 ≡ GA◦
ideal
. (7.12)
More precisely, if we additionally assume that the challenger notifies A1 in
the game G∗
real
when a (semi-)honest participant halts, then the correspondence
A 7→ (A1,A2) is evident. Namely, the sub-adversary A1 can run A until all
(semi-)honest nodes are halted2 and output the corresponding internal state as
ψa. In the second phase, the sub-adversary A2 restores the internal state of A
and continues the execution of A. For the second mapping (A◦1,A
◦
2) 7→ A◦,
note that the adversary A◦ can always detect the change of phases in the ideal
world and thus the adversary A◦ can sequentially run A◦1 and A
◦
2.
Now it is straightforward to prove that all decompositions are well defined
and the equivalences (7.12) indeed hold if π has a robust scheduling and the
computational model facilitates errorless decomposition. Also, the difference
in running times is linear. Thus, we can analyse game pairs (G∗
real
,G∗
ideal
) and
mappings (A1,A2) 7→ (A◦1,A◦2) instead of (Greal,Gideal) and A 7→ A◦. As the
real and ideal world are identical after the first phase, we can always choose
A◦2 = A2. Consequently, the second phase together with B(·) can be viewed as
a new security objective B′(·) and the claim follows.
Lemma 2. Any pre-processing phase with robust scheduling can be replaced
with an extended input distribution De. The corresponding overhead in running
times is linear for the context and for the adversary.
Proof sketch. Again, we can split a pair (Greal,Gideal) of corresponding security
games into two sub-phases so that the first phase captures the pre-processing
phase and the second phase captures the succeeding computations. Let us de-
note the corresponding two-phase game pair by (G∗
real
,G∗
ideal
) and the vector of
internal states between the sub-phases by φ = (φ1, . . . , φm, φa). Similarly, to
the proof of Lemma 1, we can analyse game pairs (G∗
real
,G∗
ideal
) and mappings
(A1,A2) 7→ (A◦1,A◦2) instead of (Greal,Gideal) and A 7→ A◦. We omit the corre-
sponding argumentation, since it is completely analogous to the previous proof.
Finally, note that the first phase can be replaced with sampling φe ← De in the
games G∗
real
and G∗
ideal
, if we consider only mappings with A◦1 = A1. Again such a
choice is natural, since the ideal and real world coincide in the first phase.
2The escaping messages produced by the first stage of the adversary should be re-sent in the
second stage to assure equivalence.
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These decomposition lemmas alone are sufficient to prove several sequential
composability results, provided that the computational context ̺〈·〉 and the pro-
tocol π share the same set of participants. However, this assumption is rarely
valid in practical applications, where only a few participants Pi1 , . . . ,Pin of the
global context ̺〈·〉 take part in the protocol π. In fact, participants Pi1 , . . . ,Pin
usually have little, if any, knowledge about the global context ̺〈·〉. Also, it is
unlikely that participants Pi1 , . . . ,Pin can force some global restrictions on the
other participants. However, local restrictions concerning only the participants
of the protocol π are enforceable. In particular, participants can always run the
protocol π in isolation by forcing the following local restrictions:
(S1) The context ̺〈·〉 uses the protocol π in black-box manner.
(S2) The protocol π and pre-processing phase have robust message scheduling
when we consider only the participants of the protocol π.
(S3) The participants of the protocol π send out only the messages of π and
delete all non-protocol messages during the execution of the protocol π.
Note that there are several ways how the participants of the protocol π can relate
to other participants. If the protocol π provides an end-to-end solution, then it is
also reasonable to assume that all non-participants are corrupted, as these exter-
nal entities are out of our control. For example, all those millions and millions
of computational devices that are connected to Internet, but do not participate
in our protocol, are potentially hostile non-participants that we cannot control.
In the two-party setting, it is natural to assume that non-participants are cor-
rupted, since each party trusts only him- or herself. The same is true for multi-
party protocols, where one controls a fixed set of nodes and thus the adversary
can potentially abuse all signals that are sent out of this group. On the other
hand, the group of semi-controllable nodes that follow the restrictions (S1)–(S3)
might change in time. For example, some new members that are believed to
be honest can join the group. Therefore, it makes sense to slightly relax the
assumption and postulate the following:
(A1) All nodes that do not participate in the protocol π are compromised during
the execution of π, afterwards the adversary might retreat from them.
(A2) All trusted third parties that are guaranteed to finish before or start after
the execution of π can be considered as participants of the protocol π.
Now it is straightforward to establish a correspondence between the isolated pro-
tocol execution and the strong stand-alone security model, i.e., the strong stand-
alone security is sufficient for all security levels except for input-privacy. For
clarity, we state only the qualitative results. The exact quantitative relations be-
tween the time bounds can be extracted from the proofs if necessary.
Theorem 1. A context ̺〈·〉 and a protocol π that satisfy restrictions (S1)–(S3) and
(A1)–(A2) preserve strong stand-alone security. The corresponding overhead is
linear for the running times and the bound on the advantage does not change.
Proof sketch. Let us first consider the simplified case, where the participants of
the context ̺〈·〉 and the protocol π coincide. Since the assumptions of Lem-
mata 1 and 2 are satisfied, we can split the respective game pair (Greal,Gideal) into
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three sub-phases, where the first phase corresponds to the pre-processing phase
and the third one to the post-processing phase. Moreover, there are constructive
mappings A 7→ (A1,A2,A3) and (A◦1,A◦2,A◦3) 7→ A◦ such that
GA
real
≡ (G∗
real
)A1,A2,A3 and (G∗
ideal
)A
◦
1,A
◦
2,A
◦
3 ≡ GA◦
ideal
. (7.13)
To conclude the proof, we must construct a mapping A2 7→ A◦2 such that∣∣Pr [(G∗
real
)A1,A2,A3 = 1
]− Pr [(G∗
ideal
)A1,A
◦
2,A3 = 1
]∣∣ ≤ ε . (7.14)
Lemma 1 assures that the third phase can be embedded into the security goal
with a linear overhead. Lemma 2 assures that the first phase can be replaced
with an appropriate extended distribution De. As the second phase corresponds
to the strong stand-alone security model, the existence of a mapping A2 7→ A◦2
is implied by the assumptions of the theorem. The claim holds even if the exact
roles in the protocol are determined dynamically by the context, since we can
always assume that the internal states φ and ψ also contain the formal specifica-
tion (code) of the computational context.
For the general case, consider a new extended protocol πˆ, where the non-
participants of the protocol π just output their initial states and halt. Then the
original security game Greal can be viewed as an execution of πˆ, where the ad-
versary corrupts the non-participants during the execution to do some malicious
side-computations. Note that the protocol πˆ and the pre-processing phase for-
mally have a robust scheduling, since all trusted third parties are guaranteed to
be inactive and other non-participants are assumed to be corrupted during the
execution of the protocol πˆ. Thus, we have reached the simplified case.
To conclude, note that the modified protocol πˆ preserves strong stand-alone
security possibly with linear overhead. First, the presence of inactive trusted
third parties is irrelevant, since their inputs and outputs are empty. Second,
there is one-to-one correspondence between the security games for the protocols
π and πˆ. Namely, the inputs of other non-participants can be embedded into the
adversarial input φa and the outputs can be embedded into the output ψa. Sim-
ilarly, any security goal B(·) for the protocol πˆ can be translated to a predicate
B′(·) that first extracts all embedded outputs from ψa and then evaluates B(·).
Hence, it is straightforward to construct an appropriate mapping (B,A) 7→ A◦
for the protocol πˆ given only a mapping (B′,A) 7→ A◦ for the protocol π. The
corresponding overhead is linear, as needed.
Corollary 1. Security in the strong stand-alone security model is sequentially
composable, provided that all sub-protocols have robust scheduling.
Proof. Let a protocol π be a sequential application of protocols π1, . . . , πs that
share the same set of participants. Then Theorem 1 assures that we can substi-
tute all protocols πi step by step with the corresponding ideal implementations
π◦i . Although each substitution step introduces a new trusted third party, the as-
sumption (A2) still holds and we can continue. The corresponding game chain
completes the proof and provides necessary bounds on the advantage.
Further discussion. The correspondence between the stand-alone security and
the isolated protocol execution implies that the strong stand-alone security is a
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sufficient and necessary security objective for end-to-end solutions. Also, note
that protocol designers control only a tiny part of the whole world and the dis-
tinction between internal and external entities is unavoidable. The assump-
tion (A1) captures the obvious judgement that external entities do not have to
follow any restrictions. In that light, Theorem 1 is just a description that explains
how and what kind of protocols one should execute in unknown hostile envi-
ronments. We emphasise that the global computational context itself can reveal
much more information than the ideal implementation of the protocol. Never-
theless, we cannot relax security requirements further to optimise the protocol
performance, since we do not know how much extra information is revealed by
the computational context. Consequently, the equivalence between ideal and
real world implementations is the best we can achieve.
Historically, cryptographers have always taken the stand-alone security model
for granted and have seldom explored its limitations in practical applications.
The latter is the main reason why Theorem 1 or its analogues have never been
proved in the mainstream cryptographic literature, although the result has been
implicitly known for decades. In that sense, various composability results that
simplify the design and analysis of protocols are more important. Thus, classical
treatments of secure computations, such as [Can00a, Gol04], emphasise only
sequential composability results and the corresponding design methodology.
Also, note that the equivalence result holds only if we assume that all external
parties are corrupted. This assumption is often too conservative and can signifi-
cantly weaken the corresponding security guarantees. The latter is another rea-
son why the equivalence result has remained unnoticed, as other more stringent
security notions provide more precise security guarantees.
Secondly, note that the usage restrictions (S1)–(S3) and (A1)–(A2) are op-
timal for the strong stand-alone security. In particular, stand-alone security is
generally insufficient to guarantee parallel composability, see [GK96b, Lin04].
Hence, the assumption (A1) is essential and cannot be relaxed, since the re-
strictions (S1)–(S3) do not eliminate the possibility of parallel execution. For
example, consider a context where P1,P2 execute a protocol π1 and P3,P4 exe-
cute a protocol π2 at the same time. Then the restrictions (S1)–(S3) and (A2) are
formally satisfied, although the real implementation cannot be replaced with the
ideal protocol. A concrete counterexample is given in [GK96b] as Theorem 5.1.
The same counterexample can be modified to show that all trusted third parties
must be inactive during the execution of the protocol.
Although the usage restrictions are optimal, we can still do some cosmetic
relaxations. In particular, we can bypass the restriction (A1) by artificially in-
creasing the number of participants. Let πˆ be an extended protocol where all
non-participants are inactive during the execution of π. Then it is straightfor-
ward to prove that the protocol πˆ preserves strong stand-alone security if and
only if the correspondence (B,A) 7→ A◦ is independent of the security goal B.
Consequently, if the protocol π is secure according to classical definitions, there
is no need to corrupt honest participants that remain inactive during the execu-
tion of π. However, this relaxation holds only for those honest participants that
are guaranteed to be inactive, since the pre-processing phase and the protocol πˆ
must have a robust message scheduling.
Centralised task scheduling. Note that strong stand-alone security is sufficient
for modular protocol design, since sub-tasks can always be executed one by one.
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As an advantage, we do not have to strengthen the security requirements for
sub-protocols but there are also many important drawbacks.
Firstly, we must implement a global synchronisation service that reserves time
slots for individual sub-tasks. As a result, all nodes must either participate in a
protocol or wait until the protocol is completed. Thus, the whole network acts as
a single virtual processor and load balancing is impossible. Moreover, the overall
performance is determined by the slowest node in the network.
Secondly, note that modern computing devices do millions of operations in
few milliseconds. Consequently, network delays can cause significant perfor-
mance penalties. Moreover, the relative impact of network delays only increases
in the future, as these delays are likely to remain constant, whereas the compu-
tational throughput is likely to grow in the future.
Thirdly, secure function evaluation is not the only practical design goal. In
many cases, we need to implement secure services that have several rounds or
are non-terminating. For example, access control and secure storage systems
must function continuously. Centralised task scheduling makes it impossible to
run two or more continuous services in parallel. Instead, we must divide the
corresponding ideal functionalities into micro-rounds and use some kind of fair
interleaving mechanism to assure the availability of all services. However, such
a solution is artificial and inherently decreases the responsiveness.
7.6 CHARACTERISATION OF UNIVERSAL COMPOSABILITY
In many cases, it is impossible to guarantee that sub-protocols are not executed
simultaneously or the corresponding performance penalty is prohibitively large.
Hence, it is advantageous to consider more liberal task schedulings. The latter
again requires more strict security definitions, since the stand-alone security does
not assure the security of parallel executions [GK96b, Lin04]. Evidently, various
restrictions on computational contexts lead to different security requirements
and feasibility results, for example, compare the results of [Pas04] and [Lin04].
However, the fundamental limitations obtained in [Lin03a, Lin04] indicate that
additional usage restrictions do not make it easier to design protocols, unless
these restrictions are really specific. Hence, it makes sense to consider protocols
that preserve the security in all time-bounded computational contexts.
Formally, we must first fix all lower level artefacts, such as message delivery
and timing models. In particular, we can study synchronised, asynchronous or
real-time model of computations. As usual let π be a protocol and π◦ denote
the corresponding ideal implementation. Let Gu be the set of all game pairs
(Greal,Gideal) that are induced by all computational contexts ̺〈·〉 and by all secu-
rity objectives B(·). Finally, fix an adversarial structure Aloc that specifies the
tolerable adversarial behaviour in local terms. The latter is necessary as contexts
may assign different roles in the protocol π to different participants. Now the
protocol π is (tre, tpr, tcnt, ε)-universally composable w.r.t. the adversarial struc-
tureAloc if for any tcnt-time game pair (Gideal,Greal) ∈ Gu and for any tre-time real
world adversary A that respects Aloc, there exist a tid-time ideal world adversary
A◦ such that for any extended input distribution De, we have
|Pr [GA
real
= 1]− Pr [GA◦
ideal
= 1]| ≤ ε . (7.15)
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The corresponding reduction schema is denoted as
GA
real
UC-SEC
====⇒
ε
GA◦
ideal
. (7.16)
We remark that the original definition of universal composability [Can01] was
given in different technical terms. The computational context ̺〈·〉 is substituted
with an autonomous malicious entity Z that has black-box access to the protocol
π and interacts with the adversary. However, the difference is purely syntactical,
as the environment Z can always simulate the computational context ̺〈·〉 and
vice versa, see also [Lin03b]. We prefer the notion of computational context,
since it is conceptually simpler and closer to reality.
Also, note that our definition is based on a mapping (Greal,Gideal,A) 7→ A◦,
whereas the original definition [Can01] requires universality A 7→ A◦ for all
tcnt-time game pairs (Greal,Gideal) ∈ Gu. As a result, the original definition also
violates the external consistency restrictions (C1)–(C2), whereas our definition
is externally consistent. Still, these definitions are qualitatively equivalent. More
formally, consider a universal context ̺u〈·〉, where all participants interpret their
inputs as a code. Then the corresponding ideal world adversary A◦u is universal
for all game pairs (Greal,Gideal) ∈ Gu and the quantitative changes in the time
bounds are linear. However, this equivalence result was first rejected in the
asymptotic security model, since the initial definition of contexts with polyno-
mial running times3 was too strict, see [Can00b, p. 49–50].
Finally, note that universal composability is closed under concurrent com-
position. More formally, if a compound protocol ̺0〈π◦1〉 is a universally com-
posable implementation of a functionality π◦0 and a protocol π1 is a universally
composable implementation of a functionality π◦1 , then the protocol ̺0〈π1〉 is
also a universally composable implementation of the functionality π◦0 regardless
of the message scheduling. Indeed, fix a computational context ̺〈·〉 and con-
sider the corresponding chain of compound protocols
̺〈π◦〉 π
◦
0=⇒̺〈̺0〈π◦1〉〉 ≡ ̺1〈π◦1〉 π1=⇒̺1〈π1〉 , (7.17)
where ̺1〈·〉 = ̺〈̺0〈·〉〉 is a shorthand for another computational context. Note
that we can still complete the corresponding reversed game chain
GA
real
≡ GA33 UC-SEC====⇒GA22 ≡ GA11 UC-SEC====⇒GA00 ≡ GA
◦
ideal
, (7.18)
where the security games G0, G1, G2, G3 correspond to the protocols and contexts
from left to right in the chain (7.17) and A1 = A2 and G1 = G2. To be precise,
the game chain exists only if the adversarial structures for both protocols π0 and
π1 are compatible. Evidently, the result holds also for longer chains of hybrid
protocols, provided that all necessary quantitative bounds are compatible.
Criterion for universal composability. Although Canetti was the first to de-
fine the universal composability for the asynchronous model of computations,
the concept itself was known already in the early 1990s. Micali and Rogaway
defined and studied the corresponding security objective as reducibility in the
synchronised model of computations, see articles [MR91a, MR91b] for further
discussion. Also, the description of universally composable protocols has been
3The latter is another example that illustrates how dangerous it is to define asymptotic security
models directly without first considering the exact formalisation.
7. MODULAR DESIGN OF COMPLEX PROTOCOLS 103
φa
pi σA
φ1 φ2 · · ·
ψ1 ψ2 · · · ψn+1
φn+1
ψmψa
B
· · ·
· · ·
pi
◦
φa φm
σ
φ1 φnφ2 · · ·
ψnψ1 ψ2 · · · ψn+1
φn+1
ψmψa
B
· · ·
· · ·
A
◦
φm
ψn
φn
Figure 7.6: Correspondence between parallel execution and stand-alone model.
The dashed box represents the compound adversary in the stand-alone model.
implicitly known for decades, starting from the early works [MR91b, Bea91b].
All subsequent works, such as [DM00, PW00, Can01, Lin03b], have just refined
technical details. Nevertheless, we provide the characterisation together with a
proof sketch, since the latter underlines some intricate connections with sequen-
tial composability and emphasises some unexpected details.
Again, we restrict ourselves to the computational models that support error-
less decomposition. Consequently, we can ignore the pre- and post-processing
phase and concentrate on the interactions between the protocol π and the side-
computations σ, see Fig. 7.6. Observe that a real world adversary A can always
break the conceptual separation between π and σ by selectively transferring data
from one process to another. Such behaviour is impossible in the ideal world,
where the idealised protocol π◦ itself is shielded from the adversary A◦. Note
that the proof of Theorem 1 uses just some obvious although very crude bounds
on the information flow between these processes. Let Iσ denote the set of nodes
that participate in the side computations. Then the information leakage from
the process σ is bounded by the corresponding inputs (φi)i∈Iσ . Similarly, we
can overestimate the reverse flow of information from π to σ by giving the con-
trol over the output states (ψi)i∈Iσ to the adversary A
◦.
Of course, the resulting security estimate is very crude, as real world adver-
saries normally have only partial control over the states (φi)i∈Iσ and (ψi)i∈Iσ .
More precisely, the stand-alone adversary As = (A,Pi)i∈Iσ can be viewed as a
tuple, where A has no direct control over non-corrupted participants. Hence,
we must place structural restrictions to the correspondence (B,As) 7→ A◦s in
the stand-alone model, or otherwise the adversarial structures differ in the real
and the ideal world. One possible solution was put forward by Beaver [Bea91b].
Namely, consider a non-rewinding interface I between the ideal implementa-
tion π◦ and the real world adversary A that translates the corresponding com-
munication. Briefly, the interface I must simulate all protocol messages for the
adversary A given only access to the ideal implementation π◦. As a result, we
can view the interface as a computational context I〈·〉 that uses the real world
adversary As in a black-box manner to define the corresponding ideal world ad-
versary4 A◦s = I〈As〉 = I〈A,Pi〉i∈Iσ . More formally, we say that a protocol π is
(tre, tid, ε)-close w.r.t. the predicate set B and interface I〈·〉 in the strong stand-
alone model, if for any tre-time adversary As and for any predicate B(·) ∈ B, the
4Canetti uses a term shell simulator to denote the compound adversary I〈As〉 in [Can00b].
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ideal tid-time adversary A◦s = I〈As〉 achieves∣∣Pr [GAs
real
= 1]− Pr [GI〈As〉real = 1]
∣∣ ≤ ε (7.19)
for any extended input distribution De. As the interface I〈·〉 preserves the adver-
sarial structure, it is straightforward to relax requirements in Theorem 1. How-
ever, the proof holds only if the communication of the protocol π is separable
from the remaining messages. Here, we assume that all messages of π are routed
via a dedicated courier node Pπnw but there are many alternatives. For example,
the standard formalisation given by Canetti requires that each message contains
a special identifier that uniquely determines its purpose [Can00b, p. 21–32].
Theorem 2. A context ̺〈·〉 and a protocol π that satisfy restrictions (S1)–(S2)
preserve strong stand-alone security w.r.t. the interface I〈·〉. The corresponding
overhead is linear for running times and the advantage does not change.
Proof sketch. For clarity, we first consider a context ̺〈·〉, where participants of π
do no side-computations. As the restrictions (S1)–(S2) still hold, we can follow
the proof of Theorem 1 and split the execution into three phases. In particular,
constructive mappings A 7→ (A1,A2,A3) and (A◦1,A◦2,A◦3) 7→ A◦ such that
GA
real
≡ (G∗
real
)A1,A2,A3 and (G∗
ideal
)A
◦
1,A
◦
2,A
◦
3 ≡ GA◦
ideal
(7.20)
are still the same as in the proof of Theorem 1. Thus, the mapping A2 7→ I〈A2〉
defines the correspondence used in the proof of Theorem 1 and we obtain∣∣Pr [(G∗
real
)A1,A2,A3 = 1
]− Pr [(G∗
ideal
)A1, I〈A2〉,A3 = 1
]∣∣ ≤ ε . (7.21)
Recall that A2 is actually a compound adversary that captures the behaviour of
A and non-participants (Pi)i∈Iσ during the execution of the protocol π. Since
I〈A2〉 does not change the interaction patterns between A and non-participants
(Pi)i∈Iσ , the resulting correspondence A 7→ A◦ also preserves the adversarial
structure and the claim follows from the proof of Theorem 1.
The general case is slightly more complex, as nodes can concurrently partic-
ipate in π and σ. Since all protocol messages are routed via the node Pπnw, the
correspondence (A1,A2,A3) 7→ (A1, I〈A2〉,A3) described above is formally
valid and the bound (7.21) still holds. For the formal proof, we split each node
into two virtual sub-nodes (Pi,P∗i ) with a shared
5 internal state, where Pi does all
the computations except for π and P∗i is reserved for the protocol π. That is, all
messages transferred by the dedicated courier node Pπnw are sent out and received
by sub-nodes P∗i . All other messages are sent and received by normal nodes Pi.
Also, the adversary A can corrupt the node pair (Pi,P∗i ) only simultaneously, as
labels Pi are P∗i refer to the same node.
As a result, we have reached the simplified case, where participants of π do
not engage in any side-computations σ. The claim follows, as the corresponding
adversary I〈A,P1, . . . ,Pn,P∗1, . . . ,P∗n〉 behaves exactly as I〈A2〉.
5It is just a mind experiment that gives two labels for the same node to simplify the reasoning
in the proof.
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Further relaxations. First, note that there is no difference between the normal
non-corruptible participant Pi and a trusted third party Tj . Hence, the proof also
holds if there are many trusted third parties in the context.
Secondly, we emphasise that the restriction (S2) is essential or otherwise the
decomposition can be ill-defined and the reasoning may fail. For example, the
lottery protocol πsl in Fig. 7.4 has a non-rewinding interface I〈·〉 in the strong
stand-alone model although it does not preserve the security even in the sim-
ple post-processing context described in Section 7.3. Nevertheless, we can use
Theorem 2 to construct universally composable protocols that remain secure in
all contexts, where the restriction (S1) is satisfied. More precisely, let ̺0〈·〉 be
a wrapper context that eliminates the possibility of synchronisation errors. For
example, a participant in the context ̺0〈·〉 starts with π when all participants
of π have sent a message “I am ready to start π” and waits until all participants
of π send “I have finished π” after the completion. Then a modified protocol
πˆ = ̺0〈π〉 is universally composable, as ̺〈πˆ〉 = ̺〈̺0〈π〉〉 = ̺1〈π〉 and thus the
protocol π in the context ̺1〈·〉 satisfies the restrictions (S1)–(S2) by the construc-
tion. To be precise, the adversary learns when a participant starts and ends the
protocol, but this is usually irrelevant in practice.
Although external synchronisation is always possible, the resulting network
delays can cause significant performance penalties. Hence, it makes sense to
consider protocols with built-in synchronisation. Such protocols must remain
secure even if some protocol messages are received before the protocol execu-
tion and assure that final outputs are not released back to the context too early.
Note that the proof of Theorem 2 generalises and we can show that a protocol is
universally composable if there exists a non-rewinding interface I〈·〉 such that∣∣Pr [GA
real
= 1]− Pr [GI〈A〉real = 1]
∣∣ ≤ ε (7.22)
for any context ̺〈·〉 without side-computations. In other words, we must first
prove that there exists an interface I〈·〉 for the stand-alone model and then show
that the interface also works for other contexts or alternatively provide some ex-
tension to I〈·〉 that handles the corresponding synchronisation errors.
Optimality of assumptions. Obviously, we cannot relax the restriction (S1)
without losing all security guarantees. Similarly, a protocol π is universally com-
posable only if there exists a non-rewinding interface I〈·〉 such that the protocol
is secure in the strong stand-alone model w.r.t. this interface I〈·〉. For proof,
consider a strong stand-alone setting, where the participants P1, . . . ,Pn execute
the protocol π and a non-corruptible bystander Pn+1 that interprets the input
φn+1 as a code and assists the universal adversary Au. More precisely, the ad-
versary Au acts as a wire between the challenger and Pn+1, i.e., Au forwards all
messages sent by the challenger to Pn+1 and all commands sent by Pn+1 to the
challenger. Since the strong stand-alone setting itself is a computational con-
text, there must exist a universal ideal world adversary A◦u. Note that A
◦
u is a
non-rewinding interface I〈·〉 that translates communication between Pn+1 and
the ideal world challenger. Since Pn+1 can interpret the code of any stand-alone
adversary A with a linear slowdown, the requirement is optimal up to a constant
factor overhead in running times. To be precise, the claim holds only for the syn-
chronised and asynchronous model of computations, since the participant Pn+1
cannot stop the clock for his computations.
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7.7 TRUSTED SETUP AND UNIVERSAL COMPOSABILITY
The design of universally composable protocols is a challenging task, since the
corresponding protocols must have a black-box non-rewinding interface I〈·〉.
Such requirements diminish possible differences between the adversary and the
interface. In fact, the interface I〈·〉 can be viewed as an attack strategy that allows
input extraction and gives partial control over the outputs. Hence, the asymme-
try of powers between the adversary and the interface exists only if the adversarial
structure itself is asymmetric or there is a significant discrepancy in the running
times. In particular, note that classical multi-party protocols with honest ma-
jority indeed have non-rewinding interfaces, see for example [Bea91b]. Hence,
it is straightforward to show that these protocols are indeed universally compos-
able [Can01, Can00b]. On the other hand, no non-trivial protocol with honest
minority can be universally composable unless the interface has a significantly
higher computational demands than the adversary [CKL03].
There are two alternatives how to achieve universal composability in the case
of honest minority. First, we can allow a significant discrepancy tre ≪ tid be-
tween the running times of the real and the ideal world adversaries. However,
such a choice has several important drawbacks. As the correspondence between
real and ideal time-success profiles is less tight, the protocol might provide a way
to speed up some computations. Consequently, such protocols are guaranteed to
preserve only information-theoretical properties of the corresponding ideal im-
plementations. The large discrepancy tre ≪ tid also introduces complications in
the security proofs. As a substitution π 7→ π◦ in a security proof yields a tid-time
adversary A◦, a protocol that uses π as a sub-protocol must be secure against tid-
time adversaries. In particular, we cannot use repetitive substitutions to analyse
a context with many instances of the protocol π.
The latter is a serious drawback, since useful sub-protocols are commonly
used in many places. Therefore, one needs a stronger version of universal com-
posability that allows to replace many instances of a protocol by a single reduc-
tion step, i.e., we must analyse concurrent executions directly. For example,
many authors first prove the security of a protocol in the world, where a trusted
third party carries out zero-knowledge proofs, and later replace all ideal imple-
mentations with a protocol that is known to be secure in such concurrent set-
tings [PR03, Pas04, BS05]. Another more modular alternative was proposed
in [PS04] where authors assumed that the interface I〈·〉 is generally efficient
except for few well-described functions O1, . . . ,Os. Hence, a running time can
be viewed as a vector t = (t0, t1, . . . , ts), where t0 is the number of elemen-
tary steps without oracle calls and ti is the number of calls to the oracle Oi. As
the corresponding time bounds tre and tid are more structured than before, the
corresponding reduction scheme might withstand many iterations.
A trusted setup is another and often a more practical way to achieve universal
composability in the case of honest minority. Such a setup phase naturally intro-
duces necessary asymmetry into the adversarial structure. The trusted dealer Pts
is non-corruptible in the real world, whereas the interface I〈·〉 always corruptsPts
in the ideal world. To be precise, the dealer Pts is not present in the ideal world
at all and thus the interface I〈·〉 must simulate its presence, i.e., the interface
I〈·〉 has full control over Pts by the construction. Such an asymmetry makes the
design of universally composable protocols pretty straightforward. Moreover, the
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Figure 7.7: Scheduling restrictions posed by modular design. Sub-protocols π3
and π6 are run in isolation, since they implement trusted setup procedures.
corresponding computational overhead compared to stand-alone setting is min-
imal compared to the protocols with semi-inefficient simulators. Thus, we can
systematically use protocols with trusted setup to achieve modularity in security
proofs without losing efficiency and round complexity.
The corresponding methodology consists of three steps. First, we must design
universally composable protocols for all necessary sub-tasks. At this stage our
main design goal is to achieve universal composability with minimal overhead.
The corresponding trusted setup phase can be as complicated as needed and the
question whether such setup scenario is plausible in practice is irrelevant. In
the second step, we use these sub-protocols to construct a round optimal solu-
tion. The corresponding security proof is straightforward, since all protocols are
universally composable. As a final design step, we replace all trusted setup pro-
cedures with standard protocols that are secure only in the strong stand-alone
security model. The resulting protocol is both efficient and secure in the strong
stand-alone model and has a modular security proof.
To be precise, security in the strong stand-alone model is an understatement,
as we can apply Theorem 1 in any computational context. Consequently, the
compound protocol remains secure in all computational contexts, where the
restrictions (S1)–(S3) and (A1)–(A2) are satisfied during the execution of sub-
protocols that implement trusted setup phases, see Fig. 7.7.
However, note that a naive application of these design principles can lead
to sub-optimal solutions. As all non-trivial protocols require trusted setup, the
resulting protocol can contain an enormous pre-processing phase, i.e., we must
still run a large portion of the protocol in isolation. Hence, it is advantageous to
reduce the number of setup phases either with bootstrapping or sharing a single
setup phase between many protocols. The idea behind bootstrapping is obvi-
ous. Imagine that there exists a universally composable protocol π∗ts with a setup
phase π◦ts that implements more than one setup phase. Then we can iteratively
run π∗ts to create enough implementations of the setup phase π
◦
ts as needed. In
particular, Canetti and Rabin have shown that common reference string model
can be bootstrapped [CR03]. As any functionality can be implemented in the
common reference string model [CLOS02], we can always construct a protocol
with a short pre-processing stage that creates an initial common reference string.
On the other hand, these results show only the feasibility in the polynomial
model and may be completely sub-optimal in practice.
Moreover, note that bootstrapping is inherently less efficient than sharing a
108 7. MODULAR DESIGN OF COMPLEX PROTOCOLS
P1
Receive (pk, sk) from Pts
Execute pi1:
Send c1 ← Encpk(x1) to P2
Execute pi2:
Receive c2 from P2
return Decsk(c2)⊕ x1
P2
Receive pk from Pts
Execute pi1:
Receive c1 from P1
Execute pi2:
Send c2 ← Encpk(x2) to P1
return 0
Figure 7.8: Protocols π1 and π2 share a single setup phase and thus fail.
single setup phase π◦ts between different protocols π1, . . . , πs. However, the gain
in efficiency does not come without additional hassle. Namely, we must show
that a corresponding compound protocol ̺〈π1, . . . , πs〉 remains universally com-
posable even if they share the same setup phase π◦ts. Finding such proofs can be
a quite complicated and error-prone task, since the messages from different pro-
tocols are now correlated and the latter increases the amount of possible attack
patterns. As a trivial example, note that one-time pad is a universally compos-
able implementation of encryption functionality as long as the encryption key
is chosen uniformly. On the other hand, two-time pad (as a double execution
of one-time pad with the same setup phase) is known to be insecure. In other
words, universally composable protocols may become insecure if we share the
same setup phase between many protocols.
Before going into the technical details, let us first clarify how one should in-
terpret security guarantees in the presence of trusted setup. The latter is not so
obvious as it seems. We use a sub-protocol π2 in Fig. 7.8 as an illustrative exam-
ple. First, note that the protocol π2 uses asymmetric encryption and the trusted
dealer Pts establishes an appropriate key pair (pk, sk) ← Gen. Second, fix an
ideal implementation π◦2 , where a trusted third party T uses the inputs x1 and
x2 to compute the outputs y1 = x1 ⊕ x2 and y2 = 0. Then it is straightfor-
ward to show that π2 is universally composable against static adversaries. The
corresponding interfaces for malicious participants P1 and P2 given below
I1〈P1〉
(pk, sk) ← Gen
Send x1 to T.
Receive y1 from T.
Send c2 ← Encpk(y1 ⊕ x1) to P1.
Output whatever P1 outputs.
I2〈P2〉
(pk, sk) ← Gen
Send pk to P2.
Receive c2 from P2.
Send xˆ2 ← Decsk(c2) to T.
Output whatever P2 outputs.
provide a perfect correspondence between the real and ideal world outputs. Note
that we can easily find an adversarial strategy A such that P2 does not know the
submitted input xˆ2 ← Decsk(c2). Still, we can construct the corresponding
generic attack, where P2 first runs I2〈A〉 in order to extract xˆ2 and then sends
cˆ2 ← Encpk(xˆ2) to P1 and continues the execution of I2〈A〉. If we consider the
averaged performance over all runs of the setup procedure, then both attacks
induce the same output distribution. However, if we consider a fixed public key
pk, then the distributions can have significant differences.
More formally, let ωts denote the randomness of Pts and let Adv(A|ωts) be
the corresponding success profile. Then the correspondence A 7→ I〈A〉 pro-
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vides estimates only on the average-case success Adv(A). As the success profiles
may have large variance, the average-case bounds are insufficient for estimating
Adv(A|ωts). Note that security guarantees w.r.t. a fixed setup run are often more
natural in practice. For example, most applications use a single instance of an
hash function, such as SHA-1 or WHIRLPOOL, and the security of a public-key
infrastructure depends on a single fixed master key. Hence, it makes sense to also
consider the universal composability w.r.t. a fixed setup run. Of course, such a
setting is meaningful only in the framework of subjective security discussed in
Section 6.5. In this setting, the interface I〈·〉 cannot maliciously corrupt Pts, or
otherwise the correspondence A 7→ I〈A〉 does not preserve closeness between
Adv(A|ωts) and Adv(A◦|ωts). Consequently, the interface I〈·〉 can use only the
same set of parameters that A obtains from Pts, i.e., the trusted setup assures
only the correctness and availability of setup parameters.
In the following, we consider only the classical objective setting although the
same holds also for the subjective setting. First, it is straightforward to verify that
the protocol π1 in Fig. 7.8 is also a universally composable implementation of
“do nothing” functionality π◦1 ≡ ⊥. However, the compound protocol of π1 and
π2 with shared setup in Fig. 7.8 is insecure, since a malicious P2 can send c1
back to P2 and thus always force the output y1 = x1 ⊕ x1 = 0. Nevertheless,
it is easy to prove that concurrent composition ̺〈π1, π1〉 with the shared setup
π◦ts is universally composable and the same is also true for ̺〈π2, π2〉. Hence, no
simulation strategy I〈·〉 for itself makes sharing the setup π◦ts impossible and the
failure of ̺〈π1, π2〉 must be caused by more subtle reasons.
More formally, assume that the protocols π1, . . . , πv share the same trusted
setup phase π◦ts. Then any computational context implicitly defines an inner
context ̺ts〈π1, . . . , πv〉 that executes only π1, . . . , πv with the inputs provided
by the outer context ̺〈·〉. Since the inner context ̺ts〈π1, . . . , πv〉 itself can be
viewed as a compound protocol,6 we must just prove that ̺ts〈π1, . . . , πv〉 is uni-
versally composable. In particular, note that the final interface I〈·〉 for the com-
pound protocol ̺ts〈π1, . . . , πv〉 may use a modified setup procedure πts in the
ideal world and thus the corresponding security proof has three phases. First, we
must prove that substituting π◦ts with πts does not change the outcome in the real
world. In other words, for any valid outer context ̺〈·〉
|Pr [GA
real
= 1]− Pr [(G∗
real
)A = 1]| ≤ ε1 , (7.23)
where Greal and G∗real are the corresponding security games. Secondly, note that
direct access to the process πts may reveal secret information and thus it may
be easier to carry out some computational operations O1, . . . ,Os. Hence, we
should again view time bounds as vectors t = (t0, . . . , ts). In the simplest case,
all parameters sent out by π◦ts and πts are public and no honest participant can
carry out these expensive operations O1, . . . ,Os. In more complicated cases, the
setup procedure sends out some private information and the honest participants
can also carry out some of these operations O1, . . . ,Os. As a result, a protocol
πi may become insecure in contexts ̺ts〈·〉, where such private information is
transferred from one node to another. Moreover, the adversary may use honest
parties with extra abilities to carry out such operations.
6So far we have always assumed that all arguments must be specified in the beginning of the
protocol but nothing changes if we allow a gradual demand-based release of arguments.
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We can safely and systematically model these aspects by rewriting all proto-
cols π1, . . . , πv in terms of oracle calls. As a result, we obtain an equivalent
computational model, where the protocol πts broadcasts only public parameters
and all running times are expressed as vectors. Since the corresponding reduc-
tion schemata quantify time complexity more precisely, it is possible to replace
protocols in the inner context ̺ts〈π1, . . . , πv〉 one by one. Finally, when there
are no protocols left, we can complete the proof by removing πts.
Let us return to the protocol depicted in Fig. 7.8. In this example, we have to
count decryption operations as well. Observe that the protocol π1 is universally
composable only if the context and the real world adversary do not use decryp-
tion operations. As the context contains a single decryption operation, we cannot
replace π1 with the ideal implementation π◦1 . Although we can replace π2 with
the ideal implementation π◦2 , the resulting adversary does an extra decryption
operation and thus we still cannot replace π1 with π◦1 .
Finally, we note that the corresponding security proofs are quite streamlined
in all settings, where trusted setup is used to create only public parameters psp.
These security proofs do not use vectors as time bounds, but we still have to take
into account the fact that the context can choose the inputs x of the protocol
based on psp. Another particularly useful shared setup model is the public-key
infrastructure model. However, the latter generally requires precise vectorised
time bounds for the reasons shown above. In fact, the presented methodology
was largely motivated by the author’s own research [GLLM04, LLM05, LLM06,
LL07]. These articles study a certain restricted class of protocols that utilise ho-
momorphic encryption. In the final article [LL07], we used a slightly simplified
methodology to prove that all these protocols can be constructed by carefully
combining three elementary protocols that are universally composable even if
they share the corresponding setup phase. Such results are important, as they
can significantly simplify practical protocol design and can show what kind of
open problems may have significant practical consequences.
7.8 PUBLIC INPUTS AND UNIVERSAL COMPOSABILITY
Recall that no protocol without trusted setup can remain universally compos-
able and preserve privacy of inputs in the presence of honest minority [CKL03].
Superficially, it seems to imply that no useful protocol with honest minority can
be universally composable in the standard model. However, such an impression
is misleading, since some important practical functionalities indeed reveal all
inputs. For example, common primitives for authentication, such as message
authentication, tamper-resist storage and public broadcast, do reveal all inputs.
Consequently, a study of universally composable protocols with public inputs is
not a mere theoretical exercise, but also has practical consequences.
More formally, we say that the inputs of a protocol π are public if all partic-
ipants first submit their inputs to the ideal world adversary and then continue
interaction with the trusted third party as usual. A closer inspection reveals that
all universally composable protocols with honest minority must have public in-
puts and thus the definition is optimal, see the results in [CKL03]. Moreover,
protocols with public inputs cannot generally preserve universal composability
and implement a non-deterministic functionality, see again [CKL03] for precise
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reasoning. For less technical argumentation, recall that any functionality can be
implemented in the trusted setup model [CLOS02]. Hence, a trusted setup pro-
cedure itself cannot have universally composable implementation in the pres-
ence of honest minority, otherwise every function would have a universally com-
posable implementation. The claim follows, as trusted setup procedures have
no inputs and are thus protocols with public inputs.
Obviously, a protocol π with public inputs reveals all outputs when the ideal
functionality is deterministic. As a result, we can guarantee only the correctness
of outputs. Secondly, note that an interface Isim〈·〉 can straightforwardly simu-
late the execution of the protocol π to the real world adversary A, as all inputs
of honest nodes are available to Isim〈·〉 in the ideal world.7 Now the correspon-
dence between real and ideal world is complete as soon as we can extract the
inputs of corrupted nodes from the traffic between A and Isim〈·〉.
More formally, let Extr(·) be a tex-time function that takes in the traffic be-
tween A and Isim〈·〉 and let xˆ = (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn) be the corresponding guessed
input. Then the input extraction fails for a single round functionality if xi 6= xˆi
or yi = fi(xˆ) for uncorrupted participants Pi. For a multi-round functionality,
Extr(·) must produce guesses for each round and Extr(·) fails if it fails for any
round. A protocol π is (tre, tex, tcnt, ε)-extractable if the input extraction fails
with the probability at most ε. The following theorem describes when a protocol
with honest minority is universally composable.
Theorem 3. There exists a constant c > 0 such that a (tre, tex, tcnt, ε)-extractable
protocol π with public inputs is (tre, c · tre, tcnt, ε)-universally composable.
Proof sketch. Clearly, the simulating interface Isim〈·〉 together with extraction
function Extr(·) is the necessary interface I〈·〉. The claim follows, as the outputs
of π and π◦ differ only if the extraction fails.
Further comments. There is a strange duality between Theorem 1 and 3.
Namely, the proofs of these theorems handle the information flow between a
protocol π and side-computations σ in a similar fashion. In the proof of The-
orem 1, we corrupt all non-participants of the protocol π and thus manage to
reduce the security to the stand-alone setting. More precisely, we first learn
the inputs of non-participants to incorporate the process σ into the ideal world
adversary and finally replace the outputs of non-participants to assure the cor-
respondence between the real and the ideal world. In the proof of Theorem 3,
we do exactly the opposite. That is, we first learn inputs of honest participants
to simulate π in the ideal world, and then use the input extraction to assure
correspondence between the real and the ideal world. The resulting security
guarantees are stronger only because Extr(·) is a non-rewinding algorithm.
Message authentication. Message authentication protocols form the most
prominent class of protocols with public inputs. Recall that the main aim of
these protocols is to transfer inputs between the nodes P1, . . . ,Pn by sending
messages through a malicious courier node Pnw. Consequently, the input extrac-
tion itself is trivial, we just have to follow the protocol instructions. Moreover,
the input extraction fails only if the adversary succeeds in deception. As a result,
7To be precise, this claim does not hold for exotic computational models, where missing real
world messages alter the message order in the ideal world.
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most of the authentication protocols are automatically universally composable,
as soon as they satisfy classical security requirements. As an example, consider
unilateral and cross-authentication protocols between honest P1 and P2. Let x1
and x2 be the corresponding inputs, then both participants should learn x1 in
the unilateral and (x1, x2) in the cross-authentication protocol. Commonly, the
security of a protocol is defined through a game in the asynchronous model of
computation, where the adversary provides inputs to both parties and succeeds
in deception if the outputs differ from ideal implementation. For unilateral au-
thentication protocols, the adversary succeeds if P2 reaches accepting state and
outputs xˆ1 6= x1. For cross-authentication protocols, the adversary succeeds if
either P1 or P2 reaches accepting state and outputs (xˆ1, xˆ2) 6= (x1, x2).
Any computational context ̺〈·〉 together with an adversary A gives a rise to
a new compound adversary A∗ that plays the original security game. Moreover,
the extraction function indeed fails only if the compound adversary A∗ succeeds
in deception. Hence, classical message authentication protocols are automati-
cally universally composable. The result holds even if we allow the adversary
to corrupt participants, but then we have to redefine what a deception failure
means. Analogous results hold also for group authentication protocols.
Note that authentication protocols also have a trusted setup phase, where the
secret keys are created and transferred to all participants. Thus, a parallel ex-
ecution of several message authentication protocols that share the same setup
phase may be completely insecure. One possible solution is to use bootstrap-
ping. For example, it is straightforward to use pseudorandom functions to gen-
erate many computationally independent session keys from a single master key.
Secondly, we can study the extractability of a compound protocol ̺ts〈π1, . . . , πs〉
with shared setup π◦ts directly. This approach is commonly known as a Bellare-
Rogaway model for message authentication, see [BR93a, BR95]. In the corre-
sponding model, deception is again defined so that adversary succeeds in decep-
tion if the corresponding input extraction procedure fails. As a result, a concur-
rent composition of authentication protocols is universally composable as soon
as it is secure in the Bellare-Rogaway model.
In recent years, cryptographers have also investigated manual authentication
protocols [Vau05, PV06a, PV06b, LN06, LP08]. These protocols do not have
a complex trusted setup phase. All of them can be implemented either in the
standard or in the common reference string model. The authenticity of mes-
sages is achieved by sending short authenticated strings. As a result, one can
easily show that a concurrent execution of these protocols is still universally
composable even if they share the setup phase. However, the latter is still in-
sufficient for security, since short authenticated strings are sent without tags that
identify the corresponding protocol instances. Consequently, we must addition-
ally assure that the adversary cannot switch short authenticated strings between
the protocols, otherwise the corresponding synchronisation errors may invalidate
the composability guarantees. Thus, we must either use further analysis to de-
termine the maximal achievable damage caused by clever message switching as
in [Vau05, PV06a, PV06b], or alternatively add further usage restrictions that
eliminate the possibility of such attacks as in [LN06, LP08].
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